phenomenon (BT)

However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word, its very indefiniteness is itself a positive PHENOMENON which needs to be clarified. An investigation of the meaning of Being cannot be expected to give this clarification at the outset. If we are to obtain the clue we need for Interpreting this average understanding of Being, we must first develop the concept of Being. In the light of this concept and the ways in which it may be explicitly understood, we can make out what this obscured or still unillumined understanding of Being means, and what kinds of obscuration – or hindrance to an explicit illumination – of the meaning of Being are possible and even inevitable. [SZ:6] BTMR §2 In contrast to all this, our treatment of the question of the meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the PHENOMENON of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case. BTMR §5 In line with the positive tendencies of this destruction, we must in the first instance raise the question whether and to what extent the Interpretation of Being and the PHENOMENON of time have been brought together thematically in the course of the history of ontology, and whether the problematic of Temporality required for this has ever been worked out in principle or ever could have been. The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant. Only when we have established the problematic of Temporality, can we succeed in casting light on the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism. But this will also show us why this area is one which had to remain closed off to him in its real dimensions and its central ontological function. Kant himself was aware that he was venturing into an area of obscurity: ‘This schematism of our understanding as regards appearances and their mere form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul, the true devices of which are hardly ever to be divined from Nature and laid uncovered before our eyes.’ Here Kant shrinks back, as it were, in the face of something which must be brought to light as a theme and a principle if the expression “Being” is to have any demonstrable meaning. In the end, those very phenomena which will be exhibited under the heading of ‘Temporality’, in our analysis, are precisely those most covert judgments of the ‘common reason’ for which Kant says it is the ‘business of philosophers’ to provide an analytic. BTMR §6 In pursuing this task of destruction with the problematic of Temporality as our clue, we shall try to Interpret the chapter on the schematism and the Kantian doctrine of time, taking that chapter as our point of departure. At the same time we shall show why Kant could never achieve an insight into the problematic of Temporality. There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject. Instead of this, Kant took over Descartes’ position quite dogmatically, notwithstanding all the essential respects in which he had gone beyond him. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that he was bringing the PHENOMENON of time back into the subject again, his analysis of it remained oriented towards the traditional way in which time had been ordinarily understood; in the long run this kept him from working out the PHENOMENON of a ‘transcendental determination of time’ in its own structure and function. Because of this double effect of tradition the decisive connection ‘between time and the ‘I think’ was shrouded in utter darkness; it did not even become a problem. [SZ:24] BTMR §6 Aristotle’s essay on time is the first detailed Interpretation of this PHENOMENON which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time, including Bergson’s, has been essentially determined by it. When we analyse the Aristotelian conception, it will likewise become clear, as we go back, that the Kantian account of time operates within the structures which Aristotle has set forth; this means that Kant’s basic ontological orientation remains that of the Greeks, in spite of all the distinctions which arise in a new inquiry. BTMR §6 This expression has two components: “PHENOMENON” and “logos”. Both of these go back to terms from the Greek: phainomenon and logos. Taken superficially, the term “phenomenology” is formed like “theology”, “biology”, “sociology” – names which may be translated as “science of God”, “science of life”, “science of society”. This would make phenomenology the science of phenomena. We shall set forth the preliminary conception of phenomenology by characterizing what one has in mind in the term’s two components, ‘PHENOMENON’ and ‘logos’, and by establishing the meaning of the name in which these are put together. The history of the word itself, which presumably arose in the Wolffian school, is here of no significance. BTMR §7 The Greek expression phainomenon, to which the term ‘PHENOMENON’ goes back, is derived from the verb phainesthai, which signifies “to show itself “. Thus phainomenon means that which shows itself, the manifest [das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare]. phainesthai itself is a middle-voiced form which comes from phaino – to bring to the light of day, to put in the light. phaino comes from the stem pha – , like phos, the light, that which is bright – in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus we must keep in mind that the expression ‘PHENOMENON’ signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the phainomena or ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light – what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with ta onta (entities). Now an entity can show itself from itself [von ihm selbst her] in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not. When it shows itself in this way, it ‘looks like something or other’ [“sieht” ... “so aus wie ...”]. This kind of showing-itself is what we call “seeming” [Scheinen]. Thus in Greek too the expression phainomenon (“PHENOMENON”) signifies that which looks like something, that which is ‘semblant’, ‘semblance’ [das “Scheinbare”, der “Schein”]. phainomenon agathon means something good which looks like, but ‘in actuality’ is not, what it gives itself out to be. If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of PHENOMENON, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification of phainomenon (‘PHENOMENON’ as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second (‘PHENOMENON’ as semblance) are structurally interconnected. Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself – that is, of being a PHENOMENON – can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it ‘merely look like so-and-so’. When phainomenon signifies ‘semblance’, the primordial signification (the PHENOMENON as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded. We shall allot the term ‘PHENOMENON’ to this positive and primordial signification of phainomenon, and distinguish “PHENOMENON” from “semblance”, which is the privative modification of “PHENOMENON” as thus defined. But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all to do with what iscalled an ‘appearance’, or still less a ‘mere appearance’. BTMR §7 In spite of the fact that ‘appearing’ is never a showing-itself in the sense of “PHENOMENON”, appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself of something. But this showing-itself, which helps to make possible the appearing, is not the appearing itself. Appearing is an announcing-itself [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself. If one then says that with the word ‘appearance’ we allude to something wherein something appears without being itself an appearance, one has not thereby defined the concept of PHENOMENON: one has rather presupposed it. This presupposition, however, remains concealed; for when one says this sort of thing about ‘appearance’, the expression ‘appear’ gets used in two ways. “That wherein something ‘appears’” means that wherein something announces itself, and therefore does not show itself; and in the words [Rede] ‘without being itself an “appearance”’, “appearance” signifies the showing-itself. But this showing-itself belongs essentially to the ‘wherein’ in which something announces itself. According to this, phenomena are never appearances, though on the other hand every appearance is dependent on phenomena. If one defines “PHENOMENON” with the aid of a conception of ‘appearance’ which is still unclear, then everything is stood on its head, and a ‘critique’ of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable undertaking. [SZ:30] BTMR §7 So again the expression ‘appearance’ itself can have a double signification: first, appearing, in the sense of announcing-itself, as not-showingitself; and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst] – that which in its showing-itself indicates something which does not show itself. And finally one can use “appearing” as a term for the genuine sense of “PHENOMENON” as showing-itself. If one designates these three different things as ‘appearance’, bewilderment is unavoidable. BTMR §7 But this bewilderment is essentially increased by the fact that ‘appearance’ can take on still another signification. That which does the announcing-that which, in its showing-itself, indicates something non-manifest – may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates [ausstrahlt] from it in such a way indeed that the nonmanifest gets thought of as something that is essentially never manifest. When that which does the announcing is taken this way, “appearance” is tantamount to a “bringing forth” or “something brought forth”, but something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth: here we have an appearance in the sense of ‘mere appearance’. That which does the announcing and is brought forth does, of course, show itself, and in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself. On the other hand, this notshowing which veils is not a semblance. Kant uses the term “appearance” in this twofold way. According to him “appearances” are, in the first place, the ‘objects of empirical intuition’: they are what shows itself in such intuition. But what thus shows itself (the “PHENOMENON” in the genuine primordial sense) is at the same time an ‘appearance’ as an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance – an emanation which announces. BTMR §7 In so far as a PHENOMENON is constitutive for ‘appearance’ in the signification of announcing itself through something which shows itself, though such a PHENOMENON can privatively take the variant form of semblance, appearance too can become mere semblance. In a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his checks were flushed with red; and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-presentat-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism. [SZ:31] BTMR §7 ”PHENOMENON”, the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. “Appearance”, on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a ‘PHENOMENON’. Both appearance and semblance are founded upon the PHENOMENON, though in different ways. The bewildering multiplicity of ‘phenomena’ designated by the words “PHENOMENON”, “semblance”, “appearance”, “mere appearance”, cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the PHENOMENON is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself. BTMR §7 If in taking the concept of “PHENOMENON” this way, we leave indefinite which entities we consider as “phenomena”, and leave it open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic which an entity may have in its Being, then we have merely arrived at the formal conception of “PHENOMENON”. If by “that which shows itself” we understand those entities which are accessible through the empirical “intuition” in, let us say, Kant’s sense, then the formal conception of “PHENOMENON” will indeed be legitimately employed. In this usage “PHENOMENON” has the signification of the ordinary conception of PHENOMENON. But this ordinary conception is not the phenomenological conception. If we keep within the horizon of the Kantian problematic, we can give an illustration of what is conceived phenomenologically as a “PHENOMENON”, with reservations as to other differences; for we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the “PHENOMENON” as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the ‘forms of the intuition’) will be the “phenomena” of phenomenology. For manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way – they must be able to become phenomena – if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when he says that space is the a priori “inside-which” of an ordering. BTMR §7 If, however, the phenomenological conception of PHENOMENON is to be understood at all, regardless of how much closer we may come to determining the nature of that which shows itself, this presupposes inevitably that we must have an insight into the meaning of the formal conception of PHENOMENON and its legitimate employment in an ordinary signification. – But before setting up our preliminary conception of phenomenology, we must also define the signification of logos so as to make clear in what sense phenomenology can be a ‘science of’ phenomena at all. BTMR §7 When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. The ‘truth of judgments’, however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary PHENOMENON of truth, with more than one kind of foundation. Both realism and idealism have – with equal thoroughness – missed the meaning of the Greek conception of truth, in terms of which only the [SZ:34] possibility of something like a ‘doctrine of ideas’ can be understood as philosophical knowledge. BTMR §7 When we envisage concretely what we have set forth in our Interpretation’ of ‘PHENOMENON’ and ‘logos’, we are struck by an inner relationship between the things meant by these terms. The expression “phenomenology” may be formulated in Greek as legein ta phainomena, where legein means apophainesthai. Thus “phenomenology” means apophainesthai ta phainomena – to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself “phenomenology”. But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above: ‘To the things themselves!’ BTMR §7 Thus the term “phenomenology” is quite different in its meaning from expressions such as “theology” and the like. Those terms designate the objects of their respective sciences according to the subject-matter which they comprise at the time [in ihrer jeweiligen Sachhaltigkeit]. ‘Phenomenology’ neither designates the object of its researches, nor characterizes the subject-matter thus comprised. The word merely informs us of the “how” with which what is to be treated in this science gets exhibited and handled. To have a science ‘of’ phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly. The expression ‘descriptive phenomenology’, which is at bottom tautological, has the same meaning. Here “description” does not signify such a procedure as we find, let us say, in botanical morphology; the term has rather the sense of a prohibition – the avoidance of characterizing anything without such demonstration.” The character of this description itself, the specific meaning of the logos, can be established first of all in terms of the ‘thinghood’ [“Sachheit”] of what is to be ‘described’ – that is to say, of what is to be given scientific definiteness as we encounter it phenomenally. The signification of “PHENOMENON”, as conceived both formally and in the ordinary manner, is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called “phenomenology” with formal justification. [SZ:35] BTMR §7 Now what must be taken into account if the formal conception of PHENOMENON is to be deformalized into the phenomenological one, and how is this latter to be distinguished from the ordinary conception? What is it that phenomenology is to ‘let us see’? What is it that must be called a ‘PHENOMENON’ in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. BTMR §7 Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only ‘in disguise’, is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as our previous observations have shown. This Being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning. Thus that which demands that ‘it become a PHENOMENON, and which demands this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object. BTMR §7 Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of “PHENOMENON” what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. And this showing-itself is not just any showing-itself, nor is it some such thing as appearing. Least of all can the Being of entities ever be anything such that ‘behind it’ stands something else ‘which does not appear’. [SZ:36] BTMR §7 ‘Behind’ the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else; on the other hand, what is to become a PHENOMENON can be hidden. And just because the phenomena are proximally and for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology. Covered-up-ness is the counterconcept to ‘PHENOMENON’. BTMR §7 There are various ways in which phenomena can be covered up. In the first place, a PHENOMENON can be covered up in the sense that it is still quite undiscovered. It is neither known nor unknown. Moreover, a PHENOMENON can be buried over [verschüttet]. This means that it has at some time been discovered but has deteriorated [verfiel] to the point of getting covered up again. This covering-up can become complete; or rather – and as a rule – what has been discovered earlier may still be visible, though only as a semblance. Yet so much semblance, so much ‘Being’. This covering-up as a ‘disguising’ is both the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading arc especially stubborn. Within a ‘system’, perhaps, those structures of Being – and their concepts – which are still available but veiled in their indigenous character, may claim their rights. For when they have been bound together constructively in a system, they present themselves as something ‘clear’, requiring no further justification, and thus can serve as the point of departure for a process of deduction. BTMR §7 The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode of PHENOMENON is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology. Thus the very point of departure [Ausgang] for our analysis requires that it be secured by the proper method, just as much as does our access [Zugang] to the PHENOMENON, or our passage [Durchgang] through whatever is prevalently covering it up. The idea of grasping and explicating phenomena in a way which is ‘original’ and ‘intuitive’ [“originären” und “intuitiven”] is directly opposed to the na naïveté of a haphazard, ‘immediate’, and unreflective ‘beholding. [“Schauen”]. [SZ:37] BTMR §7 Now that we have delimited our preliminary conception of phenomenology, the terms ‘phenomenal’ and ‘phenomenological’ can also be fixed in their signification. That which is given and explicable in the way the PHENOMENON is encountered is called ‘phenomenal’; this is what we have in mind when we talk about “phenomenal structures”. Everything which belongs to the species of exhibiting and explicating and which goes to make up the way of conceiving demanded by this research, is called. ‘phenomenological’. BTMR §7 Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to make up Being, while Being is in every case the Being of ‘some entity, we must first bring forward the entities themselves if it is our aim that Being should be laid bare; and we must do this in the right way. These entities must likewise show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them. And in this way the ordinary conception of PHENOMENON becomes phenomenologically relevant. If our analysis is to be authentic, its aim is such that the prior task of assuring ourselves ‘phenomenologically’ of that entity which is to serve as our example, has already been prescribed as our point of departure. BTMR §7 The compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary PHENOMENON. This primary datum must be seen as a whole. But while Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive items in its structure. Indeed the phenomenal datum which our expression indicates is one which may, in fact, be looked at in three ways. If we study it, keeping the whole PHENOMENON firmly in mind beforehand, the following items may be brought out for emphasis: BTMR §12 Third, Being-in [In-sein] as such. We must set forth the ontological Constitution of inhood [Inheit] itself. (See the fifth chapter of this Division.) Emphasis upon any one of these constitutive items signifies that the others are emphasized along with it; this means that in any such case the whole PHENOMENON gets seen. Of course Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein’s Being. Before making these three phenomena the themes for special analyses, we shall attempt by way of orientation to characterize the third of these factors. BTMR §12 But have we not confined ourselves to negative assertions in all our attempts to determine the nature of this state of Being? Though this Being-in is supposedly so fundamental, we always keep hearing about what it is not. Yes indeed. But there is nothing accidental about our characterizing it predominantly in so negative a manner. In doing so we have rather made known what is peculiar to this PHENOMENON, and our characterization is therefore positive in a genuine sense – a sense appropriate to the PHENOMENON itself. When Being-in-the-world is exhibited phenomenologically, disguises and concealments are rejected because this PHENOMENON itself always gets ‘seen’ in a certain way in every Dasein. And it thus gets ‘seen’ because it makes up a basic state of Dasein, and in every case is already disclosed for Dasein’s understanding of Being, and disclosed along with that Being itself. But for the most part this PHENOMENON has been explained in a way which is basically wrong, or interpreted in an ontologically inadequate manner. On the other hand, this ‘seeing in a certain way and yet for the most part wrongly explaining’ is itself based upon nothing else than this very state of Dasein’s Being, which is such that Dasein itself – and this means also its Being-in-the-world – gets its ontological understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities which it itself is not but which it encounters ‘within’ its world, and from the Being which they possess. BTMR §12 Thus the PHENOMENON of Being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single exemplar – knowing the world. This has not only been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has been understood as behaviour which is ‘non-theoretical’ and ‘atheoretical’. Because knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its ownmost kind of Being gets led astray, and accordingly Being-in-the-world must be exhibited even more precisely with regard to knowing the world, and must itself be made visible as an existential ‘modality’ of Being-in. BTMR §12 If Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein, and one in which Dasein operates not only in general but pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness, then it must also be something which has always been experienced ontically. It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world to remain totally veiled from view, especially since Dasein has at its disposal an understanding of its own Being, no matter how indefinitely this understanding may function. But no sooner was the ‘PHENOMENON of knowing the world’ grasped than it got interpreted in a ‘superficial’, [SZ:60] formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of setting up knowing as a ‘relation between subject and Object’ – a procedure in which there lurks as much ‘truth’ as vacuity. But subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world. BTMR §13 With this kind of approach one remains blind to what is already tacitly implied even when one takes the PHENOMENON of knowing as one’s theme in the most provisional manner: namely, that knowing is a mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically upon this state of Being. But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an Interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is nullified; for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already ‘alongside’ its world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of the subject? In this question the constructivist ‘standpoint’, which has not been phenomenally demonstrated, again comes to the fore; but quite apart from this, what higher court is to decide whether and in what sense there is to be any problem of knowledge other than that of the PHENOMENON of knowing as such and the kind of Being which belongs to the knower? BTMR §13 Being-in-the-world shall first be made visible with regard to that item of its structure which is the ‘world’ itself. To accomplish this task seems easy and so trivial as to make one keep taking for granted that it may be dispensed with. What can be meant by describing ‘the world’ as a PHENOMENON? It means to let us see what shows itself in ‘entities’ within the world. Here the first step is to enumerate the things that are ‘in’ the world: houses, trees, people, mountains, stars. We can depict the way such entities ‘look’, and we can give an account of occurrences in them and with them. This, however, is obviously a pre-phenomenological ‘business’ which cannot be at all relevant phenomenologically. Such a description is always confined to entities. It is ontical. But what we are seeking is Being. And we have formally defined ‘PHENOMENON’ in the phenomenological sense as that which shows itself as Being and as a structure of Being. BTMR §14 But is this a way of asking ontologically about the ‘world’? The problematic which we have thus marked out is one which is undoubtedly ontological. But even if this ontology should itself succeed in explicating the Being of Nature in the very purest manner, in conformity with the basic assertions about this entity, which the mathematical natural sciences provide, it will never reach the PHENOMENON that is the ‘world’. Nature is itself an entity which is encountered within the world and which can be discovered in various ways and at various stages. BTMR §14 Neither the ontical depiction of entities within-the-world nor the ontological Interpretation of their Being is such as to reach the PHENOMENON of the ‘world.’ In both of these ways of access to ‘Objective Being’, the ‘world’ has already been ‘presupposed’, and indeed in various ways. BTMR §14 Is it possible that ultimately we cannot address ourselves to ‘the world’ as determining the nature of the entity we have mentioned? Yet we call this entity one which is “within-the-world”. Is ‘world’ perhaps a characteristic of Dasein’s Being? And in that case, does every Dasein ‘proximally’ have its world? Does not ‘world’ thus become something ‘subjective? How, then, can there be a ‘common’ world ‘in’ which, nevertheless, we are? And if we raise the question of the ‘world’, what world do we have in view? Neither the common world nor the subjective world, but the worldhood of the world as such. By what avenue do we meet this PHENOMENON? BTMR §14 ‘Worldhood’ is an ontological concept, and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world. But we know Being-in-the-world as a way in which Dasein’s character is defined existentially. Thus worldhood itself is an existentiale. If we inquire ontologically about the ‘world’, we by no means abandon the analytic of Dasein as a field for thematic study. Ontologically, ‘world’ is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself. This does not rule out the possibility that when we investigate the PHENOMENON of the ‘world’ we must do so by the avenue of entities within-the-world and the Being which they possess. The task of ‘describing’ the world phenomenologically is so far from obvious that even if we do no more than determine adequately what form it shall take, essential ontological clarifications will be needed. BTMR §14 A glance at previous ontology shows that if one fails to see Being-in-the-world as a state of Dasein, the PHENOMENON of worldhood likewise gets passed over. One tries instead to Interpret the world in terms of the Being of those entities which are present-at-hand within-the-world but which are by no means proximally discovered – namely, in terms of Nature. If one understands Nature ontologico-categorially, one finds that Nature is a limiting case of the Being of possible entities within-the-world. Only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-the-world can Dasein discover entities as Nature. This manner of knowing them has the character of depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way. ‘Nature’, as the categorial aggregate of those structures of Being which a definite entity encountered within-the-world may possess, can never make worldhood intelligible. But even the PHENOMENON of ‘Nature’, as it is conceived, for instance, in romanticism, can be grasped ontologically only in terms of the concept of the world – that is to say, in terms of the analytic of Dasein. BTMR §14 When it comes to the problem of analysing the world’s worldhood ontologically, traditional ontology operates in a blind alley, if, indeed, it sees this problem at all. On the other hand, if we are to Interpret the worldhood of Dasein and the possible ways in which Dasein is made worldly [Verweltlichung], we must show why the kind of Being with which Dasein knows the world is such that it passes over the PHENOMENON of worldhood both ontically and ontologically. But at the same time the very Fact of this passing-over suggests that we must take special precautions to get the right phenomenal point of departure [Ausgang] for access [Zugang] to the PHENOMENON of worldhood, so that it will not get passed over. [SZ:66] BTMR §14 In the disclosure and explication of Being, entities are in every case our preliminary and our accompanying theme [das Vor-und Mitthematische]; but our real theme is Being. In the domain of the present analysis, the entities we shall take as our preliminary theme are those which show themselves in our concern with the environment. Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing the ‘world’ theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets produced, and so forth. As entities so encountered, they become the preliminary theme for the purview of a ‘knowing’ which, as phenomenological, looks primarily towards Being, and which, in thus taking Being as its theme, takes these entities as its accompanying theme. This phenomenological interpretation is accordingly not a way of knowing those characteristics of entities which themselves are [seiender Beschaffenheiten des Seienden]; it is rather a determination of the structure of the Being which entities possess. But as an investigation of Being, it brings to completion, autonomously and explicitly, that understanding of Being which belongs already to Dasein and which ‘comes alive’ in any of its dealings with entities. Those entities which serve phenomenologically as our preliminary theme – in this case, those which are used or which are to be found in the course of production – become accessible when we put ourselves into the position of concerning ourselves with them in some such way. Taken strictly, this talk about “putting ourselves into such a position” [Sichversetzen] is misleading; for the kind of Being which belongs to such concernful dealings is not one into which we need to put ourselves first. This is the way in which everyday Dasein always is: when I open the door, for instance, I use the latch. The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies, which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along with us, and which conceal not only the PHENOMENON of such ‘concern’, but even more those entities themselves as encountered of their own accord in our concern with them. These entangling errors become plain if in the course of our investigation we now ask which entities shall be taken as our preliminary theme and established as the pre-phenomenal basis for our study. BTMR §15 In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something. Only in the analyses which are to follow can the PHENOMENON which this term ‘assignment’ indicates be made visible in its ontological genesis. Provisionally, it is enough to take a look phenomenally at a manifold of such assignments. Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of [aus] its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These ‘Things’ never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’ in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the ‘arrangement’ emerges, and it is in this that any ‘individual’ item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered. [SZ:69] BTMR §15 But even if, as our ontological Interpretation proceeds further, readiness-to-hand should prove itself to be the kind of Being characteristic of those entities which are proximally discovered within-the-world, and even if its primordiality as compared with pure presence-at-hand can be demonstrated, have all these explications been of the slightest help towards understanding the PHENOMENON of the world ontologically? In Interpreting these entities within-the-world, however, we have always [SZ:72] BTMR §15 ‘presupposed’ the world. Even if we join them together, we still do not get anything like the ‘world’ as their sum. If, then, we start with the Being of these entities, is there any avenue that will lead us to exhibiting the PHENOMENON of the world? BTMR §15 The world itself is not an entity within-the-world; and yet it is so determinative for such entities that only in so far as ‘there is’ a world can they be encountered and show themselves, in their Being, as entities which have been discovered. But in what way ‘is there’ a world? If Dasein is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-World, and if an understanding of the Being of its Self belongs just as essentially to its Being, no matter how indefinite that understanding may be, then does not Dasein have an understanding of the world – a pre-ontological understanding, which indeed can and does get along without explicit ontological insights? With those entities which are encountered within-the-world – that is to say, with their character as within-the-world – does not something like the world show itself for concernful Being-in-the-world? Do we not have a pre-phenomenological glimpse of this PHENOMENON? Do we not always have such a glimpse of it, without having to take it as a theme for ontological Interpretation? Has Dasein itself, in the range of its concernful absorption in equipment ready-to-hand, a possibility of Being in which the worldhood of those entities within-the-world with which it is concerned is, in a certain way, lit up for it, along with those entities themselves? BTMR §16 If such possibilities of Being for Dasein can be exhibited within its concernful dealings, then the way lies open for studying the PHENOMENON which is thus lit up, and for attempting to ‘hold it at bay’, as it were, and to interrogate it as to those structures which show themselves therein. BTMR §16 Now that we have suggested, however, that the ready-to-hand is thus encountered under modifications in which its presence-at-hand is revealed, how far does this clarify the PHENOMENON of the world? Even in analysing these modifications we have not gone beyond the Being of what is within-the-world, and we have come no closer to the world-phenomenon than before. But though we have not as yet grasped it, we have brought ourselves to a point where we can bring it into view. BTMR §16 In such privative expressions as “inconspicuousness”, “unobtrusiveness”, and “non-obstinacy”, what we have in view is a positive phenomenal character of the Being of that which is proximally ready-to-hand. With these’ negative prefixes we have in view the character of the ready-to-hand as “holding itself in”; this is what we have our eye upon in the “Being-in-itself” of something, though ‘proximally’ we ascribe it to the present-at-hand – to the present-at-hand as that which can be thematically ascertained. As long as we take our orientation primarily and exclusively from the present-at-hand, the ‘in-itself’ can by no means be ontologically clarified. If, however, this talk about the ‘in-itself’ has any ontological importance, some interpretation must be called for. This “in-itself” of Being is something which gets invoked with considerable emphasis, mostly in an ontical way, and rightly so from a phenomenal standpoint. But if some ontological assertion is supposed to be given when this is ontically invoked, its claims are not fulfilled by such a procedure. As the foregoing analysis has already made clear, only on the basis of the PHENOMENON of the world can the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world be grasped ontologically. [SZ:76] BTMR §16 These questions are aimed at working out both the PHENOMENON and the problems of worldhood, and they call for an inquiry into the interconnections with which certain structures are built up. To answer them we must analyse these structures more concretely. BTMR §16 In our provisional Interpretation of that structure of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand (to ‘equipment’), the PHENOMENON of reference or assignment became visible; but we merely gave an indication of it, and in so sketchy a form that we at once stressed the necessity of uncovering it with regard to its ontological origin. It became plain, moreover, that assignments and referential totalities could in some sense become constitutive for worldhood itself. Hitherto we have seen the world lit up only in and for certain definite ways in which we concern ourselves environmentally with the ready-to-hand, and indeed it has been lit up only with the readiness-to-hand of that concern. So the further we proceed in understanding the Being of entities within-the-world, the broader and firmer becomes the phenomenal basis on which the world-phenomenon may be laid bare. [SZ:77] BTMR §17 We shall again take as our point of departure the Being of the ready-to-hand, but this time with the purpose of grasping the PHENOMENON of reference or assignment itself more precisely. We shall accordingly attempt an ontological analysis of a kind of equipment in which one may come across such ‘references’ in more senses than one. We come across ‘equipment’ in signs. The word “sign” designates many kinds of things: not only may it stand for different kinds of signs, but Being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a universal kind of relation, so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological clue for ‘characterizing’ any entity whatsoever. BTMR §17 If the present analysis is to be confined to the interpretation of the sign as distinct from the PHENOMENON of reference, then even within this limitation we cannot properly investigate the full multiplicity of possible signs. Among signs there are symptoms [Anzeichen], warning signals, signs of things that have happened already [Rückzeichen], signs to mark something, signs by which things are recognized; these have different ways of indicating, regardless of what may be serving as such a sign. From such ‘signs’ we must distinguish traces, residues, commemorative monuments, documents, testimony, symbols, expressions, appearances, significations. These phenomena can easily be formalized because of their formal relational character; we find it especially tempting nowadays to take such a ‘relation’ as a clue for subjecting every entity to a kind of ‘Interpretation’ which always ‘fits’ because at bottom it says nothing, no more than the facile schema of content and form. [SZ:78] BTMR §17 One might be tempted to cite the abundant use of ‘signs’ in primitive Dasein, as in fetishism and magic, to illustrate the remarkable role which they play in everyday concern when it comes to our understanding of the world. Certainly the establishment of signs which underlies this way of using them is not performed with any theoretical aim or in the course of theoretical speculation. This way of using them always remains completely within a Being-in-the-world which is ‘immediate’. But on closer inspection it becomes plain that to interpret fetishism and magic by taking our clue from the idea of signs in general, is not enough to enable us to grasp the kind of ‘Being-ready-to-hand’ which belongs to entities encountered in the primitive world. With regard to the signphenomenon, the following Interpretation may be given: for primitive man, the sign coincides with that which is indicated. Not only can the sign represent this in the sense of serving as a substitute for what it indicates, but it can do so in such a way that the sign itself always is what it indicates. This remarkable coinciding does not mean, however, that the sign-Thing has already undergone a certain ‘Objectification’ – that it has been experienced as a mere Thing and misplaced into the same realm of Being of the present-at-hand as what it indicates. This ‘coinciding’ is not an identification of things which have hitherto been isolated from each other: it consists rather in the fact that the sign has not as yet become free from that of which it is a sign. Such a use of signs is still absorbed completely in Being-towards what is indicated, so that a sign as such cannot detach itself at all. This coinciding is based not on a prior Objectification but on the fact that such Objectification is completely lacking. This means, however, that signs are not discovered as equipment at all – that ultimately what is ‘ready-to-hand’ within-the-world just does not have the kind of Being that belongs to equipment. Perhaps even readiness-to-hand and equipment have nothing to contribute [nichts auszurichten] as ontological clues in Interpreting the primitive world; and certainly the ontology of Thinghood does even less. But if an understanding of Being is constitutive for primitive Dasein and for the primitive world in general, then it is all the more urgent to work out the ‘formal’ idea of worldhood – or at least the idea of a PHENOMENON modifiable in such a way that all ontological assertions to the effect that in a given phenomenal context something is not yet such-and-such or no longer such-and-such, may acquire a positive phenomenal meaning in terms of what it is not. BTMR §17 [SZ:84] When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its “involvement”. With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically definitive for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it. That in which it is involved is the “towards-which” of serviceability, and the “for-which” of usability. With the “towards-which” of serviceability there can again be an involvement: with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a “hammer”, there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection ‘is’ for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein – that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s Being. Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, what involvement this is, has in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the totality of such involvements. In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is ‘earlier’ than any single item of equipment; so too for the farmstead with all its utensils and outlying lands. But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a “towards-which” in which there is no further involvement: this “towards-which” is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary “towards-which” is not just another “towards-this” as something in which an involvement is possible. The primary ‘towards-which’ is a “for-the-sake-of-which”. But the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure of an involvement leads to Dasein’s very Being as the sole authentic “for-the-sake-of-which”; for the present, however, we shall pursue this no further. ‘Letting something be involved’ must first be clarified enough to give the PHENOMENON of worldhood the kind of definiteness which makes it possible to formulate any problems about it. BTMR §18 Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as letting something be involved, and such things as the “with-which” and the “in-which” of involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it, such as the “towards-this” as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the “for-the-sake-of-which” to which every “towards-which” ultimately goes back – all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility [Verständlichkeit]. And what is that wherein Dasein as Being-in-the-world understands itself pre-ontologically? In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an “in-order-to” [Um-zu], and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is – one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be either authentic or inauthentic. This “in-order-to” prescribes a “towards-this” as a possible “in-which” for letting something be involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this is an involvement which something has – an involvement which is with something. Dasein always assigns itself from a “for-the-sake-of-which” to the “with-which” of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand. That wherein [Worin] Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin] it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the PHENOMENON of the world. And the structure of that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world. BTMR §18 Only step by step can the concept of worldhood and the structures which this PHENOMENON embraces be firmly secured in the course of our investigation. The Interpretation of the world begins, in the first instance, with some entity within-the-world, so that the PHENOMENON of the world in general no longer comes into view; we shall accordingly try to clarify this approach ontologically by considering what is perhaps the most extreme form in which it has been carried out. We not only shall present briefly the basic features of Descartes’ ontology of the ‘world’, but shall inquire into its presuppositions and try to characterize these in the light of what we have hitherto achieved. The account we shall give of these matters will enable us to know upon what basically undiscussed ontological ‘foundations’ those Interpretations of the world which have come after Descartes – and still more those which preceded him – have operated. [SZ:89] BTMR §18 The critical question now arises: does this ontology of the ‘world’ seek the PHENOMENON of the world at all, and if not, does it at least define some entity within-the-world fully enough so that the worldly character of this entity can be made visible in it? To both questions we must answer “No”. The entity which Descartes is trying to grasp ontologically and in principle with his “extensio”, is rather such as to become discoverable first of all by going through an entity within-the-world which is proximally ready-to-hand – Nature. Though this is the case, and though any ontological characterization of this latter entity within-the-world may lead us into obscurity, even if we consider both the idea of substantiality and the meaning of the “existit” and “ad existendum” which have been brought into the definition of that idea, it still remains possible that through an ontology based upon a radical separation of God, the “I”, and the ‘world’, the ontological problem of the world will in some sense get formulated and further advanced. If, however, this is not possible, we must then demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes’ conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him to pass over both the PHENOMENON of the world and the Being of those entities within-the-world which are proximally ready-to-hand. BTMR §21 In our exposition of the problem of worldhood (Section 14), we suggested the importance of obtaining proper access to this PHENOMENON. So in criticizing the Cartesian point of departure, we must ask which kind of Being that belongs to Dasein we should fix upon as giving us an appropriate way of access to those entities with whose Being as extensio Descartes equates the Being of the ‘world’. The only genuine access to them lies in knowing [ Erkennen), intellectio, in the sense of the kind of knowledge [ Erkenntnis] we get in mathematics and physics. Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense. Such entities are those which always are what they are. Accordingly, that which can be shown to have the character of something that constantly remains (as remanens capax mutationum), makes up the real Being of those entities of the world which get experienced. That which enduringly remains, really is. This is the sort of thing which mathematics knows. That which is accessible in an entity through mathematics, makes up its Being. Thus the Being of the ‘world’ is, as it were, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of Being which lies veiled in the concept of substantiality, [SZ:96] and in terms of the idea of a knowledge by which such entities are cognized. The kind of Being which belongs to entities within-the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but Descartes does not let them do so. Instead he prescribes for the world its ‘real’ Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own right – an idea in which Being is equated with constant presence-at-hand. Thus his ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather by his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge. is exceptionally well suited to grasp. In this way Descartes explicitly switches over philosophically from the development of traditional ontology to modern mathematical physics and its transcendental foundations. BTMR §21 But with these criticisms, have we not fobbed off on Descartes a task altogether beyond his horizon, and then gone on to ‘demonstrate’ that he has failed to solve it? If Descartes does not know the PHENOMENON of the world, and thus knows no such thing as within-the-world-ness, how can he identify the world itself with certain entities within-the-world and the Being which they possess? BTMR §21 In controversy over principles, one must not only attach oneself to theses which can be grasped doxographically; one must also derive one’s orientation from the objective tendency of the problematic, even if it does not go beyond a rather ordinary way of taking things. In his doctrine of the res cogitans and the res extensa, Descartes not only wants to formulate the problem of ‘the “I” and the world’; he claims to have solved it in a radical manner. His Meditations make this plain. (See especially Meditations I and VI.) By taking his basic ontological orientation from traditional sources and not subjecting it to positive criticism, he has made it impossible to lay bare any primordial ontological problematic of Dasein; this has inevitably obstructed his view of the PHENOMENON of the world, and has made it possible for the ontology of the ‘world’ to be compressed into that of certain entities within-the-world. The foregoing discussion should have proved this. BTMR §21 But quite apart from the specific problem of the world itself, can the Being of what we encounter proximally within-the-world be reached ontologically by this procedure? When we speak of material Thinghood, have we not tacitly posited a kind of Being – the constant presence-at hand of Things – which is so far from having been rounded out ontologically by subsequently endowing entities with value-predicates, that these value-characters themselves are rather just ontical characteristics of those entities which have the kind of Being possessed by Things? Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-at-hand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics which a Thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand. They would have their sole ultimate ontological source in our previously laying down the actuality of Things as the fundamental stratum. But even prephenomenological experience shows that in an entity which is supposedly a Thing, there is something that will not become fully intelligible through Thinghood alone. Thus the Being of Things has to be rounded out. What, then does the Being of values or their ‘validity’ [“Geltung”] (which Lotze took as a mode of ‘affirmation’) really amount to ontologically? And what does it signify ontologically for Things to be ‘invested’ with values in this way? As long as these matters remain obscure, to reconstruct the Thing of use in terms of the Thing of Nature is an ontologically questionable undertaking, even if one disregards the way in which the problematic has been perverted in principle. And if we are to reconstruct this Thing of use, which supposedly comes to us in the first instance ‘with its skin off’, does not this always require that we previously take a positive look at the PHENOMENON whose totality such a reconstruction is to restore? But if we have not given a proper explanation beforehand of its ownmost state of Being, are we not building our reconstruction without a plan? Inasmuch as this reconstruction and ‘rounding-out’ of the traditional ontology of the ‘world’ results in our reaching the same entities with which we started when we analysed the readiness-to-hand of equipment and the totality of [SZ:100] involvements, it seems as if the Being of these entities ‘has in fact been clarified or has at least become a problem. But by taking extensio as a proprietas, Descartes can hardly reach the Being of substance; and by taking refuge in ‘value’-characteristics (“wertlichen” Beschaffenheiten] we are just as far from even catching a glimpse of Being as readiness-to-hand, let alone permitting it to become an ontological theme.Descartes has narrowed down the question of the world to that of Things of Nature [Naturdinglichkeit] as those entities within-the-world’ which are proximally accessible. He has confirmed the opinion that to know an entity in what is supposedly the most rigorous ontical manner is our only possible access to the primary Being of the entity which such knowledge reveals. But at the same time we must have the insight to see that in principle the ‘roundings-out’ of the Thing-ontology also operate on the same dogmatic basis as that which Descartes has adopted.We have already intimated in Section 14 that passing over the world and those ‘entities which we proximally encounter is not accidental, not an oversight which it would be’ simple to correct, but that it is grounded in a kind of Being which belongs essentially to Dasein itself. When our analytic of Dasein has given some transparency to those main structures of Dasein which are of the most importance in the framework of this problematic, and when we have assigned [zugewiesen] to the concept of Being in general the horizon within which its intelligibility becomes possible, so that readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand also become primordially intelligible ontologically for the first time, only then can our critique of the Cartesian ontology of the world (an ontology which, in principle, is still the usual one today) come philosophically into its own.To do this, we must show several things. (See Part One, Division Three.) BTMR §21 If space is constitutive for the world in a sense which we have yet to determine, then it cannot surprise us that in our foregoing ontological characterization of the Being of what is within-the-world we have had to look upon this as something that is also within space. This spatiality of the ready-to-hand is something which we have not yet grasped explicitly as a PHENOMENON; nor have we pointed out how it is bound up with the structure of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand. This is now our task. BTMR §22 One must notice, however, that the directionality which belongs to de-severance is founded upon Being-in-the-world. Left and right are not something ‘subjective’ for which the subject has a feeling; they are directions of one’s directedness into a world that is ready-to-hand already. ‘By the mere feeling of a difference between my two sides’ I could never find my way about in a world. The subject with a ‘mere feeling’ of this difference is a construct posited in disregard of the state that is truly constitutive for any subject – namely, that whenever Dasein has such a ‘mere feeling’, it is in a world already and must be in it to be able to orient itself at This becomes plain from the example with which Kant tries to clarify the PHENOMENON of orientation. BTMR §23 De-severance and directionality, as constitutive characteristics of Being-in, are determinative for Dasein’s spatiality – for its being concernfully and circumspectively in space, in a space discovered and within-the-world. Only the explication we have just given for the spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world and the spatiality of Being-in-the-world, will. provide the prerequisites for working out the PHENOMENON of the world’s spatiality and formulating the ontological problem of space. BTMR §23 The space which is thus disclosed with the worldhood of the world still lacks the pure multiplicity of the three dimensions. In this disclosedness which is closest to us, space, as the pure “wherein” in which positions are ordered by measurement and the situations of things are determined, still remains hidden. In the PHENOMENON of ‘the region we have already indicated that on the basis of which space is discovered beforehand is Dasein. By a “region” we have understood the “whither” to which an equipment-context ready-to-hand might possibly belong, when that context is of such a sort that it can be encountered as directionally desevered – that is, as having been placed. This belongingness [Gehärigkcit] is determined in terms of the significance which is constitutive for the world, and it Articulates the “hither” and “thither” within the possible “whither”. In general the “whither” gets prescribed by a referential totality which has been made fast in a “for-the-sake-of-which” of concern, and within which letting something be involved by freeing it, assigns itself. With anything encountered as ready-to-hand there is always an involvement in [bei] a region. To the totality of involvements which makes up the Being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, there belongs a spatial involvement which has the character of a region. By reason of such an involvement, the ready-to-hand becomes something which we can come across and ascertain as having form and direction. With the factical Being of [SZ:111] Dasein, what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is desevered and given directionality, depending upon the degree of transparency that is possible for concernful circumspection. BTMR §24 In accordance with its Being-in-the-world, Dasein always has space presented as already discovered, though not thematically. On the other hand, space in itself, so far as it embraces the mere possibilities of the pure spatiail Being of something, remains proximally still concealed. The fact that space essentially shows itself in a world is not yet decisive for the kind of Being which it possesses. It need not have the kind of Being characteristic of something which is itself spatially ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Nor does the Being of space have the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein. Though the Being of space itself cannot be conceived as the kind of Being which belongs to a res extensa, it does not follow that it must be defined ontologically as a ‘PHENOMENON’ of such a res. (In its Being, it would not be distinguished from such a res.) Nor does it follow that the Being of space can be equated to that of the res cogilans and conceived as merely ‘subjective’, quite apart from the questionable character of the Being of such a subject. [SZ:113] BTMR §24 The Interpretation of the Being of space has hitherto been a matter of perplexity, not so much because we have been insufficiently acquainted with the’ content of space itself as a thing [des Sachgehaltes des Raumes selbst], as because the possibilities of Being in general have not been in principle transparent, and an Interpretation of them in terms of ontological concepts has been lacking. If we are to understand the ontological problem of space, it is of decisive importance that the question of Being must be liberated from the narrowness of those concepts of Being which merely chance to be available and which are for the most part rather rough; and the problematic of the Being of space (with regard to that PHENOMENON itself and various phenomenal spatialitics) must be turned in such a direction as to clarify the possibilities of Being in general. BTMR §24 In the PHENOMENON of space the primary ontological character of the Being of entities within-the-world is not to be found, either as unique or as one among others. Still less does space constitute the PHENOMENON of the world. Unless we go back to the world, space cannot be conceived. Space becomes accessible only if the environment is deprived of its worldhood; and spatiality is not discoverable at all except on the basis of the world. Indeed space is still one of the things that is constitutive for the world, just as Dasein’s own spatiality is essential to its basic state of Being-in-the-world. BTMR §24 Our analysis of the worldhood of the world has constantly been bringing the whole PHENOMENON of Being-in-the-world into view, although its constitutive items have not all stood out with the same phenomenal distinctness as the PHENOMENON of the world itself. We have Interpreted the world ontologically by going through what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; and this Interpretation has been put first, because Dasein, in its everydayness (with regard to which Dasein remains a constant theme for study), not only is in a world but comports itself towards that world with one predominant kind of Being. Proximally and for the most part Dasein is fascinated with its world. Dasein is thus absorbed in the world; the kind of Being which it thus possesses, and in general the Being-in which underlies it, are essential in determining the character of a PHENOMENON which we are now about to study. We shall approach this PHENOMENON by asking who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness. All the structures of Being which belong to Dasein, together with the PHENOMENON which provides the answer to this question of the “who”, are ways of its Being. To characterize these ontologically is to do so existentially. We must therefore pose the question correctly and outline the procedure for bringing into view a broader phenomenal domain of Dasein’s everydayness. By directing our researches, towards the PHENOMENON which is to provide us with an answer to the question of the “who”, we shall be led to certain structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: Being-with and Daseinwith [Mitsein und Mitdasein]. In this kind of Being is grounded the mode of everyday Being-one’s-Self [Selbstsein]; the explication of this mode will [SZ:114] enable us to see what we may call the ‘subject’ of everydayness – the “they”. Our chapter on the ‘who’ of the average Dasein will thus be divided up as follows: 1. an approach to the existential question of the “who” of Dasein (Section 25); 2. the Dasein-with of Others, and everyday Being-with (Section 26); 3. everyday Being-one’s-Self and the “they” (Section 27). BTMR §24 Just as the ontical obviousness of the Being-in-itself of entities within-the-world misleads us into the conviction that the meaning of this Being is obvious ontologically, and makes us overlook the PHENOMENON of the world, the ontical obviousness of the fact that Dasein is in each case mine, also hides the possibility that the ontological problematic which belongs to it has been led astray. Proximally the “who” of Dasein is not only a problem ontologically; even ontically it remains concealed. BTMR §25 [SZ:121] If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then, like our circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world (which, by way of anticipation, we have called ‘concern’), it must be Interpreted in terms of the PHENOMENON of care; for as “care” the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined. (Compare Chapter 6 of this Division.) Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though Being-with, like concern, is a Being towards entities encountered within-the-world. But those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of solicitude. BTMR §26 But just as opening oneself up [Sichoffenbaren] or closing oneself off is grounded in one’s having Being-with-one-another as one’s kind of Being at the time, and indeed is nothing else but this, even the explicit disclosure of the Other in solicitude grows only out of one’s primarily Being with him in each case. Such a disclosure of the Other (which is indeed thematic, but not in the manner of theoretical psychology) easily becomes the PHENOMENON which proximally comes to view when one considers the theoretical problematic of understanding the ‘psychical life of Others’ [“fremden Seelenlebens”]. In this phenomenally ‘proximal’ manner it thus presents a way of Being with one another understandingly; but at the same time it gets taken as that which, primordially and ‘in the beginning’, constitutes Being towards Others and makes it possible at all. BTMR §26 This PHENOMENON, which is none too happily designated as ‘empathy’ [“Einfühlung”], is then supposed, as it were, to provide the first ontological bridge from one’s own subject, which is given proximally as alone, to the other subject, which is proximally quite closed off. BTMR §26 But the fact that ‘empathy’ is not a primordial existential PHENOMENON, any more than is knowing in general, does not mean that there is nothing problematical about it. The special hermeneutic of empathy will have to show how Being-with-one-another and Dasein’s knowing of itself are led astray and obstructed by the various possibilities of Being which Dasein itself possesses, so that a genuine ‘understanding’ gets suppressed, and Dasein takes refuge in substitutes; the possibility of understanding the stranger correctly presupposes such a hermeneutic as its positive existential condition. Our analysis has shown that Being-with is an existential constituent of Being-in-the-world. Dasein-with has proved to be a kind of Being which entities encountered within-the-world have as their own. So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being. This cannot be conceived as a summative result of the occurrence of several ‘subjects’. Even to come across a number of ‘subjects’ [einer Anzahl von “Subjekten”] becomes possible only if the Others who are concerned proximally in their Dasein-with are treated merely as ‘numerals’ [“Nummer”]. Such a number of ‘subjects’ gets discovered only by a definite Being-with-and-towards-one-another. This ‘inconsiderate’ Being-with ‘reckons’ [“rechnet”] with the Others without seriously ‘counting on them’ [“auf sie zählt”], or without even wanting to ‘have anything to do’ with them. BTMR §26 Of course, the “they” is as little present-at-hand as Dasein itself. The more openly the “they” behaves, the harder it is to grasp, and the slier it is, but the less is it nothing at all. If we ‘see’ it ontico-ontologically with an unprejudiced eye, it reveals itself as the ‘Realest subject’ of everydayness. And even if it is not accessible like a stone that is present-at-hand, this is not in the least decisive as to its kind of Being. One may neither decree prematurely that this “they” is ‘really’ nothing, nor profess the opinion that one can Interpret this PHENOMENON ontologically by somehow ‘explaining’ it as what results from taking the Being-present-at-hand-together of several subjects and then fitting them together. On the contrary, in working out concepts of Being one must direct one’s course by these phenomena, which cannot be pushed aside. BTMR §27 The “they” is an existentiale; and as a primordial PHENOMENON, it belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution. It itself has, in turn, various possibilities of becoming concrete as something characteristic of Dasein [seiner daseinsmässigen Konkretion]. The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit may change in the course of history. BTMR §27 From the kind of Being which belongs to the “they” – the kind which is closest – everyday Dasein draws its pre-ontological way of interpreting its Being. In the first instance ontological Interpretation follows the tendency to interpret it this way: it understands Dasein in terms of the world and comes across it as an entity within-the-world. But that is not all: even that meaning of Being on the basis of which these ‘subject’ entities [diese scienden “Subjekte”] get understood, is one, which that ontology of Dasein which is ‘closest’ to us lets itself present in terms of the ‘world’. But because the PHENOMENON of the world itself gets gassed over in this absorption in the world, its place gets taken [tritt an seine Stelle] by what is present-at-hand within-the-world, namely, Things. The Being of those entities which are there with us, gets conceived as presence-at-hand. Thus by exhibiting the positive PHENOMENON of the closest everyday Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to get an insight into the reason why an ontological Interpretation of this state of Being has been missing. This very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up. [SZ:130] BTMR §27 [SZ:131] The fact that we foresaw this structural item which carries so much weight, arose from our aim of setting the analysis of single items, from the outset, within the frame of a steady preliminary view of the structural whole, and of guarding against any disruption or fragmentation of the unitary PHENOMENON. Now, keeping in mind what has been achieved in the concrete analysis of the world and the “who”, we must turn our Interpretation back to the PHENOMENON of Being-in. By considering this more penetratingly, however, we shall not only get a new and surer phenomenological view of the structural totality of Being-in-the-world, but shall also pave the way to grasping the primordial Being of Dasein itself – namely, care. BTMR §28 But what more is there to point out in Being-in-the-world, beyond the essential relations of Being alongside the world (concern), Being-with (solicitude), and Being-one’s-Self (“who”)? If need be, there still remains the possibility of broadening out the analysis by characterizing compratively the variations of concern and its circumspection, of solicitude a the considerateness which goes with it; there is also the possibility of contrasting Dasein with entities whose character is not that of Dasein by a more precise explication of the Being of all possible entities within-the-world. Without question, there are unfinished tasks still lying in this field. What we have hitherto set forth needs to be rounded out in many ways by working out fully the existential a priori of philosophical anthropology and taking a look at it. But this is not the aim of our investigation. Its aim is one of fundamental ontology. Consequently, if we inquire about Being-in as our theme, we cannot indeed consent to nullify the primordial character of this PHENOMENON by deriving it from others – that is to say, by an inappropriate analysis, in the sense of a dissolving or breaking up. But the fact that something primordial is underivable does not rule out the possibility that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then existentially they are equiprimordial. The PHENOMENON of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple ‘primal ground’. BTMR §28 In which direction must we look, if we are to characterize Being-in, as such, phenomenally? We get the answer to this question by recalling what we were charged with keeping phenomenologically in view when we called attention to this PHENOMENON: Being-in is distinct from the presentat-hand insideness of something present-at-hand ‘in’ something else that is present-at-hand; Being-in is not a characteristic that is effected, or even just elicited, in a present-at-hand subject by the ‘world’s’ Being-presentat-hand; Being-in is rather an essential kind of Being of this entity itself. But in that case, what else is presented with this PHENOMENON than the commercium which is present-at-hand between a subject present-at-hand and an Object present-at-hand? Such an interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if we were to say that Dasein is the Being of this ‘between’. Yet to take our orientation from this ‘between’ would still be misleading. For with such an orientation we would also be covertly assuming the entities between which this “between”, as such, ‘is’, and we would be doing so in a way which is ontologically vague. The “between” is already conceived as the result of the convenientia of two things that are present-at-hand. But to assume these beforehand always splits the PHENOMENON asunder, and there is no prospect of putting it together again from the fragments. Not only do we lack the ‘cement’; even the ‘schema’ in accordance with which this joining-together is to be accomplished, has been split asunder, or never as yet unveiled. What is decisive for ontology is to prevent the splitting of the PHENOMENON – in other words, to hold its positive phenomenal content secure. To say that for this we need farreaching and detailed study, is simply to express the fact that something which was ontically self-evident in the traditional way of treating the [SZ:132] BTMR §28 Under B (the everyday Being of the “there”, and the falling of Dasein) we shall analyse idle talk (Section 35), curiosity (Section 36), and ambiguity (Section 37) as existential modes of the everyday Being of the “there”; we shall analyse them as corresponding respectively to the constitutive PHENOMENON of discourse, the sight which lies in understanding, and the interpretation (or explaining [Deutung]) which belongs to understanding. In these phenomenal modes a basic kind of Being of the “there” will become visible – a kind of Being which we Interpret as falling; and this ‘falling’ shows a movement [Bewegtheit] which is existentially its own. BTMR §28 What we indicate ontologically by the term “state-of-mind” is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned. Prior to all psychology of moods, a field which in any case still lies fallow, it is necessary to see this PHENOMENON as a fundamental existentiale, and to outline its structure. BTMR §29 It has been one of the ‘merits of phenomenological research that it has again brought these phenomena more unrestrictedly into our sight. Not only that: Scheler, accepting the challenges of Augustine and Pascal, has guided the problematic to a consideration of how acts which ‘represent’ and acts which ‘take an interest’ are interconnected in their foundations. But even here the existential-ontological foundations of the PHENOMENON of the act in general are admittedly still obscure. BTMR §29 A state-of-mind not only discloses Dasein in its thrownness and its submission to that world which is already disclosed with its own Being; it is itself the existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the ‘world’ and lets the ‘world’ “matter” to it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self. The existential constitution of such evasion will become clear in the PHENOMENON of falling. BTMR §29 Later (Cf. Section 40) we shall provide an Interpretation of anxiety as such a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, and as one which is significant from the existential-ontological standpoint; with this in view, we shall now illustrate the PHENOMENON of state-of-mind even more concretely in its determinate mode of fear. BTMR §29 There are three points of view from which the PHENOMENON of fear may be considered. We shall analyse: (1) that in the face of which we fear, (2) fearing, and (3) that about which we fear. These possible ways of looking at fear are not accidental; they belong together. With them the general structure of states-of-mind comes to the fore. We shall complete our analysis by alluding to the possible ways in which fear may be modified; each of these pertains to different items in the structure of fear. BTMR §30 There can be variations in the constitutive items of the full PHENOMENON of fear. Accordingly, different possibilities of Being emerge in fearing. Bringing-close close by, belongs to the structure of the threatening as encounterable. If something threatening breaks in suddenly upon concernful Being-in-the-world (something threatening in its ‘not right away, but any moment’), fear becomes alarm [Erschrecken]. So, in what is threatening we must distinguish between the closest way in which it brings itself close, and the manner in which this bringing-close gets encountered – its suddenness. That in the face of which we are alarmed is proximally something well known and familiar. But if, on the other hand, that which threatens has the character of something altogether unfamiliar, then fear becomes dread [Grauen]. And where that which threatens is laden with dread, and is at the same time encountered with the suddenness of the alarming, then fear becomes terror [Entsetzen]. There are further variations of fear, which we know as timidity, shyness, misgiving, becoming startled. All modifications of fear, as possibilities of having a state-of-mind, point to the fact that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is ‘fearful’ [“furchtsam”]. This ‘fearfulness’ is not to be understood in an ontical sense as some factical ‘individualized’ disposition, but as an existential possibility of the essential state-of-mind of Dasein in general, though of course it is not the only one. BTMR §30 State-of-mind is one of the existential structures in which the Being of the ‘there’ maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this Being is understanding. A state-of-mind always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood. If we Interpret understanding as a fundamental existentiale, this indicates that this PHENOMENON is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein’s Being. On the other hand, ‘understanding’ in the sense of one possible kind of cognizing among others (as distinguished, for instance, from ‘explaining’), must, like explaining, be Interpreted as an existential derivative of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the Being of the “there” in general. [SZ:143] BTMR §31 As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities. This Being-towards-possibilities which understands is itself a potentiality-for-Being, and it is so because of the way these possibilities, as disclosed, exert their counter-thrust [Rückschlag] upon Dasein. The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility – that of developing itself [sich auszubilden]. This development of the understanding we call “interpretation”. In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding. In accordance with the trend of these preparatory analyses of everyday Dasein, we shall pursue the PHENOMENON of interpretation in understanding the world – that is, in inauthentic understanding, and indeed in the mode of its genuineness. BTMR §32 How are we to conceive the character of this ‘fore’? Have we done so if we say formally that this is something ‘a priori’? Why does understanding, which we have designated as a fundamental existentiale of Dasein, have this structure as its own? Anything interpreted, as something interpreted, has the ‘as’-structure as its own; and how is this related to the ‘fore’ structure? The PHENOMENON of the ‘as’-structure is manifestly not to be dissolved or broken up ‘into pieces’. But is a primordial analytic for it thus ruled out? Are we to concede that such phenomena are ‘ultimates’? Then there would still remain the question, “why?” Or do the forestructure of understanding and the as-structure of interpretation show an existential-ontological connection with the PHENOMENON of projection? And does this PHENOMENON point back to a primordial state of Dasein’s Being? [SZ:151] BTMR §32 Before we answer these questions, for which the preparation up till now has been far from sufficient, we must investigate whether what has become visible as the fore-structure of understanding and the as-structure of interpretation, does not itself already present us with a unitary PHENOMENON – one of which copious use is made in philosophical problematics, though what is used so universally falls short of the primordiality of ontological explication. BTMR §32 The ‘circle’ in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter PHENOMENON is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein – that is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure. If, however, we note that ‘circularity’ belongs ontologically to a kind of Being which is present-at-hand (namely, to subsistence [Bestand]), we must altogether avoid using this PHENOMENON to characterize anything like Dasein ontologically. BTMR §32 For one thing, it can be demonstrated, by considering assertion, in what ways the structure of the ‘as’, which is constitutive for understanding and interpretation, can be modified. When this has been done, both understanding and interpretation will be brought more sharply into view. For another thing, the analysis of assertion has a special position in the problematic of fundamental ontology, because in the decisive period when ancient ontology was beginning, the logos functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to that which authentically is [zun eigentlich Seienden], and for defining the Being of such entities. Finally assertion has been accepted from ancient times as the primary and authentic ‘locus’ of truth. The PHENOMENON of truth is so thoroughly coupled with the problem of Being that our investigation, as it proceeds further, will necessarily come up against the problem of truth; and it already lies within the dimensions of that problem, though not explicitly. The analysis of assertion will at the same time prepare the way for this latter problematic. BTMR §33 In what follows, we give three significations to the term “assertion”. These are drawn from the PHENOMENON which is thus designated, they are connected among themselves, and in their unity they encompass the full structure of assertion. BTMR §33 There is prevalent today a theory of ‘judgment’ which is oriented to the PHENOMENON of ‘validity’. We shall not give an extensive discussion of it here. It will be sufficient to allude to the very questionable character of this PHENOMENON of ‘validity’, though since the time of Lotze people have been fond of passing this off as a ‘primal PHENOMENON’ which cannot be traced back any further. The fact that it can play this role is due only to its ontologically unclarified character. The ‘problematic’ which has established itself round this idolized word is no less opaque. In the first place, validity is viewed as the ‘form’ of actuality which goes with the content of the judgment, in so far as that content remains unchanged as opposed to the changeable ‘psychical’ process of judgment. Considering how the status of the question of Being in general has been characterized in the introduction to this treatise, we would scarcely venture to expect that ‘validity’ as ‘ideal Being’ is distinguished by special ontological clarity. In the second place, “validity” means at the same time the validity of the meaning of the judgment, which is valid of the ‘Object’ it has in view; and thus it attains the signification of an ‘Objectively valid character’ and of Objectivity in general. In the third place, the meaning which is thus ‘valid’ of an entity, and which is valid ‘timelessly’ in itself, is said to be ‘valid’ also in the sense of being valid for everyone who judges rationally. “Validity” now means a bindingness, or ‘universally valid’ character. Even if one were to advocate a ‘critical’ epistemological theory, according to which the subject does not ‘really’ ‘come out’ to the Object, then this valid character, as the validity of an Object (Objectivity), is grounded upon that stock of true (!) meaning which is itself valid. The three significations of ‘being valid’ which we have set forth – the way of Being of the ideal, Objectivity, and bindingness – not only are opaque in themselves but constantly get confused with one another. Methodological fore-sight [SZ:156] demands that we do not choose such unstable concepts as a clue to Interpretation. We make no advance restriction upon the concept of “meaning” which would confine it to signifying the ‘content of judgment’, but we understand it as the existential PHENOMENON already characterized, in which the formal framework of what can be disclosed in understanding and Articulated in interpretation becomes visible. BTMR §33 If we bring together the three significations of ‘assertion’ which we have analysed, and get a unitary view of the full PHENOMENON, then we may define “assertion” as “a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates”. It remains to ask with what justification we have taken assertion as a mode of interpretation at all. If it is something of this sort, then the essential structures of interpretation must recur in it. The pointing-out which assertion does is performed on the basis of what has already been disclosed in understanding or discovered circumspectively. Assertion is not a free-floating kind of behaviour which, in its own right, might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary it always maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world. What we have shown earlier in relation to knowing the world, holds just as well as assertion. Any assertion requires a fore-having of whatever has been disclosed; and this is what it points out by way of giving something a definite character. Furthermore, in any approach when one gives something a definite character, one is already taking a look directionally at what is to be put forward in the assertion. When an entity which has been presented is given a definite character, the function of giving it such a character is taken over by that with regard to which we set our sights towards the entity. Thus any assertion requires a fore-sight; in this the predicate which we are to assign [zuzuweisende] and make stand out, gets loosened, so to speak, from its unexpressed inclusion in the entity itself. To any assertion as a communication which gives something a definite character there belongs, moreover, an Articulation of what is pointed out, and this Articulation is in accordance with significations. Such an assertion will operate with a definite way of conceiving: “The hammer is heavy”, “Heaviness belongs to the hammer”, “The hammer has the property of heaviness”. When an assertion is made, some foreconception is always implied; but it remains for the most part inconspicuous, because the language already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving. Like any interpretation whatever, assertion necessarily has a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception as its existential foundations. [SZ:157] BTMR §33 With the progress of knowledge about the structure of the logos, it was inevitable that this PHENOMENON of the apophantical ‘as’ should come into view in some form or other. The manner in which it was proximally seen was not accidental, and did not fail to work itself out in the subsequent history of logic. BTMR §33 When considered philosophically, the logos itself is an entity, and, according to the orientation of ancient ontology, it is something presentat-hand. Words are proximally present-at-hand; that is to say, we come across them just as we come across Things; and this holds for any sequence of words, as that in which the logos expresses itself. In this first search for the structure of the logos as thus present-at-hand, what was found was the Being-present-at-hand-together of several words. What establishes the unity of this “together”? As Plato knew, this unity lies in the fact that the logos is always logos. In the tinos an entity is manifest, and with a view to this entity, the words are put together in one verbal whole. Aristotle saw this more radically: every logos is both synthesis and diairesis, not just the one (call it ‘affirmative judgment’) or the other (call it ‘negative judgment’). Rather, every assertion, whether it affirms or denies, whether it is true or false, is synthesis and diairesis equiprimordially. To exhibit anything is to take it together and take it apart. It is [SZ:159] true, of course, that Aristotle did not pursue the analytical question as far as the problem of which PHENOMENON within the structure of the logos is the one that permits and indeed obliges us to characterize every statement as synthesis and diacresis. BTMR §33 Along with the formal structures of ‘binding’ and ‘separating’ – or, more precisely, along with the unity of these – we should meet the PHENOMENON of the ‘something as something’, and we should meet this as a PHENOMENON. In accordance with this structure, something is understood with regard to something: it is taken together with it, yet in such away that this confrontation which understands will at the same time take apart what has been taken together, and will do so by Articulating it interpretatively. If the PHENOMENON of the ‘as’ remains covered up, and, above all, if its existential source in the hermeneutical ‘as’ is veiled, then Aristotle’s phenomenological approach to the analysis of the logos collapses to a superficial ‘theory of judgment’, in which judgment becomes the binding or separating of representations and concepts. BTMR §33 How far this problematic has worked its way into the Interpretation of the logos, and how far on the other hand the concept of ‘judgment’ has (by a remarkable counter-thrust) worked its way into the ontological problematic, is shown by the PHENOMENON of the copula. When we consider this ‘bond’, it becomes clear that proximally the synthesis-structure is regarded as self-evident, and that it has also retained the function of serving as a standard for Interpretation. But if the formal characteristics of ‘relating’ and ‘binding’ can contribute nothing phenomenally towards the structural analysis of the logos as subject-matter, then in the long run the PHENOMENON to which we allude by the term “copula” has nothing to do with a bond or binding. The Interpretation of the ‘is’, whether it be expressed in its own right in the language or indicated in the verbal ending, leads us therefore into the context of problems belonging to the existential analytic, if assertion and the understanding of Being are existential possibilities for the Being of Dasein itself. When we come to work out the question of Being (cf. Part I, Division 3), we shall thus [SZ:160] encounter again this peculiar PHENOMENON of Being which we meet within the logos. BTMR §33 The fundamental existentialia which constitute the Being of the “there”, the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, are states-of-mind and understanding. In understanding, there lurks the possibility of interpretation – that is, of appropriating what is understood. In so far as a state-of-mind is equiprimordial with an act of understanding, it maintains itself in a certain understanding. Thus there corresponds to it a certain capacity for getting interpreted. We have seen that assertion is derived from interpretation, and is an extreme case of it. In clarifying the third signification of assertion as communication (speaking forth), we were led to the concepts of “saying” and “speaking”, to which we had purposely given no attention up to that point. The fact that language now becomes our theme for the first time will indicate that this PHENOMENON has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness. The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk. This PHENOMENON is one of which we have been making constant use already in our foregoing Interpretation of state-of-mind, understanding, interpretation, and assertion; but we have, as it were, kept it suppressed in our thematic analysis. [SZ:161] BTMR §34 As we have already indicated in our analysis of assertion, the PHENOMENON of communication must be understood in a sense which is ontologically broad. ‘Communication’ in which one makes assertions – giving information, for instance – is a special case of that communication which is grasped in principle existentially. In this more general kind of communication, the Articulation of Being with one another understandingly is constituted. Through it a co-state-of-mind [Mitbefindlichkeit] gets ‘shared’, and so does the understanding of Being-with. Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject, into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding. In discourse Being-with becomes ‘explicitly’ shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated. BTMR §34 Because discourse is constititutive for the Being of the “there” (that is, for states-of-mind and understanding), while “Dasein” means Being-in-the-world, Dasein as discursive Being-in, has already expressed itself. Dasein has language. Among the Greeks, their everyday existing was largely diverted into talking with one another, but at the same time they ‘had eyes’ to see. Is it an accident that in both their pre-philosophical and their philosophical ways of interpreting Dasein, they defined the essence of man as zoon logon echon? The later way of interpreting this definition of man in the sense of the animal rationale, ‘something living which has reason’, is not indeed ‘false’, but it covers up the phenomenal basis for this definition of “Dasein”. Man shows himself as the entity which talks. This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to him, but rather that he is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself. The Greeks had no word for “language”; they understood this PHENOMENON ‘in the first instance’ as discourse. But because the logos came into their philosophical ken primarily as assertion, this was the kind of logos which they took as their clue for working out the basic structures of the forms of discourse and its components. Grammar sought its foundations in the ‘logic’ of this logos. But this logic was based upon the ontology of the present-at-hand. The basic stock of ‘categories of signification’, which passed over into the subsequent science of language, and which in principle is still accepted as the standard today, is oriented towards discourse as assertion. But if on the contrary we take this PHENOMENON to have in principle the primordiality and breadth of an existentiale, then there emerges the necessity of re-establishing the science of language on foundations which are ontologically more primordial. The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existentiale. It is not a task that can be carried through later on by improving and rounding out what has been handed down. Bearing this in mind, we must inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable, and to do so in accordance with significations; and this articulation must not be confined to entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering them theoretically, and which we express in sentences. A doctrine of signification will not emerge automatically even if we make a comprehensive comparison of as many languages as possible, and those which are most exotic. To accept, let us say, the philosophical horizon within which W. von Humboldt made language a problem, would be no less inadequate. The doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein. Whether it prospers or decays depends on the fate of this ontology. BTMR §34 Our Interpretation of language has been designed merely to point out the ontological ‘locus’ of this PHENOMENON in Dasein’s state of Being, and especially to prepare the way for the following analysis, in which, taking as our clue a fundamental kind of Being belonging to discourse, in connection with other phenomena, we shall try to bring Dasein’s everydayness into view in a manner which is ontologically more primordial. BTMR §34 If understanding must be conceived primarily as Dasein’s potentialityfor-Being, then it is from an analysis of the way of understanding and interpreting which belongs to the “they” that we must gather which possibilities of its Being have been disclosed and appropriated by Dasein as “they”. In that case, however, these possibilities themselves make manifest an essential tendency of Being – one which belongs to everydayness. And finally, when this tendency has been explicated in an ontologically adequate manner, it must unveil a primordial kind of Being of Dasein, in such a way, indeed, that from this kind of Being the PHENOMENON of thrownness, to which we have called attention, can be exhibited in its existential concreteness. BTMR §34 The expression ‘idle talk’ [“Gerede”] is not to be used here in a ‘disparaging’ signification. Terminologically, it signifies a positive PHENOMENON which constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s understanding and interpreting. For the most part, discourse is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language. But in that case understanding and interpretation already lie in what has thus been expressed. In language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken out [Ausgesprochenheit], there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted. This way of interpreting it is no more just present-at-hand than language is; on the contrary, its Being is itself of the character of Dasein. Proximally, and with certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness, which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the state-of-mind belonging to it. The way things have been expressed or spoken out is such that in the totality of contexts of signification into which it has been articulated, it preserves an understanding of the disclosed world and therewith, equiprimordially, an understanding of the Dasein-with of Others and of one’s own Being-in. The understanding which has thus already been “deposited” in the way things have been expressed, pertains just as much to any traditional discoveredness of entities which may have been reached, as it does to one’s current understanding of Being and to whatever possibilities and horizons for fresh interpretation and conceptual Articulation may be available. But now we must go beyond a bare allusion to the Fact of this interpretedness of Dasein, and must inquire about the existential kind of Being of that discourse which is expressed and which expresses itself. If this cannot be conceived as something present-at-hand, what is its Being, and what does this tell us in principle about Dasein’s everyday kind of Being? [SZ:168] BTMR §35 The basic state of sight shows itself in a peculiar tendency-of-Being which belongs to everydayness – the tendency towards ‘seeing’. We designate this tendency by the term “curiosity” [Neugier], which characteristically is not confined to seeing, but expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception. Our aim in Interpreting this PHENOMENON is in principle one which is existential-ontological. We do not restrict ourselves to an orientation towards cognition. Even at an early date (and in Greek philosophy this was no accident) cognition was conceived in terms of the ‘desire to see’. The treatise which stands first in the collection of Aristotle’s treatises on ontology begins with the sentence: pantes anthropoi tou eidenai oregontai physei. The care for seeing is essential to man’s Being. This remark introduces an investigation in which Aristotle seeks to uncover the source of all learned exploration of entities and their Being, by deriving it from that species of Dasein’s Being which we have just mentioned. This Greek Interpretation of the existential genesis of science is not accidental. It brings to explicit understanding what has already ‘been sketched out beforehand in the principle of Parmenides: tò gar auto noein estin te kai einai. Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding. This thesis has remained the foundation of western philosophy ever since. The Hegelian dialectic found in it its motivating conception, and is possible only on the basis of it. [SZ:171] BTMR §36 What is to be said about this tendency just to perceive? Which existential state of Dasein will become intelligible in the PHENOMENON of curiosity? [SZ:172] BTMR §36 Rather it concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known. Both this not tarrying in the environment with which one concerns oneself, and this distraction by new possibilities, are constitutive items for curiosity; and upon these is founded the third essential characteristic of this PHENOMENON, which we call the character of “never dwelling anywhere” [Aufenthaltslosigkeit]. Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein – a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself. [SZ:173] BTMR §36 Idle talk controls even the ways in which one may be curious. It says what one “must” have read and seen. In being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is delivered over to idle talk. These two everyday modes of Being for discourse and sight are not just present-at-hand side by side in their tendency to uproot, but either of these ways-to-be drags the other one with it. Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, provide themselves (that is, the Dasein which is in this manner [dem so seienden Dasein]) with the guarantee of a ‘life’ which, supposedly, is genuinely ‘lively’. But with this supposition a third PHENOMENON now shows itself, by which the disclosedness of everyday Dasein is characterized. BTMR §36 Neither in our first allusion to Being-in-the-world as Dasein’s basic state, nor in our characterization of its constitutive structural items, did we go beyond an analysis of the constitution of this kind of Being and take note of its character as a PHENOMENON. We have indeed described concern and solicitude, as the possible basic kinds of Being-in. But we did not discuss the question of the everyday kind of Being of these ways in which one may be. We also showed that Being-in is something quite different from a mere confrontation, whether by way of observation or by way of action; that is, it is not the Being-present-at-hand-together of a subject and an Object. Nevertheless, it must still have seemed that Being-in-the-world has the function of a rigid framework, within which Dasein’s possible ways of comporting itself towards its world run their course without touching the ‘framework’ itself as regards its Being. But this supposed ‘framework’ itself helps make up the kind of Being which is Dasein’s. An existential mode of Being-in-the-world is documented in the PHENOMENON of falling. BTMR §38 But now that falling has been exhibited, have we not set forth a PHENOMENON which speaks directly against the definition we have used in indicating the formal idea of existence? Can Dasein be conceived as an entity for which, in its Being, its potentiality-for-Being is an issue, if this entity, in its very everydayness, has lost itself, and, in falling, ‘lives’ away from itself? But falling into the world would be phenomenal ‘evidence’ against the existentiality of Dasein only if Dasein were regarded as an isolated “I” or subject, as a self-point from which it moves away. In that case, the world would be an Object. Falling into the world would then have to be re-Interpreted ontologically as Being-present-at-hand in the manner of an entity within-the-world. If, however, we keep in mind that Dasein’s Being is in the state of Being-in-the-world, as we have already pointed out, then it becomes manifest that falling, as a kind of Being of this Being-in, affords us rather the most elemental evidence for Dasein’s existentiality. In failing, nothing other than our potentiality-for-Being-in world is the issue, even if in the mode of inauthenticity. Dasein can fall only because Being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it. On the other hand, authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon. BTMR §38 The PHENOMENON of falling does not give us something like a ‘night view’ of Dasein, a property which occurs ontically and may serve to round out the innocuous aspects of this entity. Falling reveals an essential ontological structure of Dasein itself. Far from determining its nocturnal side, it constitutes all Dasein’s days in their everydayness. BTMR §38 Being-in-the-world is a structure which is primordially and constantly whole. In the preceding chapters (Division One, Chapters 2-5) this structure has been elucidated phenomenally as a whole, and also in its constitutive items, though always on this basis. The preliminary glance which we gave to the whole of this PHENOMENON in the beginning has now lost the emptiness of our first general sketch of it. To be sure, the constitution of the structural whole and its everyday kind of Being, is phenomenally so manifold that it can easily obstruct our looking at the whole as such phenomenologically in a way which is unified. But we may look at it more freely and our unified view of it may be held in readiness more securely if we now raise the question towards which we have been working in our preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein in general: “how is the totality of that structural whole which we have pointed out to be defined. in an existential-ontological manner?” [SZ:181] BTMR §39 To put it negatively, it is beyond question that the totality of the structural whole is not to be reached by building it up out of elements, For this we would need an architect’s plan. The Being of Dasein, upon which the structural whole as such is ontologically supported, becomes accessible to us when we look all the way through this whole to a single primordially unitary PHENOMENON which is already in this whole in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation for each structural item in its structural possibility. Thus we cannot Interpret this ‘comprehensively’ by a process of gathering up what we have hitherto gained and taking it all together. The question of Dasein’s basic existential character is essentially different from that of the Being of something present-at-hand. Our everyday environmental experiencing [Erfahren], which remains directed both ontically and ontologically towards entities within-the-world, is not the sort of thing which can present Dasein in an ontically primordial manner for ontological analysis. Similarly our immanent perception of Experiences [Erlebnissen] fails to provide a clue which is ontologically adequate. On the other hand, Dasein’s Being is not be to deduced from an idea of man. Does the Interpretation of Dasein which we have hitherto given permit us to infer what Dasein, from its own standpoint, demands as the only appropriate ontico-ontological way of access to itself? [SZ:182] BTMR §39 As a state-of-mind which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the PHENOMENON of anxiety will be made basic for our analysis. In working out this basic state-of-mind and characterizing ontologically what is disclosed in it as such, we shall take the PHENOMENON of falling as our point of departure, and distinguish anxiety from the kindred PHENOMENON of fear, which we have analysed earlier. As one of Dasein’s possibilities of Being, anxiety – together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it – provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being. Dasein’s Being reveals itself as care. If we are to work out this basic existential PHENOMENON, we must distinguish it from phenomena which might be proximally identified with care, such as will, wish, addiction, and urge. Care cannot be derived from these, since they themselves are founded upon it. BTMR §39 The analytic of Dasein, which is proceeding towards the PHENOMENON of care, is to prepare the way for the problematic of fundamental ontology – the question of the meaning of Being in general. In order that we may turn our glance explicitly upon this in the light of what we have gained, and go beyond the special task of an existentially a priori anthropology, we must look back and get a more penetrating grasp of the phenomena which are most intimately connected with our leading question – the question of Being. These phenomena are those very ways of Being which we have been hitherto explaining: readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, as attributes of entities within-the-world whose character is not that of Dasein. Because the ontological problematic of Being has heretofore been’ understood primarily in the sense of presence-at-hand (‘Reality’, ‘world-actuality’), while the nature of Dasein’s Being has remained ontologically undetermined, we need to discuss the ontological interconnections of care, worldhood, readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand (Reality). This will lead to a more precise characterization of the concept of Reality in the context of a discussion of the epistemological questions oriented by this idea which have been raised in realism and idealism. BTMR §39 Entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. Hence Being can be something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood. In ontological problematics Being and truth have, from time immemorial, been brought, together if not entirely identified. This is evidence that there is a necessary connecton between Being and understanding, even if it may perhaps be hidden in its primordial grounds. If we are to give an adequate preparation for the question of Being, the PHENOMENON of truth must be ontologically clarified. This will be accomplished in the first instance on the basis of what we have gained in our foregoing Interpretation, in connection with the phenomena of disclosedness and discoveredness, interpretation and assertion. BTMR §39 Since our aim is to proceed towards the Being of the totality of the structural whole, we shall take as our point of departure the concrete analyses of falling which we have just carried through. Dasein’s absorption in the “they” and its absorption in the ‘world’ of its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself-of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self. This PHENOMENON of Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself and in the face of its authenticity, seems at least a suitable phenomenal basis for the following investigation. But to bring itself face to face with itself, is precisely what Dasein does not do when it thus flees. It turns away from itself in accordance with its ownmost inertia [Zug] of falling. In investigating such phenomena, however, we must be careful not to confuse ontico-existentiell characterization with ontologico-existential Interpretation nor may we overlook the positive phenomenal bases provided for this Interpretation by such a characterization. BTMR §40 So in orienting our analysis by the PHENOMENON of falling, we are not in principle condemned to be without any prospect of learning something ontologically about the Dasein disclosed in that PHENOMENON. On the contrary, here, least of all, has our Interpretation been surrendered to an artificial way in which Dasein grasps itself; it merely carries out the explication of what Dasein itself ontically discloses. The possibility of proceeding towards Dasein’s Being by going along with it and following it up [Mit- und Nachgehen] Interpretatively with an understanding and the state-of-mind that goes with it, is the greater, the more primordial is that PHENOMENON which functions methodologically as a disclosive state-of-mind. It might be contended that anxiety performs some such function. BTMR §40 We are not entirely unprepared for the analysis of anxiety. Of course it still remains obscure how this is connected ontologically with fear. Obviously these are kindred phenomena. This is betokened by the fact that for the most part they have not been distinguished from one another: that which is fear, gets designated as “anxiety”, while that which has the character of anxiety, gets called “fear”. We shall try to proceed towards the PHENOMENON of anxiety step by step. BTMR §40 In that in the face of which one has anxiety, the ‘It is nothing and nowhere’ becomes manifest. The obstinacy of the “nothing and nowhere within-the-world” means as a PHENOMENON that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety. The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the “nothing and nowhere”, does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself. [SZ:187] BTMR §40 That about which anxiety is anxious reveals itself as that in the face of which it is anxious – namely, Being-in-the-world. The selfsameness of that in the face of which and that about which one has anxiety, extends even to anxiousness [Sichängsten] itself. For, as a state-of-mind, anxiousness is a basic kind of Being-in-the-world. Here the disclosure and the disclosed are existentially selfsame in such a way that in the latter the world has been disclosed as world, and Being-in has been disclosed as a potentiality-for-Being which is individualized, pure, and thrown; this makes it plain that with the PHENOMENON of anxiety a distinctive state-of-mind has become a theme for Interpretation. Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘solus ipse’. But this existential ‘solipsism’ is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world. BTMR §40 If we Interpret Dasein’s uncanniness from an existential-ontological point of view as a threat which reaches Dasein itself and which comes from Dasein itself, we are not contending that in factical anxiety too it has always been understood in this sense. When Dasein “understands” uncanniness in the everyday manner, it does so by turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the “not-at-home” gets ‘dimmed down’. Yet the everydayness of this fleeing shows phenomenally that anxiety, as a basic state-of-mind, belongs to Dasein’s essential state of Being-in-the-world, which, as one that is existential, is never present-at-hand but is itself always in a mode of factical Being-there – that is, in the mode of a state-of-mind. That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a mode of Dasein’s uncanniness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point of view, the “not-at-home” must be conceived as the more primordial PHENOMENON. BTMR §40 Even rarer than the existentiell Fact of “real” anxiety are attempts to Interpret this PHENOMENON according to the principles of its existential-ontological Constitution and function. The reasons for this lie partly in the general neglect of the existential analytic of Dasein, but more particularly in a failure to recognize the PHENOMENON of state-of-mind . Yet the factical rarity of anxiety as a PHENOMENON cannot deprive it of its fitness to take over a methodological function in principle for the existential analytic. On the contrary, the rarity of the PHENOMENON is an index that Dasein, which for the most part remains concealed from itself in its authenticity because of the way in which things have been publicly interpreted by the “they”, becomes disclosable in a primordial sense in this basic state-of-mind. BTMR §40 Since our aim is to grasp the totality of this structural whole ontologically, we must first ask whether the PHENOMENON of anxiety and that which is disclosed in it, can give us the whole of Dasein in a way which is phenomenally eiquiprimordial, and whether they can do so in such a manner that if we look searchingly at this totality, our view of it will be filled in by what has thus been given us. The entire stock of what lies therein may be counted up formally and recorded: anxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Thus the entire PHENOMENON of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen. These existential characteristics are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which might sometimes be missing; but there is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up that totality of the structural whole which we are seeking. In the unity of those characteristics of Dasein’s Being which we have mentioned, this Being becomes something which it is possible for us to grasp as such ontologically. How is this unity itself to be characterized? BTMR §41 But this structure pertains to the whole of Dasein’s constitution. “Being-ahead-of-itself” does not signify ‘anything like an isolated tendency in a worldless ‘subject’, but characterizes Being-in-the-world. To Being-in-the-world, however, belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself – that it has in each case already been thrown into a world. The abandonment of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial concreteness in anxiety. “Being-ahead-of-itself” means, if we grasp it more fully, “ahead-of-itselfin-already-being-in-a-world”. As soon as this essentially unitary structure is seen as a PHENOMENON, what we have set forth earlier in our analysis of worldhood also becomes plain. The upshot of that analysis was that the referential totality of significance (which as such is constitutive for worldhood) has been ‘tied up’ with a “for-the-sake-of-which”. The fact that this referential totality of the manifold relations of the ‘in-order-to’ has been bound up with that which is an issue for Dasein, does not signify that a ‘world’ of Objects which is present-at-hand has been welded together with a subject. It is rather the phenomenal expression of the fact that the constitution of Dasein, whose totality is now brought out explicitly as aheadof-itself-in-Being-already-in ..., is primordially a whole. To put it otherwise, existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity. BTMR §41 Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ [“vor”] every. factical ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them. So this PHENOMENON by no means expresses a priority of the ‘practical’ attitude over the theoretical. When we ascertain something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care just as much as does a ‘political action’ or taking a rest and enjoying oneself. ‘Theory’ and ‘practice’ are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as “care”. BTMR §41 The PHENOMENON of care in its totality is essentially something that cannot be torn asunder; so any attempts to trace it back to special acts or drives like willing and wishing or urge and addiction, or to construct it out of these, will be unsuccessful. [SZ:194] BTMR §41 That very potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein is, has Being-in-the-world as its kind of Being. Thus it implies ontologically a relation to entities within-the-world. Care is always concern and solicitude, even if only privatively. In willing, an entity which is understood – that is, one which has been projected upon its possibility – gets seized upon, either as something with which one may concern oneself, or as something which is to be brought into its Being through solicitude. Hence, to any willing there belongs something willed, which has already made itself definite in terms of a “for-the-sake-of-which”. If willing is to be possible ontologically, the following items are constitutive for it: (1) the prior disclosedness of the “for-the-sake-of-which” in general (Being-ahead-of-itself); (2) the disclosedness of something with which one can concern oneself (the world as the “wherein” of Being-already); (3) Dasein’s projection of itself understandingly upon a potentiality-for-Being towards a possibility of the entity ‘willed’. In the PHENOMENON of willing, the underlying totality of care shows through. BTMR §41 With the expression ‘care’ we have in mind a basic existential-ontological PHENOMENON, which all the same is not simple in its structure. The ontologically elemental totality of the care-structure cannot be traced back to some ontical ‘primal element’, just as Being certainly cannot be ‘explained’ in terms of entities. In the end it will be shown that the idea of Being in general is just as far from being ‘simple’ as is the Being of Dasein. In defining “care” as “Being-ahead-of-oneself – in-Being-already-in ... – as Being-alongside ...”, we have made it plain that even this PHENOMENON is, in itself, still structurally articulated. But is this not a phenomenal symptom that we must pursue the ontological question even further until we can exhibit a still more primordial PHENOMENON which provides the ontological support for the unity and the totality of the structural manifoldness of care? Before we follow up this question, we must look back and appropriate with greater precision what we have hitherto Interpreted in aiming at the question of fundamental ontology as to the meaning of Being in general. First, however, we must show that what is ontologically ‘new’ in this Interpretation is ontically quite old. In explicating Dasein’s Being as care, we are not forcing it under an idea of our own contriving, but we are conceptualizing existentially what has already been disclosed in an ontico-existentiell manner. BTMR §41 The transcendental ‘generality’ of the PHENOMENON of care and of all fundamental existentialia is, on the other hand, broad enough to present a basis on which every interpretation of Dasein which is ontical and belongs to a world-view must move, whether Dasein is understood as affliction [Not] and the ‘cares of life’ or in an opposite manner. [SZ:200] BTMR §42 The question of whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised by Dasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it? Furthermore, it is encumbered with a double signification. The world as the “wherein” [das Worin] of Being-in, and the ‘world’ as entities within-the-world (that in which [das Wobei] one is concernfully absorbed) either have been confused or are not distinguished at all. But the world is disclosed essentially along with the Being of Dasein; with the disclosedness of the world, the ‘world’ has in each case been discovered too. Of course entities within-the-world in the sense of the Real as merely present-at-hand, are the very things that can remain concealed. But even the Real can be discovered only on the basis of a world which has already been disclosed. And only on this basis can anything Real still remain hidden. The question of the ‘Reality’ of the ‘external world’ gets raised without any previous clarification of the PHENOMENON of the world as such. Factically, the ‘problem of the external world’ is constantly oriented with regard to entities within-the-world (Things and Objects). So these discussions drift along into a problematic which it is almost impossible to disentangle ontologically. [SZ:203] BTMR §43 But even if the ontical priority of the isolated subject and inner experience should be given up, Descartes’ position would still be retained ontologically. What Kant proves – if we may suppose that his proof is correct and correctly based – is that entities which are changing and entities which are permanent are necessarily present-at-hand together. But when two things which are present-at-hand are thus put on the same level, this does not as yet mean that subject and Object are present-at-hand together. And even if this were proved, what is ontologically decisive would still be covered up – namely, the basic state of the ‘subject’, Dasein, as Being-in-the-world. The Being-present-at-hand-together of the physical and the psychical is completely different onticaly and ontologicaly from the PHENOMENON of Being-in-the-world. BTMR §43 Even if one should invoke the doctrine that the subject must presuppose and indeed always does unconsciously presuppose the presence-at-hand of the ‘external world’, one would still be starting with the construct of an isolated subject. The PHENOMENON of Being-in-the-world is something that one would no more meet in this way than one would by demonstrating that the physical and the psychical are present-at-hand together. With such presuppositions, Dasein always comes ‘too late’; for in so far as it does this presupposing as an entity (and otherwise this would be impossible), it is, as an entity, already in a world. ‘Earlier’ than any presupposition which Dasein makes, or any of its ways of behaving, is the ‘a priori’ character of its state of Being as one whose kind of Being is care. [SZ:206] BTMR §43 The ‘problem of Reality’ in the sense of the question whether an external world is present-at-hand and whether such a world can be proved, turns out to be an impossible one, not because its consequences lead to inextricable impasses, but because the very entity which serves as its theme, is one which, as it were, repudiates any such formulation of the question. Our task is not to prove that an ‘external world’ is present-at-hand or to show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has the tendency to bury the ‘external world’ in nullity ‘epistemologically’ before going on to prove it. The reason for this lies in Dasein’s falling and in the way in which the primary understanding of Being has been diverted to Being as presence-at-hand – a diversion which is motivated by that falling itself. If one formulates the question ‘critically’ with such an ontological orientation, then what one finds present-at-hand as proximally and solely certain, is something merely ‘inner’. After the primordial PHENOMENON of Being-in-the-world has been shattered, the isolated subject is all that remains, and this becomes the basis on which it gets joined together with a ‘world’. BTMR §43 If the term “Reality” is meant to stand for the Being of entities presentat-hand within-the-world (res) (and nothing else is understood thereby), then when it comes to analysing this mode of Being, this signifies that entities within-the-world are ontologically conceivable only if the PHENOMENON of within-the-world-ness has been clarified. But within-the-worldness is based upon the PHENOMENON of the world, which, for its part, as an essential item in the structure of Being-in-the-world, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. Being-in-the-world, in turn, is bound up ontologically in the structural totality of Dasein’s Being, and we have characterized care as such a totality. But in this way we have marked out the foundations and the horizons which must be clarified if an analysis of Reality is to be possible. Only in this connection, moreover, does the character of the “in-itself” become ontologically intelligible. By taking our orientation from this context of problems, we have in our earlier analyses Interpreted the Being of entities within-the-world. BTMR §43 [SZ:209] To be sure, the Reality of the Real can be characterized phenomenologically within certain limits without any explicit existential-ontological basis. This is what Dilthey has attempted in the article mentioned above. He holds that the Real gets experienced in impulse and will, and that Reality is resistance, or, more exactly, the character of resisting. He then works out the PHENOMENON of resistance analytically. This is the positive contribution of his article, and provides the best concrete substantiation for his idea of a ‘psychology which both describes and dissects’. But he is kept from working out the analysis of this PHENOMENON correctly by the epistemological problematic of Reality. The ‘principle of phenomenality’ does not enable him to come to an ontological Interpretation of the Being of consciousness. ‘Within the same consciousness,’ he writes, ‘the will and its inhibition emerge.’ What kind of Being belongs to this ‘emerging’? What is the meaning of the Being of the ‘within’? What relationship-of-Being does consciousness bear to the Real itself? All this must be determined ontologically. That this has not been done, depends ultimately on the fact that Dilthey has left ‘life’ standing in such a manner that it is ontologically undifferentiated; and of course ‘life’ is something which one cannot go back ‘behind’. But to Interpret Dasein ontologically does not signify that we must go back ontically to some other entity. The fact that Dilthey has been refuted epistemologically cannot prevent us from making fruitful use of what is positive in his analyses – the very thing that has not been understood in such refutations. [SZ:210] BTMR §43 Nor is resistance experienced in a drive or will which ‘emerges’ in its own right. These both turn out to be modifications of care. Only entities with this kind of Being can come up against something resistant as something within-the-world. So if “Reality” gets defined as “the character of resisting”, we must notice two things: first, that this is only one character of Reality among others; second, that the character of resisting presupposes necessarily a world which has already been disclosed. Resistance characterizes the ‘external world’ in the sense of entities within-the-world, but never in the sense of the world itself. ‘Consciousness of Reality’ is itself a way of Being-in-the-world. Every ‘problematic of the external world’ comes back necessarily to this basic existential PHENOMENON. [SZ:211] BTMR §43 ”Reality”, as an ontological term, is one which we have related to entities within-the-world. If it serves to designate this kind of Being in general, then readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand function as modes of Reality. If, however, one lets this word have its traditional signification, then it stands for Being in the sense of the pure presence-at-hand of Things. But not all presence-at-hand is the presence-at-hand of Things. The ‘Nature’ by which we are ‘surrounded’ is, of course, an entity within-the-world; but the kind of Being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand as ‘Things of Nature’. No matter how this Being of ‘Nature’ may be Interpreted, all the modes of Being of entities within-the-world are founded ontologically upon the worldhood of the world, and accordingly upon the PHENOMENON of Being-in-the-world. From this there arises the insight that among the modes of Being of entities within-the-world, Reality has no priority, and that Reality is a kind of Being which cannot even characterize anything like the world or Dasein in a way which is ontologically appropriate. BTMR §43 In the order of the ways in which things are connected in their ontological foundations and in the order of any possible categorial and existential demonstration, Reality is referred back to the PHENOMENON of care. But the fact that Reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the Real be as that which in itself it is. [SZ:212] BTMR §43 If, however, truth rightfully has a primordial connection with Being, then the PHENOMENON of truth comes within the range of the problematic of fundamental ontology. In that case, must not this PHENOMENON have been encountered already within our preparatory fundamental analysis, the analytic of Dasein? What ontico-ontological connection does ‘truth’ have with Dasein and with that ontical characteristic of Dasein which we call the “understanding of Being”? Can the reason why Being necessarily goes together with truth and vice versa be pointed out in terms of such understanding? BTMR §44 These questions are not to be evaded. Because Being does indeed ‘go together’ with truth, the PHENOMENON of truth has already been one of the themes of our earlier analyses, though not explicitly under this title. In giving precision to the problem of Being, it is now time to delimit the PHENOMENON of truth explicitly and to fix the problems which it comprises. In doing this, we should not just take together what we have previously taken apart. Our investigation requires a new approach. [SZ:214] BTMR §44 Our analysis takes its departure from the traditional conception of truth and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception (a). In terms of these foundations the primordial PHENOMENON of truth becomes visible. We can then exhibit the way in which the traditional conception of truth has been derived from this PHENOMENON (b). Our investigation will make it plain that to the question of the ‘essence’ of truth, there belongs necessarily the question of the kind of Being which truth possesses. Together with this we must clarify the ontological meaning of the kind of talk in which we say that ‘there is truth’, and we must also clarify the kind of necessity with which ‘we must presuppose’ that ‘there is’ truth (c). BTMR §44 If we go back to the distinction between the act of judgment and its content, we shall not advance our discussion of the question of the kind of Being which belongs to the adaequatio; we shall only make plain the indispensability of clarifying the kind of Being which belongs to knowledge itself. In the analysis which this necessitates we must at the same time try to bring into view a PHENOMENON which is characteristic of knowledge – the PHENOMENON of truth. When does truth become phenomenally explicit in knowledge itself? It does so when such knowing demonstrates itself as true. By demonstrating itself it is assured of its truth. Thus in the phenomenal context of demonstration, the relationship of agreement must become visible. BTMR §44 Being-true as Being-uncovering, is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world. This latter PHENOMENON, which we have known as a basic state of Dasein, is the foundation for the primordial PHENOMENON of truth. We shall now follow this up more penetratingly. BTMR §44 ”Being-true” (“truth”) means Being-uncovering. But is not this a highly arbitrary way to define “truth”? By such drastic ways of defining this concept we may succeed in eliminating the idea of agreement from the conception of truth. Must we not pay for this dubious gain by plunging the ‘good’ old tradition into nullity? But while our definition is seemingly arbitrary, it contains only the necessary Interpretation of what was primordially surmised in the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy and even understood in a pre-phenomenological manner. If a logos as apophansis is to be true, its Being-true is aletheuein in the manner of apophainesthai – of taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). The aletheia which Aristotle equates with pragma and phainomena in the passages cited above, signifies the ‘things themselves’; it signifies what shows itself – entities in the “how” of their uncoveredness. And is it accidental that in one of the fragments of Heracleitus – the oldest fragments of philosophical doctrine in which the logos is explicitly handled – the PHENOMENON of truth in the sense of uncoveredness (unhiddenness), as we have set it forth, shows through? Those who are lacking in understanding are contrasted with the logos, and also with him who speaks that logos, and understands it. The logos is phrazon hopos echei: it tells how entities comport themselves. But to those who are lacking in understanding, what they do remains hidden – lanthanei. They forget it (epilanthanontai); that is, for them it sinks back into hiddenness. Thus to the logos belongs unhiddenness – a-letheia. To translate this word as ‘truth’, and, above all, to define this expression conceptually in theoretical ways, is to cover up the meaning of what the Greeks made ‘self-evidently’ basic for the terminological use of aletheia as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it. BTMR §44 We have now given a phenomenal demonstration of what we set forth earlier as to logos and aletheia in, so to speak, a dogmatic Interpretation. In proposing our ‘definition’ of “truth” we have not shaken off the tradition, but we have appropriated it primordially; and we shall have done so all the more if we succeed in demonstrating that the idea of agreement is one to which theory had to come on the basis of the primordial PHENOMENON of truth, and if we can show how this came about. BTMR §44 Being-true as Being-uncovering, is a way of Being for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called ‘true’ in a still more primordial sense. The most primordial PHENOMENON of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering. BTMR §44 Our earlier analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities within-the-world has Shown, however, that the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is grounded in the world’s disclosedness. But disclosedhess is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its “there”. Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self. In its very structure, care is ahead of itself – Being already in a world – as Being alongside entities within-the-world; and in this structure the disclosedness of Dasein lies hidden. With and through it is uncoveredness; hence only with Dasein’s disclosedness is the most primordial PHENOMENON of truth attained. What we have pointed out earlier with regard to the existential Constitution of the “there” and in relation to the everyday Being of the “there”, pertains ‘to the most primordial PHENOMENON of truth, nothing less. In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially ‘true’. Dasein is ‘in the truth’. This assertion has meaning ontologically. It does not purport to say that ontically Dasein is introduced ‘to all the truth’ either always or just in every case, but rather that the disclosedncss of its ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution. [SZ:221] BTMR §44 3. To Dasein’s state of Being belongs projection – disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-Being. As something that understands, Dasein can understand itself in terms of the ‘world’ and Others or in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The possibility just mentioned means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This authentic disclosedncss shows the PHENOMENON of the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the truth of existence. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis of Dasein’s authenticity. BTMR §44 The upshot of our existential-ontological Interpretation of the PHENOMENON of truth is (1) that truth, in the most primordial sense, is Dasein’s disclosedness, to which the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world belongs; and (2) that Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth. BTMR §44 Within the horizon of the traditional Interpretation of the PHENOMENON of truth, our insight into these principles will not be complete until it can be shown: (1) that truth, understood as agreement, originates from disclosedness by way of definite modification; (2) that the kind of Being which belongs to disclosedness itself is such that its derivative modification first comes into view and leads the way for the theoretical explication of the structure of truth. BTMR §44 Assertion and its structure (namely, the apophantical “as”) are founded upon interpretation and its structure (viz, the hermeneutical “as”) and also upon understanding – upon Dasein’s disclosedness. Truth, however, is regarded as a distinctive character of assertion as so derived. Thus the roots of the truth of assertion reach back to the disclosedness of the understanding. But over and above these indications of how the truth of assertion has originated, the PHENOMENON of agreement must now be exhibited explicitly in its derivative character. BTMR §44 Though it is founded upon Dasein’s disclosedness, the existential PHENOMENON of uncoveredness becomes a property which is present-at-hand but in which there still lurks a relational character; and as such a property, it gets broken asunder into a relationship which is present-at-hand. Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities – a Being which itself uncovers – has become truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth. BTMR §44 Yet that which is last in the order of the way things are connected in their foundations existentially and ontologically, is regarded ontically and factically as that which is first and closest to us. The necessity of this Fact, however, is based in turn upon the kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses. Dasein, in its concernful absorption, understands itself in terms of what it encounters within-the-world. The uncoveredncss which belongs to uncovering, is something that we come across proximally within-the-world in that which has been expressed [im Ausgesprochenen]. Not only truth, however, is encountered as present-at-hand: in general our understanding of Being is such that every entity is understood in the first instance as present-at-hand. If the ‘truth’ which we encounter proximally in an ontical manner is considered ontologically in the way that is closest to us, then the logos (the assertion) gets understood as logos tinos – as an assertion about something, an uncoveredness of something; but the PHENOMENON gets Interpreted as something present-at-hand with regard to its possible presence-at-hand. Yet because presence-at-hand has been equated with the meaning of Being in general, the question of whether this kind of Being of truth is a primordial one, and whether there is anything primordial in that structure of it which we encounter as closest to us, can not come alive at all. The primordial PHENOMENON of truth has been covered up by Dasein’s very understanding of Being – that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle. BTMR §44 The answer to the question of the meaning of Being has yet to be given [steht ... aus]. What has our fundamental analysis of Dasein, as we have carried it out so far, contributed to working out this question? By laying bare the PHENOMENON of care, we have clarified the state of Being of that entity to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. At the same time the Being of Dasein has thus been distinguished from modes of Being (readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, Reality) which. characterize entities with a character other than that of Dasein. Understanding has itself been elucidated; and at the same time the methodological transparency of the procedure of Interpreting Being by understanding it and interpreting it, has thus been guaranteed. BTMR §44 If in care we have arrived at Dasein’s primordial state of Being, then this must also be the basis for conceptualizing that understanding of Being which lies in care; that is to say, it must be possible to define the meaning of Being. But is the PHENOMENON of care one in which the most primordial existential-ontological state of Dasein is disclosed? And has the structural manifoldness which lies in this PHENOMENON, presented us with the most primordial totality of factical Dasein’s Being? Has our investigation up to this point ever brought Dasein into view as a whole? BTMR §44 What have we gained by our preparatory analysis of Dasein, and what are we seeking? In Being-in-the-world, whose essential structures centre in disclosedness, we have found the basic state of the entity we have taken as our theme. The totality of Being-in-the-world as a structural whole has revealed itself as care. In care the Being Of Dasein is included. When we came to analyse this Being, we took as our clue existence , which, in anticipation, we had designated as the essence of Dasein. This term “existence” formally indicates that Dasein is as an understanding potentialityfor-Being, which, in its Being, makes an issue of that Being itself. In every case, I myself am the entity which is in such a manner [dergestalt sciend]. By working out the PHENOMENON of care, we have given ourselves an insight into the concrete constitution of existence – that is, an insight into its equiprimordial connection with Dasein’s facticity and its falling. BTMR §45 Thus arises the task of putting Dasein as a whole into our fore-having. This signifies, however, that we must first of all raise the question of this entity’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to that which is thus outstanding, the ‘end’ itself belongs. The ‘end’ [SZ:232] of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being – that is to say, to existence – limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein. If, however, Dasein’s Being-at-an-end in death, and therewith its Being-a-whole, are to be included in the discussion of its possibly Being-a-whole, and if this is to be done in a way which is appropriate to the phenomena, then we must have obtained an ontologically adequate conception of death – that is to say an existential conception of it. But as something of the character of Dasein, death is only in an existentiell Being towards death [Sein zum Tode]. The existential structure of such Being proves to be the ontologically constitutive state of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. Thus the whole existing Dasein allows itself to be brought into our existential fore-having. But can Dasein also exist authentically as a whole? How is the authenticity of existence to be determined at all, if not with regard to authentic existing? Where do we get our criterion for this? Manifestly, Dasein itself must, in its Being, present us with the possibility and the manner of its authentic existence, unless such existence is something that can be imposed upon it ontically, or ontologically fabricated. But an authentic potentiality-for-Being is attested by the conscience. And conscience, as a PHENOMENON of Dasein, demands, like death, a genuinely existential Interpretation. Such an Interpretation leads to the insight that Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-Being in that it wants to have a conscience. But this is an existentiell possibility which tends, from the very meaning of its Being, to be made definite in an existentiell way by Being-towards-death. BTMR §45 But the primordial ontological basis for, Dasein’s existentiality is temporality. In terms of temporality, the articulated structural totality of Dasein’s Being as care first becomes existentially intelligible. The Interpretation of the meaning of Dasein’s Being cannot stop with this demonstration. The existential-temporal analysis of this entity needs to be confirmed concretely. We must go back and lay bare in their temporal meaning the ontological structures of Dasein which we have previously obtained. Everydayness reveals itself as a mode of temporality. But by thus recapitulating our preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, we will at the same time make the PHENOMENON of temporality itself more transparent. In terms of temporality, it then becomes intelligible why Dasein is, and can be, historical in the basis of its Being, and why, as historical, it can develop historiology. [SZ:235] BTMR §45 We must answer these questions before the problem of Dasein’s totality can be dismissed as nugatory [nichtiges]. This question – both the existentiell question of whether a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is possible, and the existential question of the state-of-Being of ‘end’ and ‘totality’ – is one in which there lurks the task of giving a positive analysis for some phenomena of existence which up till now have been left aside. In the centre of these considerations we have the task of characterizing ontologically Dasein’s Being-at-an-end and of achieving an existential conception of death. The investigations relating to these topics are divided up as follows: the possibility of experiencing the death of Others, and the possibility of getting a whole Dasein into our grasp (Section 47); that which is still outstanding, the end, and totality (Section 48); how the existential analysis of death is distinguished from other possible Interpretations of this PHENOMENON (Section 49); a preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death (Section 50); Being-towards-death and the everydayness of Dasein (Section 51); everyday Being-towards-death, and the full existential conception of death (Section 52); an existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death (Section 53). BTMR §46 Even the Dasein of Others, when it has reached its wholeness in death, is no-longer-Dasein, in the sense of Being-no-longer-in-the-world. Does not dying mean going-out-of-the-world, and losing one’s Being-in-the-world? Yet when someone has died, his Being-no-longer-in-the-world (if we understand it in an extreme way) is still a Being, but in the sense of the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of a corporeal Thing which we encounter. In the dying of the Other we can experience that remarkable PHENOMENON of Being which may be defined as the change-over of an entity from Dasein’s kind of Being (or life) to no-longer-Dasein. The end of the entity qua Dasein is the beginning of the same entity qua something present-at-hand. BTMR §47 However, this possibility of representing breaks down completely if the issue is one of representing that possibility-of-Being which makes up Dasein’s coming to an end, and which, as such, gives to it its wholeness. No one can take the Other’s dying away from him. Of course someone can ‘go to his death for another’. But ‘that always means to sacrifice oneself for the Other ‘in some definite affair’. Such “dying for” can never signify that the Other has thus had his death taken away in even the slightest degree. Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it ‘is’ at all. And indeed death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one’s own Dasein is an issue. In dying, it is shown that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death. Dying is not an event; it is a PHENOMENON to be understood existentially; and it is to be understood in a distinctive sense which must be still more closely delimited. BTMR §47 But if ‘ending’, as dying, is constitutive for Dasein’s totality, then the Being of this wholeness itself must be conceived as an existential PHENOMENON of a Dasein which is in each case one’s own. In ‘ending’, and in Dasein’s Being-a-whole, for which such ending is constitutive, there is, by its very essence, no representing. These are the facts of the case existentially; one fails to recognize this when one interposes the expedient of making the dying of Others a substitute theme for the analysis of totality. BTMR §47 So once again the attempt to make Dasein’s Being-a-whole accessible in a way that is appropriate to the phenomena, has broken down. But our deliberations have not been negative in their outcome; they have been oriented by the phenomena, even if only rather roughly. We have indicated that death is an existential PHENOMENON. Our investigation is thus forced into a purely existential orientation to the Dasein which is in every case one’s own. The only remaining possibility for the analysis of death as dying, is either to form a purely existential conception of this PHENOMENON, or else to forgo any ontological understanding of it. BTMR §47 From the foregoing discussion of the ontological possibility of getting death into our grasp, it becomes clear at the same time that substructures of entities with another kind of Being (presence-at-hand or life) thrust themselves to the fore unnoticed, and threaten to bring confusion to the Interpretation of this PHENOMENON – even to the first suitable way of presenting it. We can encounter this PHENOMENON only by seeking, for our further analysis, an ontologically adequate way of defining the phenomena which are constitutive for it, such as “end” and “totality”. BTMR §47 If we are to carry out a positive Interpretation of death and its character as an end, by way of existential analysis, we must take as our clue the basic state of Dasein at which we have already arrived – PHENOMENON of care. BTMR §48 §49. How the Existential Analysis of Death is Distinguished from Other Possible Interpretations of this PHENOMENON BTMR §49 Death, in the widest sense, is a PHENOMENON of life. Life must be understood as a kind of Being to which there belongs a Being-in-the-world. Only if this kind of Being is oriented in a privative way to Dasein, can we fix its character ontologically. Even Dasein may be considered purely as life. When the question is formulated from the viewpoint of biology and physiology, Dasein moves into that domain of Being which we know as the world of animals and plants. In this field, we can obtain data and statistics about the longevity of plants, animals and men, and we do this by ascertaining them ontically. Connections between longevity, propagation, and growth may be recognized. The ‘kinds’ of death, the causes, ‘contrivances’ and ways in which it makes its entry, can be explored. BTMR §49 Underlying this biological-ontical exploration of death is a problematic that is ontological. We still have to ask how the ontological essence of death is defined in terms of that of life. In a certain way, this has always been decided already in the ontical investigation of death. Such investigations operate with preliminary conceptions of life and death, which have been more or less clarified. These preliminary conceptions need to be sketched out by the ontology of Dasein. Within the ontology of Dasein, which is superordinate to an ontology of life, the existential analysis of death is, in turn, subordinate to a characterization of Dasein’s basic state. The ending of that which lives we have called ‘perishing’. Dasein too ‘has’ its death, Of the kind appropriate to anything that lives; and it has it, not in ontical isolation, but as codetermined by its primordial kind of Being. In so far as this is the case, Dasein too can end without authentically dying, though on the other hand, qua Dasein, it does not simply perish. We designate this intermediate PHENOMENON as its “demise”. Let the term “dying” stand for that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death. Accordingly we must say that Dasein never perishes. Dasein, however, can demise only as long as it is dying. Medical and biological investigation into “demising” can obtain results which may even become significant ontologically if the basic orientation for an existential Interpretation of death has been made secure. Or must sickness and death in general – even from a medical point of view – be primarily conceived as existential phenomena? [SZ:247] BTMR §49 On the other hand, in the ontological analysis of Being-towards-the-end there is no anticipation of our taking any existentiell stand toward death. If “death” is defined as the ‘end’ of Dasein – that is to say, of Being-in-the-world – this does not imply any ontical decision whether ‘after death’ still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein ‘lives on’ or everi ‘outlasts’ itself and is ‘immortal’. Nor is anything decided ontically about the ‘other-worldly’ and its possibility, any more than about the ‘this-worldly’; it is not as if norms and rules for comporting oneself towards death were to be proposed for ‘edification’. But our analysis of death remains purely ‘this-worldly’ in so far as it Interprets that PHENOMENON merely in the way in which it enters into any particular Dasein as a possibility of its Being. Only when death is conceived in its full ontological essence can we have anymethodological assurance in even asking what may be after death; only then can we do so with meaning and justification. Whether such a question is a possible theoretical question at all will not be decided here. The this-worldly ontological Interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation. [SZ:248] BTMR §49 Methodologically, the existential analysis is superordinate to the questions of a biology, psychology, theodicy, or theology of death. Taken ontically, the results of the analysis show the peculiar formality and emptiness of any ontological characterization. However, that must not blind us to the rich and complicated structure of the PHENOMENON. If Dasein in general never becomes accessible as something present-at-hand, because Being-possible belongs in its own way to Dasein’s kind of Being, even less may we expect that we can simply read off the ontological structure of death, if death is indeed a distinctive possibility of Dasein. BTMR §49 From our considerations of totality, end, and that which is still outstanding, there has emerged the necessity of Interpreting the PHENOMENON of death as Being-towards-the-end, and of doing so in terms of Dasein’s basic state. Only so can it be made plain to what extent Being-a-whole, as constituted by Being towards-the-end, is possible in Dasein itself in conformity with the structure of its Being. We have seen that care is the basic state of Dasein. The ontological signification of the expression “care” has been expressed in the ‘definition’: “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)”. In this are expressed the fundamental characteristics of Dasein’s Being: existence, in the “ahead-of-itself”; facticity, in the “Being-already-in”; falling, in the “Being-alongside”. If indeed death belongs in a distinctive sense to the Being of Dasein, then death (or Being-towards-the-end) must be defined in terms of these characteristics. [SZ:250] BTMR §50 We must, in the first instance, make plain in a preliminary sketch how Dasein’s existence, facticity, and falling reveal themselves in the PHENOMENON of death. BTMR §50 As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped [unüberholbare]. As such, death is something distinctively impending. Its existential possibility is based on the fact that Dasein is essentially disclosed to itself, and disclosed, indeed, as ahead-of-itself. This item in the structure of care has its most primordial concretion in Being-towards-death. As a PHENOMENON, Being-towards-the-end [SZ:251] becomes plainer as Being towards that distinctive possibility of Dasein which we have characterized. BTMR §50 Defining the existential structure of Being-towards-the-end helps us to work out a kind of Being of Dasein in which Dasein, as Dasein, can be a whole. The fact that even everyday Dasein already is towards its end – that is to say, is constantly coming to grips with its death, though in a ‘fugitive’ manner – shows that this end, conclusive [abschliessende] and determinative for Being-a-whole, is not something to which Dasein ultimately comes only in its demise. In Dasein, as being towards its death, its own uttermost “not-yet” has already been included – that “not-yet” which all others lie ahead of. So if one has given an ontologically inappropriate Interpretation of Dasein’s “not-yet” as something still outstanding, any formal inference from this to Dasein’s lack of totality will not be correct. The PHENOMENON of the “not-yet” has been taken over from the “ahead-of-itself”; no more than the care-structure in general, can it serve as a higher court which would rule against the possibility of an existent Being-a-whole; indeed this “ahead-of-itself” is what first of all makes such a Being-towards-the-end possible. The problem of the possible Being-a-whole of that entity which each of us is, is a correct one if care, as Dasein’s basic state, is ‘connected’ with death – the uttermost possibility for that entity. BTMR §52 However, Dasein comports itself towards something possible in its possibility by expecting it [im Erwarten]. Anyone who is intent on something possible, may encounter it unimpeded and undiminished in its ‘whether it comes or does not, or whether it comes after all’. But with this PHENOMENON of expecting, has not our analysis reached the same kind of Being towards the possible to which we have already called attention in our description of “Being out for something” concernfully? To expect something possible is always to understand it and to ‘have’ it with regard to whether and when and how it will be actually present-at-hand. Expecting is not just an occasional looking-away from the possible to its possible actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that actualization [ein Warten auf diese]. Even in expecting, one leaps away from the possible and gets a foothold in the actual. It is for its actuality that what is expected is expected. By the very nature of expecting, the possible is drawn into the actual, arising out of the actual and returning to it. BTMR §53 In the following Interpretation we shall claim that this potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein’s everyday interpretation of itself, is familiar to us as the “voice of conscience” [Stimme des Gewissens]. That the very ‘fact’ of conscience has been disputed, that its function as a higher court for Dasein’s existence has been variously assessed, and that ‘what conscience says’ has been interpreted in manifold ways – all this might only mislead us into dismissing this PHENOMENON if the very ‘doubtfulness’ of this Fact – or of the way in which it has been interpreted – did not prove that here a primordial PHENOMENON of Dasein lies before us. In the following analysis conscience will be taken as something which we have in advance theoretically, and it will be investigated in a purely existential mannner, with fundamental ontology as our aim. BTMR §54 We shall first trace conscience back to its existential foundations and structures and make it visible as a PHENOMENON of Dasein, holding fast to what we have hitherto arrived at as that entity’s state of Being. The ontological analysis of conscience on which we are thus embarking, is prior to any description and classification of Experiences of conscience, and likewise lies outside of any biological ‘explanation’ of this PHENOMENON (which would mean its dissolution). But it is no less distant from a theological exegesis of conscience or any employment of this PHENOMENON for proofs of God or for establishing an ‘immediate’ consciousness of God. [SZ:269] BTMR §54 Nevertheless, even when our investigation of conscience is thus restricted,,we must neither exaggerate its outcome nor make perverse claims about it and lessen its worth. As a PHENOMENON of Dasein, conscience is not just a fact which occurs and is occasionally present-at-hand. It ‘is’ only in Dasein’s kind of Being, and it makes itself known as a Fact only with factical existence and in it. The demand that an ‘inductive empirical proof’ should’ be given for the ‘factuality’ of conscience and for the legitimacy of its ‘voice’, rests upon an ontological perversion of the PHENOMENON. This perversion, however, is one that is shared by every “superior” criticism in which conscience is taken as something just occurring from time to time rather than as a ‘universally established and ascertainable fact’. Among such proofs and counterproofs, the Fact of conscience cannot present itself at all. This is no lack in it, but merely a sign by which we can recognize it as ontologically of a different kind from what is environmentally present-at-hand. BTMR §54 Conscience gives us ‘something’ to understand; it discloses. By characterizing this PHENOMENON formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness, as a basic state of that entity which we ourselves are, is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, falling, and discourse. If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call [Ruf]. Calling is a mode of discourse. The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty. This existential Interpretation is necessarily a far cry from everyday ontical common sense, though it sets forth the ontological foundations of what the ordinary way of interpreting conscience has always understood within certain limits and has conceptualized as a ‘theory’ of conscience. Accordingly our existential Interpretation needs to be confirmed by a critique of the way in which conscience is ordinarily interpreted. When this PHENOMENON has been exhibited, we can bring out the extent to which it attests an authentic potentiality-for-Being of Dasein. To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible bearing. Our understanding of the appeal unveils itself as our wanting to have a conscience [Gewissenhabenwollen]. But in this PHENOMENON lies that existentiell choosing which we seek – the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one’s-Self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call “resoluteness”. Thus we can see how the analyses of this chapter are divided up: the [SZ:270] existential-ontological foundations of conscience (Section 55); the character of conscience as a call (Section 56); conscience as the call of care (Section 57); understanding the appeal, and guilt (Section 58); the existential Interpretation of conscience and the way conscience is ordinarily interpreted (Section 59); the existential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which is attested in the conscience (Section 60). BTMR §54 In the PHENOMENON of conscience we find, without further differentiation, that in some way it gives us something to understand. Our analysis of it takes its departure from this finding. Conscience discloses, and thus belongs within the range of those existential phenomena which constitute the Being of the “there” as disclosedness. We have analysed the most universal structures-of-state-of-mind, understanding, discourse and falling. If we now bring conscience into this phenomenal context, this is not a matter of applying these structures schematically to a special ‘case’ of Dasein’s disclosure. On the contrary, our Interpretation of conscience not only will carry further our earlier analysis of the disclosedness of the “there”, but it will also grasp it more primordially with regard to Dasein’s authentic Being. BTMR §55 But by this characterization of the conscience we have only traced the phenomenal horizon for analysing its existential structure. We are not comparing this PHENOMENON with a call; we are understanding it as a kind of discourse – in terms of the disclosedness that is constitutive for Dasein. In considering this we have from the beginning avoided the first route which offers itself for an Interpretation of conscience – that of tracing it back to some psychical faculty such as understanding, will, or feeling, or of explaining it as some sort of mixture of these. When one is confronted with such a PHENOMENON as conscience, one is struck by the ontologico-anthropological inadequacy of a free-floating framework of psychical faculties or personal actions all duly classified. BTMR §55 The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite. Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent. In this way it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces the Dasein which has been appealed to and summoned, into the reticence of itself. The fact that what is called in the call has not been formulated in words, does not give this PHENOMENON the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but merely indicates that our understanding of what is ‘called’ is not to be tied up with an expectation of anything like a communication. [SZ:274] BTMR §56 Conscience summons Dasein’s Self from its lostness in the “they”. The Self to which the appeal is made remains indefinite and empty in its “what”. When Dasein interprets itself in terms of that with which it concerns itself, the call passes over what Dasein, proximally and for the most part, understands itself a s. And yet the Self has been reached, unequivocally and unmistakably. Not only is the call meant for him to whom the appeal is made ‘without regard for persons’, but even the caller maintains itself in conspicuous indefiniteness. If the caller is asked about its name, status, origin, or repute, it not only refuses to answer, but does not even leave the slightest possibility of one’s making it into something with which one can be familiar when one’s understanding of Dasein has a ‘worldly’ orientation. On the other hand, it by no means disguises itself in the call. That which calls the call, simply holds itself aloof from any way’of becoming well-known, and this belongs to its phenomenal character. To let itself be drawn into getting considered and talked about, goes against its kind of Being. The peculiar indefiniteness of the caller and the impossibility of making more definite what this caller is, are not just nothing; they are distinctive for it in a positive way. They make known to us that the caller is solely absorbed in summoning us to something, that it is heard only as such, and furthermore that it will not let itself be coaxed. But if so, is it not quite appropriate to the PHENOMENON to leave unasked the question of what the caller is? Yes indeed, when it comes to listening to the factical call of conscience in an existentiell way, but not when it comes to analysing existentially the facticity of the calling and the existentiality of the hearing. [SZ:275] BTMR §57 But methodologically this is too precipitate. We must instead hold fast not only to the phenomenal finding that I receive the call as coming both from me and from beyond me, but also to the implication that this PHENOMENON is here delineated ontologically as a PHENOMENON of Dasein. Only the existential constitution of this entity can afford us a clue for Interpreting the kind of Being of the ‘it’ which does the calling. [SZ:276] BTMR §57 Such considerations are indisputably within their rights. We can, however, demand that in any Interpretation of conscience ‘one’ should recognize in it the PHENOMENON in question as it is experienced in an everyday manner. But satisfying this requirement does not mean in turn that the ordinary ontical way of understanding conscience must be recognized as the first court of appeal [erste Instanz] for an ontological Interpretation. On the other hand, the considerations which we have just marshalled remain premature as long as the analysis of conscience to which they pertain falls short of its goal. Hitherto we have merely tried to trace back conscience as a PHENOMENON of Dasein to the ontological constitution of that entity. This has served to prepare us for the task of making the conscience intelligible as an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being – an attestation which lies in Dasein itself. BTMR §57 But what the conscience attests becomes completely definite only when we have delimited plainly enough the character of the hearing which genuinely corresponds to the calling. The authentic understanding which ‘follows’ the call is not a mere addition which attaches itself to the PHENOMENON of conscience by a process Which may or may not be forthcoming. Only from an understanding of the appeal and together with such an understanding does the full Experience of conscience let itself be grasped. If in each case the caller and he to whom the appeal is made are at the same time one’s own Dasein themselves, then in any failure to hear the call or any incorrect hearing of oneself, there lies a definite kind of Dasein’s Being. A free-floating call from which ‘nothing ensues’ is an’ impossible fiction when seen existentially. With regard to Dasein, ‘that nothing ensues’ signifies something positive. BTMR §57 But is not the question of what the call says answered more easily and surely if we ‘simply’ allude to what we generally hear or fail to hear in any experience of conscience: namely, that the call either addresses Dasein as ‘Guilty!’, or, as in the case when the conscience gives warning, refers to a possible ‘Guilty!’, or affirms, as a ‘good’ conscience, that one is ‘conscious of no guilt’? Whatever the ways in which conscience is experienced or interpreted, all our experiences ‘agree’ on this ‘Guilty!’. If only it were not defined in such wholly different ways! And even if the meaning of this ‘Guilty!’ should let itself be taken in a way upon which everyone is agreed, the existential conception of this Being-guilty would still remain obscure. Yet if Dasein ‘addresses itself as ‘Guilty!’, whence could it draw its idea of guilt except from the Interpretation of its own Being? All the same, the question arises a new: who says how we are guilty and what “guilt” signifies? On the other hand, the idea of guilt is not one which could be thought up arbitrarily and forced upon Dasein. If any understanding of the essence of guilt is possible at all, then this possibility must have been sketched out in Dasein beforehand. How are we to find the trail which can lead to revealing this PHENOMENON? All ontological investigations of such phenomena as guilt, conscience, and death, must start with what the everyday interpretation of Dasein ‘says’ about them. Because Dasein has falling as its kind of Being, the way Dasein gets interpreted is for the most part inauthentically ‘oriented’ and does not reach the ‘essence’; for to Dasein the primordially appropriate ontological way of formulating questions remains alien. But whenever we see something wrongly, some injunction as to the primordial ‘idea’ of the PHENOMENON is revealed along with it. Where, however, shall we get our criterion for the primordial existential meaning of the ‘Guilty!’? From the fact that this ‘Guilty!’ turns up as a predicate for the ‘I am’. Is it possible that what is understood as ‘guilt’ in our inauthentic interpretation lies in Dasein’s Being as such, and that it does so in such a way that so far as any Dasein factically exists, it is also guilty? [SZ:281] BTMR §58 We need not consider how such requirements arise and in what way their character as requirements and laws must be conceived by reason of their having such a source. In any case, “Being-guilty” in the sense last mentioned, the breach of a ‘moral requirement’, is a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein. Of course this holds good also for “Being-guilty” as ‘making oneself punishable’ and as ‘having debts’, and for any ‘having responsibility for ...’. These too are ways in which Dasein behaves. If one takes ‘laden with moral guilt’ as a ‘quality’ of Dasein, one has said very little. On the contrary, this only makes it manifest that such a characterization does not suffice for distinguishing ontologically between this kind of ‘attribute of Being’ for Dasein and those other ways of behaving which we have just listed. After all, the concept of moral guilt has been so little clarified ontologically that when the idea of deserving punishment, or even of having debts to someone, has also been included in this concept, or when these ideas have been employed in the very defining of it, such interpretations of this PHENOMENON could become prevalent and have remained so. But therewith the ‘Guilty!’ gets thrust aside into the domain of concern in the sense of reckoning up claims and balancing them off. [SZ:283] BTMR §58 The PHENOMENON of guilt, which is not necessarily related to ‘having debts’ and law-breaking, can be clarified only if we first inquire in principle into Dasein’s Being-guilty – in other words, if we conceive the idea of ‘Guilty!’ in terms of Dasein’s kind of Being. BTMR §58 The concepts of privation and lack – which, moreover, are not very transparent – are already insufficient for the ontological Interpretation of the PHENOMENON of guilt, though if we take them formally enough, we can put them to considerable use. Least of all can we come any closer to the existential PHENOMENON of guilt by taking our orientation from the idea of evil, the malum as privatio boni. Just as the bonum and its privatio have the same ontological origin in the ontology of the present-at-hand, this ontology also applies to the idea of ‘value’, which has been ‘abstracted’ from these. BTMR §58 Though the call gives no information, it is not merely critical; it is positive, in that it discloses Dasein’s most primordial potentiality-for-Being as Being-guilty. Thus conscience manifests itself as an attestation which belongs to Dasein’s Being – an attestation in which conscience calls Dasein itself face to face with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Is there an existentially more concrete way of determining the character of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which has thus been attested? But now that we have exhibited a potentiality-for-Being which is attested in Dasein itself, a preliminary question arises: can we claim sufficient evidential weight for the way we have exhibited this, as long as the embarrassment of our Interpreting the conscience in a one-sided manner by tracing it back to Dasein’s constitution while hastily passing over all the familiar findings of the ordinary interpretation of conscience, is one that is still undiminished? Is, then, the PHENOMENON of conscience, as it actually’ is, still recognizable at all in the Interpretation we have given? Have we not been all too sure of ourselves in the ingenuousness with which we have deduced an idea of the conscience from Dasien’s state of Being? [SZ:289] BTMR §58 Conscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world – the call which summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty. And corresponding to this call, wanting-to-have-a-conscience has emerged as the way in which the appeal is understood. These two definitions cannot be brought into harmony at once with the ordinary interpretation of conscience. Indeed they seem to be in direct conflict with it. We call this interpretation of conscience the “ordinary” one [Vulgär] because in characterizing this PHENOMENON and describing its’ ‘function’, it sticks to what “they” know as the conscience, and how “they” follow it or fail to follow it. BTMR §59 And so with regard to the ordinary kind of Being of Dasein itself, there is no guarantee that the way of interpreting conscience which springs from it or the theories of conscience which are thus oriented, have arrived at the right ontological horizon for its Interpretation. In spite of this, even the ordinary experience of conscience must somehow – pre-ontologically – reach this PHENOMENON. Two things follow from this: on the one hand, the everyday way of interpreting conscience cannot be accepted as the final criterion for the ‘Objectivity’ of an ontological analysis. On the other hand, such an analysis has no right to disregard the everyday understanding of conscience and to pass over the anthropological, psychological, and theological theories of conscience which have been based upon it. If existential analysis has laid bare the PHENOMENON of conscience in its ontological roots, then precisely in terms of this analysis the ordinary interpretations must become intelligible; and they must become intelligible not least in the ways in which they miss the PHENOMENON and in the reasons why they conceal it. But since in the context of the problems of this treatise the analysis of conscience is merely ancillary to what is ontologically the fundamental question, we must be satisfied with alluding to the essential problems when we characterize the connection between the existential Interpretation of conscience and the way it is ordinarily interpreted. [SZ:290] BTMR §59 In this ordinary interpretation there are four objections which might be brought up against our Interpretation of conscience as the summons of care to Being-guilty: (1) that the function of conscience is essentially critical; (2) that conscience always speaks in a way that is relative to some definite deed which has been performed or willed; (3) that when the ‘voice’ is experienced, it is never so radically related to Dasein’s Being; (4) that our Interpretation takes no account of the basic forms of the PHENOMENON – ‘evil’ conscience and ‘good’, that which ‘reproves’ and that which ‘warns’. BTMR §59 But does the ‘fact’ that the voice comes afterwards, prevent the call from being basically a calling-forth? That the voice gets taken as a stirring of conscience which follows after is not enough to prove that we understand the PHENOMENON of conscience primordially. What if factical indebtedness were only the occasion for the factical calling of conscience? What if that Interpretation of the ‘evil’ conscience which we have described goes only half way? That such is the case is evident from the ontological fore-having within whose scope the PHENOMENON has been brought by this Interpretation. The voice is something that turns up; it has its position in the sequence of Experiences which are present-at-hand, and it follows after the Experience of the deed. But neither the call, nor the deed which has happened, nor the guilt with which one is laden, is an occurrence with the character of something present-at-hand which runs its course. The call has the kind of Being which belongs to care. In the call Dasein ‘is’ ahead of itself in such a way that at the same time it directs itself back to its thrownness. Only by first positing that Dasein is an interconnected sequence of successive Experiences, is it possible to take the voice as something which comes afterwards, something later, which therefore necessarily refers back. The voice does call back, but it calls beyond the deed which has happened, and back to the Being-guilty into which one has been thrown, which is ‘earlier’ than any indebtedness. But at the same time, this calling-back calls forth to Being-guilty, as something to be seized upon in one’s own existence, so that authentic existentiell Being-guilty only ‘follows after’ the call, not vice versa. Bad conscience is basically so far from just reproving and pointing back that it rather points forward as it calls one back into one’s thrownness. The order of the sequence in which Experiences run their course does not give us the phenomenal structure of existing. [SZ:291] BTMR §59 If we cannot reach the primordial PHENOMENON by a characterization of ‘bad’ conscience, still less can we do so by a characterization of ‘good’ conscience, whether we take this as a self-subsistent form of conscience or as one which is essentially founded upon ‘bad’ conscience. Just as Dasein’s ‘Being-evil’ would be made known to us in the ‘bad’ conscience, the ‘good’ conscience must have made known its ‘Being-good’. It is easy to see that the conscience which used to be an ‘effluence of the divine power’ now becomes a slave of Pharisaism. Such a conscience would let a man say of himself ‘I am good’; who else can say this than the good man himself, and who would be less willing to affirm it? But if this impossible conclusion is drawn from the idea of the good conscience, the fact that ‘Being-guilty” is what the conscience calls, only comes to the fore. BTMR §59 In so far as talk about a ‘good’ conscience arises from everyday Dasein’s way of experiencing the conscience, everyday Dasein merely betrays thereby that even when it speaks of the ‘bad’ conscience it basically fails to reach the PHENOMENON. For the idea of the ‘bad’ conscience is oriented factically by that of the ‘good’ conscience. The everyday interpretation keeps within the dimension of concernfully reckoning up ‘guilt’ and ‘innocence’ [“Unschuld”] and balancing them off. This, then, is the horizon within which the voice of conscience gets ‘Experienced’. BTMR §59 In characterizing what is primordial in the ideas of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ conscience, we have also decided as to the distinction between a conscience which points forward and warns and one which points back and reproves. The idea of the warning conscience seems, of course, to come closest to the PHENOMENON of the summons. It shares with this the character of pointing forward. But this agreement is just an illusion. When we experience a warning conscience, the voice is regarded in turn as merely oriented towards the deed which has been willed, from which it seeks to preserve us. But the warning, as a check on what we have willed, is possible only because the ‘warning’ call is aimed at Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being – that is, at its understanding of itself in Being-guilty; not until we have such understanding does ‘what we have willed’ get shattered. The conscience which warns us has the function of regulating from moment to moment our remaining free from indebtednesses. In the experience of a ‘warning’ conscience the tendency of its call is seen only to the extent that it remains accessible to the common sense of the “they”. BTMR §59 The third consideration which we have mentioned invokes the fact that the everyday experience of the conscience has no acquaintance with anything like getting summoned to Being-guilty. This must be conceded. But does this everyday experience thus give us any guarantee that the ‘full possible content of the call of the voice of conscience has been heard therein? Does it follow from this that theories of conscience which are based on the ordinary way of experiencing it have made certain that their ontological horizon for analysing this PHENOMENON is an appropriate one? Does not falling, which is an essential kind of Being for Dasein, show us rather that ontically this entity understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of the horizon of concern, but that ontologically, it defines “Being” in the sense of presence-at-hand? This, however, leads to covering up the PHENOMENON in two ways: what one sees in this theory is a sequence of Experiences or ‘psychical processes’ – a sequence whose kind of Being is for the most part wholly indefinite. In such experience the conscience is encountered as an arbiter and admonisher, with whom Dasein reckons and pleads its cause. [SZ:293] BTMR §59 If, however, that which is primary in the call is not a relatedness to a guilt which is factically ‘present-at-hand” or to some guilt-charged deed which has been factically willed, and if accordingly the ‘reproving’ and ‘warning’ types of conscience express no primordial call-functions, then we have also undermined the consideration we mentioned first, that the existential Interpretation fails to recognize the ‘essentially’ critical character of what the conscience does. This consideration too is one that springs from catching sight of the PHENOMENON in a manner which, within certain limits, is genuine; for in the content of the call, one can indeed point to nothing which the voice ‘positively’ recommends and imposes. But how are we to understand this positivity which is missing in what the conscience does? Does it follow from this that conscience has a ‘negative’ character? [SZ:294] BTMR §59 Resoluteness, by its ontological essence, is always the resoluteness of some factical Dasein at a particular time. The essence of Dasein as an entity is its existence. Resolutcness ‘exists’ only as a resolution [Entschluss] which understandingly projects itself. But on what basis does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness? On what is it to resolve? Only the resolution itself can give the answer. One would completely misunderstand the PHENOMENON of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them. The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time. To resoluteness, the indefiniteness characteristic of every potentiality-for-Being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs. Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself. The existentiell indefiniteness of resoluteness never makes itself definite except in a resolution; yet it has, all the same, its existential definiteness. BTMR §60 What one resolves upon in resoluteness has been prescribed ontologically in the existentiality of Dasein in general as a potentiality-for-Being in the manner of concernful solicitude. As care, however, Dasein has been Determined by facticity and falling. Disclosed in its ‘there’, it maintains itself both in truth and in untruth with equal primordiality. This ‘really’ holds in particular for resoluteness as authentic truth. Resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically. Dasein is already in irresoluteness [Unentschlossenheit], and soon, perhaps, will be in it again. The term “irresoluteness’ merely expresses that PHENOMENON which we have Interpreted as a Being-surrendered to the way in which things have been prevalently interpreted by the “they”. Dasein, as a they-self, gets ‘lived’ by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has always made its decision. “Resoluteness” signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness in the “they”. The irresoluteness of the “they” remains dominant notwithstanding, but it cannot impugn resolute existence. In the counterconcept to irresoluteness, as resoluteness as existentially understood, we do not have in mind any ontico-psychical characteristic in the sense of Being-burdened with inhibitions. Even resolutions remain dependent upon [SZ:299] the “they” and its world. The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness is what first gives authentic transparency to Dasein. In resoluteness the issue for Dasein is its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factical possibilities. Resolution does not withdraw itself from ‘actuality’, but discovers first what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the “they”. The existential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein include the items constitutive for an existential PHENOMENON which we call a “Situation” and which we have hitherto passed over. BTMR §60 This PHENOMENON which we have exhibited as “resoluteness’ can hardly be confused with an empty ‘habitus’, or an indefinite ‘velleity’. Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of a Situation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into that Situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already taking action. The term ‘take action’ is one which we are purposely avoiding. For in the first place this term must be taken so broadly that “activity” [Aktivität] will also embrace the passivity of resistance. In the second place, it suggests a misunderstanding in the ontology of Dasein, as if resoluteness were a special way of behaviour belonging to the practical faculty as contrasted with one that is theoretical. Care, however, as concernful solicitude, so primordially and wholly envelops Dasein’s Being that it must already be presupposed as a whole when we distinguish between theoretical and practical behaviour; it cannot first be built up out of these faculties by a dialectic which, because it is existentially ungrounded, is necessarily quite baseless. Resoluteness, however, is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care [in der Sorge gesorgte], and which is possible as care – the authenticity of care itself. [SZ:301] BTMR §60 §61. A Preliminag Sketch of the Methodological Step from the Definition of Dasein’s Authentic Being-a-whole to the Laying-bare of Temporality as a PHENOMENON BTMR §61 An authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole on the part of Dasein has been projected existentially. By analysing this PHENOMENON, we have revealed that authentic Being-towards-death is anticipation. Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being, in its existentiell attestation, has been exhibited, and at the same time existentially Interpreted, as resoluteness. How are these two phenomena of anticipation and resoluteness to be brought together? Has not our ontological projection of the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole led us into a dimension of Dasein which lies far from the PHENOMENON of resoluteness? What can death and the ‘concrete Situation’ of taking action have in common? In attempting to bring resoluteness and anticipation forcibly together, are we not seduced into an intolerable and quite unphenomenological construction, for which we can no longer claim that it has the character of an ontological projection, based upon the phenomena? [SZ:302] BTMR §61 Any superficial binding together of the two phenomena is excluded. There still remains one way out, and this is the only possible method: namely, to take as our point of departure the PHENOMENON of resoluteness, as attested in its existentiell possibility, and to ask: “Does resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell tendency of Being, point forward to anticipatory resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility?” What if resoluteness, in accordance with its own meaning, should bring itself into its authenticity only when it projects itself not upon any random possibilities which just-lie closest, but upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of every factical potentiality-for-Being of Dasein, and, as such, enters more or less undisguiscdly into every potentiality-for-Being of which Dasein factically takes hold? What if it is only in the anticipation of [zum] death that resoluteness, as Dasein’s authentic truth, has reached the authentic certainty which belongs to it? What, if it is only in the anticipation if death that all the factical ‘anticipatoriness’ of resolving would be authentically understood – in other words, that it would be caught up with in an existentiell way? BTMR §61 Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or Real. Its ‘subsistence’ is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the ‘Self-subsistence’ of the existing Self, whose Being has been conceived as care. The PHENOMENON of the Self – a PHENOMENON which is included in care – needs to be defined existentially in a way which is primordial and authentic, in contrast to our preparatory exhibition of the inauthentic they-self. Along with this, we must establish what possible ontological questions are to be directed towards the ‘Self’, if indeed it is neither substance nor subject. BTMR §61 In this way, the PHENOMENON of care will be adequately clarified for. the first time, and we shall then interrogate it as to its ontological meaning. When this meaning has been determined, temporality will have been laid bare. In exhibiting this, we are not led into out-of-the-way and sequestered domains of Dasein; we merely get a conception of the entire phenomenal content of Dasein’s basic existential constitution in the ultimate foundations of its own ontological intelligibility. Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole, in the PHENOMENON of anticipatory resoluteness. If temporality makes itself known primordially in this, then we may suppose that the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness is a distinctive mode of temporality. Temporality has different possibilities and different ways of temporalizing itself. The basic possibilities [SZ:304] of existence, the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein, are grounded ontologically on possible temporalizations of temporality. BTMR §61 If the ascendancy of the falling understanding of Being (of Being as presence-at-hand) keeps Dasein far from the ontological character of its own Being, it keeps it still farther from the primordial foundations of that Being. So one must not be surprised if, at first glance, temporality does not correspond to that which is accessible to the ordinary understanding as ‘time’. Thus neither the way time is conceived in our ordinary experience of it, nor the problematic which arises from this experience, can function without examination as a criterion for the appropriateness of an Interpretation of time. Rather, we must, in our investigation, make ourselves familiar beforehand with the primordial PHENOMENON of temporality, so that in terms of this we may cast light on the necessity, the source, and the reason for the dominion of the way it is ordinarily understood. BTMR §61 The primordial PHENOMENON of temporality will be held secure by demonstrating that if we have regard for the possible totality, unity, and development of those fundamental structures of Dasein which we have hitherto exhibited, these structures are all to be conceived as at bottom ‘temporal’ and as modes of the temporalizing of temporality. Thus, when temporality has been laid bare, there arises for the existential analytic the task of repeating our analysis of Dasein in the sense of Interpreting its essential structures with regard to their temporality. The basic directions of the analyses thus required are prescribed by temporality itself. Accordingly the chapter will be divided as follows: anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity (Section 62); the hermeneutical Situation at which we have arrived for Interpreting the meaning of the Being of care, and the methodological character of the existential analytic in general (Section 63); care and Selfhood (Section 64); temporality as the ontological meaning of care (Section 65); Dasein’s temporality and the tasks arising therefrom of repeating the existential analysis in a primordial manner (Section 66). [SZ:305] BTMR §61 When resoluteness has been ‘thought through to the end’ in a way corresponding to its ownmost tendency of Being, to what extent does it lead us to authentic Being-towards-death? How are we to conceive the connection between wanting to have a conscience and Dasein’s existentially projected, authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole? Does welding these two together yield a new PHENOMENON? Or are we left with the resoluteness which is attested in its existentiell possibility, and can this resoluteness undergo an existentiell modalization through Being-towards-death? What does it mean ‘to think through to the end’ existentially the PHENOMENON of resoluteness? BTMR §62 The PHENOMENON of resoluteness has brought us before the primordial truth of existence. As resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical potentiality-for-Being, and in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing and Being-revealed. To any truth, there belongs a corresponding holding-for-true. The explicit appropriating of what has been disclosed or discovered is Being-certain. The primordial truth of existence demands an equiprimordial Being-certain, in which one maintains oneself in what resoluteness discloses. It gives itself the current factical Situation, and brings itself into that Situation. The Situation cannot be calculated in advance or presented like something present-at-hand which is waiting for someone to grasp it. It merely gets disclosed in a free resolving which has not been determined beforehand but is open to the possibility of such determination. What, then, does the certainty which belongs to such resoluteness signify? Such certainty must maintain itself in what is disclosed by the resolution. But this means that it simply cannot become rigid as regards the Situation, but must understand that the resolution, in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure, must be held open and free for the current factical possibility. The certainty of the resolution signifies that one holds oneself free for the possibility of taking it back – a possibility which is factically necessary. However, such holding-for-true in resoluteness (as the truth of existence) by no means lets us fall back into irresoluteness. On the contrary, this holding-for-true, as a resolute holding-oneself-free for taking back, is authentic resoluteness which resolves to keep repeating itself. Thus, in [SZ:308] an existentiell manner, one’s very lostness in irresoluteness gets undermined. The holding-for-true which belongs to resoluteness, tends, in accordance with its meaning, to hold itself free constantly – that is, to hold itself free for Dasein’s whole potentiality-for-Being. This constant certainty is guaranteed to resoluteness only so that it will relate itself to that possibility of which it can be utterly certain. In its death, Dasein must simply ‘take back’ everything. Since resoluteness is constantly certain of death – in other words, since it anticipates it – resoluteness thus attains a certainty which is authentic and whole. BTMR §62 By thus casting light upon the ‘connection’ between anticipation and resoluteness in the sense of the possible modalization of the latter by the former, we have exhibited as a PHENOMENON an authentic potentialityfor-Being-a-whole which belongs to Dasein. If with this PHENOMENON we have reached a way of Being of Dasein in which it brings itself to itself and face to face with itself, then this PHENOMENON must, both ontically and ontologically, remain unintelligible to the everyday common-sense manner in which Dasein has been interpreted by the “they”. It would be a misunderstanding to shove this existentiell possibility aside as ‘unproved’ or to want to ‘prove’ it theoretically. Yet the PHENOMENON needs to be protected against the grossest perversions. [SZ:310] BTMR §62 The way which we have so far pursued in the analytic of Dasein has led us to a concrete demonstration of the thesis which was put forward just casually at the beginning – that the entity which in every case we ourselves are, is ontologically that which is farthest. The reason for this lies in care itself. Our Being alongside the things with which we concern ourselves most closely in the ‘world’ – a Being which is falling – guides the everyday way in which Dasein is interpreted, and covers up ontically Dasein’s authentic Being, so that the ontology which is directed towards this entity is denied an appropriate basis. Therefore the primordial way in which this entity is presented as a PHENOMENON is anything but obvious, if even ontology proximally follows the course of the everyday interpretation of Dasein. The laying-bare of Dasein’s primordial Being must rather be wrested from Dasein by following the opposite course from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation. BTMR §63 Even if the ontico-ontological projection of Dasein upon an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole may not be just something that is left to our discretion, does this already justify the existential Interpretation we have given for this PHENOMENON? Where does this Interpretation get its clue, if not from an idea of existence in general which has been ‘presupposed’? How have the steps in the analysis of inauthentic everydayness been regulated, if not by the concept of existence which we have posited? And if we say that Dasein ‘falls’, and that therefore the authenticity of its potentiality-for-Being must be wrested from Dasein in spite of this tendency of its Being, from what point of view is this spoken? Is not everything already illumined by the light of the ‘presupposed’ idea of existence, even if rather dimly? Where does this idea get its justification? Has our initial projection, in which we called attention to it, led us nowhere? By no means. BTMR §63 Under the guidance of this idea the preparatory analysis of the everydayness that lies closest to us has been carried out as far as the first conceptual [SZ:314] definition of “care”. This latter PHENOMENON has enabled us to get a more precise grasp of existence and of its relations to facticity and falling. And defining the structure of care has given us a basis on which to distinguish ontologically between existence and Reality for the first time. This has led us to the thesis that the substance of man is existence. BTMR §63 At the same time our analysis of anticipatory resoluteness has led us to the PHENOMENON of primordial and authentic truth. We have shown earlier how that understanding-of-Being which prevails proximally and for the most part, conceives Being in the sense of presence-at-hand, and so covers up the primordial PHENOMENON of truth. If, however, ‘there is’ Being only in so far as truth ‘is’, and if the understanding of Being varies according to the kind of truth, then truth which is primordial and authentic must guarantee the understanding of the Being of Dasein and of Being in general. The ontological ‘truth’ of the existential analysis is developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth. However, the latter does not necessarily need the former. The most primordial and basic existential truth, for which the problematic of fundamental ontology strives in preparing for the question of Being in general, is the disclosedness of the meaning of the Being of care. In order to lay bare this meaning, we need to hold in readiness, undiminished, the full structural content of care. BTMR §63 Through the unity of the items which are constitutive for care – existentiality, facticity, and fallenness – it has become possible to give the first ontological definition for the totality of Dasein’s structural whole.’ We have given an existential formula for the structure of care as “aheadof-itself – Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)”. We have seen that the care-structure does not first arise from a coupling together, but is articulated all the sarne. In assessing this ontological result, we have had to estimate how well it [SZ:317] satisfies the requirements for a primordial Interpretation of Dasein. The upshot of these considerations has been that neither the whole of Dasein nor its authentic potentiality-for-Being has ever been made a theme. The structure of care, however, seems to be precisely where the attempt to grasp the whole of Dasein as a PHENOMENON has foundered. The “ahead-of-itself” presented itself as a “not-yet”. But when the “ahead-of-itself” which had been characterized as something still outstanding, was considered in genuinely existential manner, it revealed itself as Being-towards-the-end – something which, in the depths of its Being, every Dasein is. We made it plain at the same time that in the call of conscience care summons Dasein towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When we came to understand in a primordial manner how this appeal is understood, we saw that the understanding of it manifests itself as anticipatory resoluteness, which includes an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole – a potentiality of Dasein. Thus the care-structure does not speak against the possibility of Being-a-whole but is the condition for the possibility of such an existentiell potentiality-for-Being. In the course of these analyses, it became plain that the existential phenomena of death, conscience, and guilt are anchored in the PHENOMENON of care. The totality of the structural whole has become even more richly articulated; and because of this, the existential question of the unity of this totality has become still more urgent. BTMR §64 How are we to conceive this unity? How can Dasein exist as a unity in the ways and possibilities of its Being which we have mentioned? Manifestly, it can so exist only in such a way that it is itself this Being in its essential possibilities – that in each case I am this entity. The ‘I’ seems to ‘hold together’ the totality of the structural whole. In the ‘ontology’ of this entity, the ‘I’ and the ‘Self’ have been conceived from the earliest times as the supporting ground (as substance or subject). Even in its preparatory characterization of everydayness, our analytic has already come up against the question of Dasein’s “who”. It has been shown that proximally and for the most part Dasein is not itself but is lost in the they-self, which is an existentiell modification of the authentic Self. The question of the ontological constitution of Selfhood has remained unanswered. In principle, of course, we have already fixed upon a clue for this problem; for if the Self belongs to the essential [wesenhaften] attributes of Dasein, while Dasein’s ‘Essence’ [“Essenz”] lies in existence, then “I”-hood and Selfhood must be conceived existentially. On the negative side, it has also been shown that our ontological characterization of the “they” prohibits us from making any use of categories of presence-at-hand (such as substance). It has become clear, in principle, that ontologically care is not to be derived from Reality or to be built up with the [SZ:318] categories of Reality. Care already harbours in itself the PHENOMENON of the Self, if indeed the thesis is correct that the expression ‘care for oneself’ [“Selbstsorge”], would be tautological if it were proposed in conformity with the term “solicitude” [Fürsorge] as care for Others. But in that case the problem of defining ontologically the Selfhood of Dasein gets sharpened to the question of the existential ‘connection’ between care and Selfhood. BTMR §64 For Kant, however, these representations are the ‘empirical’, which is ‘accompanied’ by the “I” – the appearances to which the “I” ‘clings’. Kant nowhere shows the kind of Being of this ‘clinging’ and ‘accompanying’. At bottom, however, their kind of Being is understood as the constant Being-present-at-hand of the “I” along with its representations. Kant has indeed avoided cutting the “I” adrift from thinking; but he has done so without starting with the ‘I think’ itself in its full essential content as an ‘I think something’, and above all, without seeing what is ontologically ‘presupposed’ in taking the ‘I think something’ as a basic characteristic of the Self. For even the ‘I think something’ is not definite enough ontologically as a starting-point, because the ‘something’ remains indefinite. If by this “something” we understand an entity within-the-world, then it tacitly implies that the world has been presupposed; and this very PHENOMENON of the world co-determines the state of Being of the “I”, if indeed it is to be possible for the “I” to be something like an ‘I think something’. In saying “I”, I have in view the entity which in each case I am as an ‘Iam-in-a-world’. Kant did not see the PHENOMENON of the world, and was consistent enough to keep the ‘representations’ apart from the a priori content of the ‘I think’. But as a consequence the “I” was again forced back to an isolated subject, accompanying representations in a way which is ontologically quite indefinite. BTMR §64 Being-already-in-a-world, however, as Being-alongside-the-ready-to-hand-within-the-world, means, equiprimordially that one is ahead of oneself. With the ‘I’, what we have in view is that entity for which the issue is the Being of the entity that it is. With the ‘I’, care expresses itself, though proximally and for the most part in the ‘fugitive’ way in which the “I” talks when it concerns itself with something. The they-self keeps on saying “I” most loudly and most frequently because at bottom it is not authentically itself, and evades its authentic potentiality-for-Being. If the ontological constitution of the Self is not to be traced back either to an “I”-substance or to a ‘subject’, but if, on the contrary, the everyday fugitive way in which we keep on saying “I” must be understood in terms of our authentic potentiality-for-Being, then the proposition that the Self is the basis of care and constantly present-at-hand, is one that still does not follow. Self hood is to be discerned existentially only in one’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-one’s-Self – that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s Being as care. In terms of care the constancy of the Self, as the supposed persistence of the subjectum, gets clarified. But the PHENOMENON of this authentic potentiality-for-Being also opens our eyes for the constancy of the Self in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position. The constancy of the Self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling. Existentially, “Self-constancy” signifies nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. The ontological structure of such resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the Self’s Selfhood. BTMR §64 Care does not need to be founded in a Self. But existentiality, as constitutive for care, provides the ontological constitution of Dasein’s Self-constancy, to which there belongs, in accordance with the full structural content of care, its Being-fallen factically into non-Self-constancy. When fully conceived, the care-structure includes the PHENOMENON of Selfhood. This PHENOMENON is clarified by Interpreting the meaning of care; and it is as care that Dasein’s totality of Being has been defined. BTMR §64 What are we seeking ontologically with the meaning of care? What does “meaning” signify? In our investigation, we have encountered this PHENOMENON in connection with the analysis of understanding and interpretation. According to that analysis, meaning is that wherein the understandability [Verstehbarkeit] of something maintains itself – even [SZ:324] that of something which does not come into view explicitly and thematically. “Meaning” signifies the “upon-which” [das Woraufhin] of a primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as that which it is. Projecting discloses possibilities – that is to say, it discloses the sort of thing that makes possible. BTMR §65 That which was projected in the primordial existential projection of existence has revealed itself as anticipatory resoluteness. What makes this authentic Being-a-whole of Dasein possible with regard to the unity of its articulated structural whole? Anticipatory resoluteness, when taken formally and existentially, without our constantly designating its full structural content, is Being towards one’s ownmost, distinctive potentiality for-Being. This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself – in other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial PHENOMENON of the future as coming towards. If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein’s Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural [als zukünftiges], in the sense which we have now indicated, and which we have still to define more closely. By the term ‘futural’, we do not here have in view a “now” which has not yet become ‘actual’ and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming [Kunft] in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself. Anticipation makes Dasein authentically fatural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming towards itself – that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general. BTMR §65 Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of “having been” arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which “has been” (or better, which “is in the process of having been”) releases from itself the Present. This PHENOMENON has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as “temporality”. Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care. BTMR §65 The phenomenal content of this meaning, drawn from the state of Being of anticipatory resoluteness, fills in the signification of the term “temporality”. In our terminological use of this expression, we must hold ourselves aloof from all those significations of ‘future’, ‘past’, and ‘Present’ which thrust themselves upon us from the ordinary conception of time. This holds also for conceptions of a ‘time’ which is ‘subjective’ or ‘Objective’, ‘immanent’ or ‘transcendent’. Inasmuch as Dasein understands itself in a way which, proximally and for the most part, is inauthentic, we may suppose that ‘time’ as ordinarily understood does indeed represent a genuine PHENOMENON, but one which is derivative [ein abkünftiges]. It arises from inauthentic temporality, which has a source of its own. The conceptions of ‘future’, ‘past’ and ‘Present’ have first arisen in terms of the inauthentic way of understanding time. In terminologically delimiting the primordial and authentic phenomena which correspond to these, we have to struggle against the same difficulty which keeps all ontological terminology in its grip. When violences are done in this field of investigation, they are not arbitrary but have a necessity grounded in the facts. If, however, we are to point out without gaps in the argument, how inauthentic temporality has its source in temporality which is [SZ:327] primordial and authentic, the primordial PHENOMENON, which we have described only in a rough and ready fashion, must first be worked out correctly. BTMR §65 If resoluteness makes up the mode of authentic care, and if this itself is possible only through temporality, then the PHENOMENON at which we have arrived by taking a look at resoluteness, must present us with only a modality of temporality, by which, after all, care as such is made possible. Dasein’s totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-alreadybeing-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). When we first fixed upon this articulated structure, we suggested that with regard to this articulation the ontological question must be pursued still further back until the unity of the totality of this structural manifoldness has been laid bare. The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality. BTMR §65 In enumerating the ecstases, we have always mentioned the future first. We have done this to indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality. This is so, even though temporality does not first arise through a cumulative sequence of the ecstases, but in each case temporalizes itself in their equiprimordiality. But within this equiprimordiality, the modes of temporalizing are different. The difference lies in the fact that the nature of the temporalizing can be determined primarily in terms of the different ecstases. Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present. The primary PHENOMENON of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. The priority of the future will vary according to the ways in which the temporalizing of inauthentic temporality itself is modified, but it will still come to the fore even in the derivative kind of ‘time’. BTMR §65 The temptation to overlook the finitude of the primordial and authentic future and therefore the finitude of temporality, or alternatively, to hold ‘a priori’ that such finitude is impossible, arises from the way in which the ordinary understanding of time is constantly thrusting itself to the fore. If the ordinary understanding is right in knowing a time which is endless, and in knowing only this, it has not yet been demonstrated that it also understands this time and its ‘infinity’. What does it mean to say, ‘Time goes on’ or ‘Time keep passing away?’ What is the signification of ‘in time’ in general, and of the expressions ‘in the future’ and ‘out of the future’ in particular? In what sense is ‘time’ endless? Such points need to be cleared up, if the ordinary objections to the finitude of primordial time are not to remain groundless. But we can clear them up effectively only if we have obtained an appropriate way of formulating the question as regards finitude and in-finitude. Such a formulation, however, arises only if we view the primordial PHENOMENON of time understandingly. The problem is not one of how the ‘derived’ [“abgeleitete”] infinite time, ‘in which the ready-to-hand arises and passes away, becomes primordial finite temporality; the problem is rather that of how inauthentic temporality arises out of finite authentic temporality, and how inauthentic temporality, as inauthentic, temporalizes an in-finite time out of the finite. Only because primordial time is finite can the ‘derived’ time temporalize itself as infinite. In the order in which we get things into our grasp through the understanding, the finitude of time does not become fully visible until we have exhibited ‘endless time’ so that these may be contrasted. [SZ:331] BTMR §65 Not only does the PHENOMENON of temporality which we have laid bare demand a more widely-ranging confirmation of its constitutive power, but only through such confirmation will it itself come into view as regards the basic possibilities of temporalizing. The demonstration of the possibility of Dasein’s state of Being on the basis of temporality will be designated in brief – though only provisionally – as “the ‘temporal’ Interpretation”. BTMR §66 Our next task is to go beyond the temporal analysis of Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole and a general characterization of the temporality of care so that Dasein’s’ inauthenticity may be made visible in its own specific temporality. Temporality first showed itself in anticipatory resoluteness. This is the authentic mode of disclosedness, though disclosedness maintains itself for the most part in the inauthenticity with which the “they” fallingly interprets itself. In characterizing the temporality of disclosedness in general, we are led to the temporal understanding of that concernful Being-in-the-world which lies closest to us, and therefore of the average undifferentiatedness of Dasein from which the existential analytic first took its start. We have called Dasein’s average kind of Being, in which it maintains itself proximally and for the most part, “everydayness”. By repeating the earlier analysis, we must reveal everydayness in its temporal meaning, so that the problematic included in temporality may come to light, and the seemingly ‘obvious’ character of the preparatory analyses may completely disappear. Indeed, confirmation is to be found for temporality in all the essential structures of Dasein’s basic constitution. Yet this will not lead to running through our analyses again superficially and schematically in the same sequence of presentation. The course of our temporal analysis is directed otherwise: it is to make [SZ:332] plainer the interconnection of our earlier considerations and to do away with whatever is accidental and seemingly arbitrary. Beyond these necessities of method, however, the PHENOMENON itself gives us motives which compel us to articulate our analysis in a different way when we repeat it. BTMR §66 By Interpreting everydayness and historicality temporally we shall get a steady enough view of primordial time to expose it as the condition which makes the everyday experience of time both possible and necessary. As an entity for which its Being is an issue, Dasein utilizes itself primarily for itself [verwendet sich ... für sich selbst], whether it does so explicitly or not. Proximally and for the most part, care is circumspective concern. In utilizing itself for the sake of itself, Dasein ‘uses itself up’. In using itself up, Dasein uses itself – that is to say, its time. In using time, Dasein reckons with it. Time is first discovered in the concern which reckons [SZ:333] circumspectively, and this concern leads to the development of a time-reckoning. Reckoning with time is constitutive for Being-in-the-world. Concernful circumspective discovering, in reckoning with its time, permits those things which we have discovered, and which are ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, to be encountered in time. Thus entities within-the-world become accessible as ‘being in time’. We call the temporal attribute of entities within-the-world “within-time-ness” [die Innerzeitkeit]. The kind of ‘time’ which is first found ontically in within-time-ness, becomes the basis on which the ordinary traditional conception of time takes form. But time, as within-time-ness, arises from an essential kind of temporalizing of primordial temporality. The fact that this is its source, tells us that the time ‘in which’ what is present-at-hand arises and passes away, is a genuine PHENOMENON of time; it is not an externalization of a ‘qualitative time’ into space, as Bergson’s Interpretation of time – which is ontologically quite indefinite and inadequate – would have us believe. BTMR §66 If we are to bring back into our phenomenological purview the phenomena at which we have arrived in our preparatory analysis, an allusion to the stages through which we have passed must be sufficient. Our definition of “care” emerged from our analysis of the disclosedness which constitutes the Being of the ‘there’. The clarification of this PHENOMENON signified that we must give a provisional Interpretation of Being-in-the-world – the basic state of Dasein. Our investigation set out to describe Being-in-the-world, so that from the beginning we could secure an adequate phenomenological horizon as opposed to those inappropriate and mostly inexplicit ways in which the, nature of Dasein has been determined beforehand ontologically. Being-in-the-world was first characterized with regard to the PHENOMENON of the world. And in our explication this was done by characterizing ontico-ontologically what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand ‘in’ the environment, and then bringing within-the-world-ness into relief, so that by this the PHENOMENON of worldhood in general could be made visible. But understanding belongs essentially to disclosedness; and the structure of worldhood, significance, turned out to be bound up with that upon which understanding projects itself – namely that potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein exists. BTMR §67 The temporal Interpretation of everyday Dasein must start with those structures in which disclosedness constitutes itself: understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and discourse. The modes in which temporality temporalizes are to be laid bare with regard to these phenomena, and will give us a basis for defining the temporality of Being-in-the-world. This leads us back to the PHENOMENON of the world, and permits us to delimit the specifically temporal problematic of worldhood. This must be confirmed by characterizing that kind of Being-in-the-world which in an everyday manner is closest to us – circumspective, falling concern. The temporality of this concern makes it possible for circumspection to be modified into a perceiving which looks at things, and the theoretical cognition which is grounded in such perceiving. The temporality of Being-in-the-world thus emerges, and it turns out, at the same time, to be the foundation for that spatiality which is specific for Dasein. We must also show the temporal Constitution of deseverance and directionality. Taken as a whole, these analyses will reveal a possibility for the temporalizing of temporality in which Dasein’s inauthenticity is ontologically grounded; and they will lead us face to face with the question of how the temporal character of everydayness – the temporal meaning of the phrase ‘proximally and for the most part’, which we have been using constantly hitherto – is to be understood. By fixing upon this problem we shall have. made it plain that the clarification of this PHENOMENON which we have so far attained is insufficient, and we shall have shown the extent of this insufficiency. [SZ:335] BTMR §67 Understanding, as existing in the potentiality-for-Being, however it may have been projected, is primarily futural. But it would not temporalize itself if it were not temporal – that is, determined with equal primordiality by having been and by the Present. The way in which the latter ecstasis helps constitute inauthentic understanding, has already been made plain in a rough and ready fashion. Everyday concern understands itself in terms of that potentiality-for-Being which confronts it as coming from its possible success or failure with regard to whatever its object of concern may be. Corresponding to the inauthentic future (awaiting), there is a special way of Being-alongside the things with which one concerns oneself. This way of Being-alongside is the Present – the “waiting-towards”; this ecstatical mode reveals itself if we adduce for comparison this very same ecstasis, but in the mode of authentic temporality. To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a Present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the Situation. In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one’s closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That Present Which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the “moment of vision”. This term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness. The moment of vision is a PHENOMENON which in principle [SZ:338] can not be clarified in terms of the “now” [dem Jetzt]. The “now” is a temporal PHENOMENON which belongs to time as within-time-ness: the “now” ‘in which’ something arises, passes away, or is present-at-hand. ‘In the moment of vision’ nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us to encounter for the first time what can be ‘in a time’ as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. BTMR §68 The specific ecstatical unity which makes it existentially possible to be afraid, temporalizes itself primarily out of the kind of forgetting characterized above, which, as a mode of having been, modifies its Present and its future in their own temporalizing. The temporality of fear is a forgetting which awaits and makes present. The common-sense interpretation of fear, taking its orientation from what we encounter within-the-world, seeks in the first instance to designate the ‘oncoming evil’ as that in the face of which we fear, and, correspondingly, to define our relation to this evil as one of “expecting”. Anything else which belongs to the PHENOMENON remains a ‘feeling of pleasure or displeasure’. BTMR §68 How is the temporality of anxiety related to that of fear? We have called the PHENOMENON of anxiety a basic state-of-mind. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its ownmost Being-thrown and reveals the uncanniness of everyday familiar Being-in-the-world. Anxiety, like fear, has its character formally determined by something in the face of which one is anxious and something about which one is anxious. But our analysis has shown that these two phenomena coincide. This does not mean that their structural characters are melted away into one another, as if anxiety were anxious neither in the face of anything nor about anything. Their coinciding means rather that the entity by which both these structures are filled in [das sie erfüllende Seiende] is the same – namely Dasein. In particular, that in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite with which one can concern oneself; the threatening does not come from what is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather from the fact that neither of these ‘says’ anything any longer. Environmental entities no longer have any involvement. The world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance; and the world which is thus disclosed is one in which entities can be freed only in the character of having no involvement. Anxiety is anxious in the face of the “nothing” of the world; but this does not mean that in anxiety we experience something like the absence of what is present-at-hand within-the-world. The present-at-hand must be encountered in just such a way that it does not have any involvement whatsoever, but can show itself in an empty mercilessness. This implies, however, that our concernful awaiting finds nothing in terms of which it might be able to understand itself; it clutches at the “nothing” of the world; but when our understanding has come up against the world, it is brought to Being-in-the-world as such through anxiety. Being-in-the-world, however, is both what anxiety is anxious in-the-face-of and what it is anxious about. To be anxious in-the-face-of ... does not have the character of an expecting or of any kind of awaiting. That in-the-face-of which one has anxiety is indeed already ‘there’ – namely, Dasein itself. In that case, does not anxiety get constituted by a future? Certainly; but not by the inauthentic future of awaiting. [SZ:343] BTMR §68 [SZ:345] But may not the thesis of the temporality of moods hold only for those phenomena which we have selected for our analysis? How is a temporal meaning to be found in the pallid lack of mood which dominates the ‘grey everyday’ through and through? And how about the temporality of such moods and affects as hope, joy, enthusiasm, gaiety? Not only fear and anxiety, but other moods, are founded existentially upon one’s haying been; this becomes plain if we merely mention such phenomena as satiety, sadness, melancholy, and desperation. Of course these must be Interpreted on the broader basis of an existential analytic of Dasein that has been well worked out. But even a PHENOMENON like hope, which seems to be founded wholly upon the future, must be analysed in much the same way as fear. Hope has sometimes been characterized as the expectation of a bonum futurum, to distinguish it from fear, which relates itself to a malum futurum. But what is decisive for the structure of hope as a PHENOMENON, is not so much the ‘futural’ character of that to which it relates itself but rather the existential meaning of hoping itself. Even here its character as a mood lies primarily in hoping as hoping for something for oneself [Fürsich-erhoffen]. He who hopes takes himself with him into his hope, as it were, and brings himself up against what he hopes for. But this presupposes that he has somehow arrived at himself. To say that hope brings alleviation [erleichtert] from depressing misgivings, means merely that even hope, as a state-of-mind, is still related to our burdens, and related in the mode of Being-as-having been. Such a mood of elation – or better, one which elates – is ontologically possible only if Dasein has an ecstatico-temporal relation to the thrown ground of itself. BTMR §68 Only through the fact that Being-there is rooted in temporality can we get an insight into the existential possibility of that PHENOMENON which, at the beginning of our analytic of Dasein, we have designated as its basic state: Being-in-the-world. We had to assure ourselves in the beginning that the structural unity of this PHENOMENON cannot be torn apart. The question of the basis which makes the unity of this articulated structure possible, remained in the background. With the aim of protecting this PHENOMENON from those tendencies to split it up which were the most obvious and therefore the most baleful, we gave a rather thorough Interpretation of that everyday mode of Being-in-the-world which is closest to us – concernful Being alongside the ready-to-hand within-the-world. Now that care itself has been defined ontologically and traced back to temporality as its existential ground, concern can in turn be conceived explicitly in terms of either care or temporality. BTMR §69 Circumspective making-present, however, is a PHENOMENON with more than one kind of foundation. In the first instance, it always belongs to a full ecstatical unity of temporality. It is grounded in a retention of that context of equipment with which Dasein concerns itself in awaiting a possibility. That which has already been laid open in awaiting and retaining is brought closer by one’s deliberative making-present or envisaging. But if deliberation is to be able to operate in the scheme of the ‘if – then’, concern must already have ‘surveyed’ a context of involvements and have an understanding of it. That which is considered with an ‘if’ must already be understood as something or other. This does not require that the understanding of equipment be expressed in a predication. The schema ‘something as something’ has already been sketched out beforehand in the structure of one’s pre-predicative understanding. The as-structure is grounded ontologically in the temporality of understanding. But on the other hand, only to the extent that Dasein, in awaiting some possibility (here this means a “towards-which”), has come back to a “towards-this” (that is to say that it retains something ready-to-hand) – only to this extent can the making-present which belongs to this awaiting and retaining, start with what is thus retained, and bring it, in its character of having been assigned or referred to its “towards-which”, explicitly closer. The deliberation which brings it close must, in the schema of making present, be in conformity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is’ to be brought close. The involvement-character of the ready-to-hand does not first get discovered by deliberation, but only gets brought close by it in such a manner as to let that in which something has an involvement, be seen circumspectively as this very thing. [SZ:360] BTMR §69 The way the Present is rooted in the future and in having been, is the existential-temporal condition for the possibility that what has been projected in circumspective understanding can be brought closer in a making-present, and in such a way that the Present can thus conform itself to what is encountered within the horizon of awaiting and retaining; this means that it must interpret itself in the schema of the as-structure. We have thus answered the question we formulated earlier – the question of whether the’ as-structure has some existential-ontological connection with the PHENOMENON of projection. Like understanding and interpretation in general, the ‘as’ is grounded in the ecstatico-horizonal unity of temporality. In our fundamental analysis of Being, and of course in connection with the interpretation of the ‘is’ (which, as a copula, gives ‘expression’ to the addressing of something as something), we must again make the PHENOMENON of the “as” a theme and delimit the conception of this ‘schema’ existentially. BTMR §69 Though the expression ‘temporality’ does not signify what one understands by “time” when one talks about ‘space and time’, nevertheless spatiality seems to make up another basic attribute of Dasein corresponding to temporality. Thus with Dasein’s spatiality, existential-temporal analysis seems to come to a limit, so that this entity which we call “Dasein”, must be considered as ‘temporal’ ‘and also’ as spatial coordinately. Has our existential-temporal analysis of Dasein thus been brought to a halt by that PHENOMENON with which we have become acquainted as the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, and which we have pointed out as belonging to Being-in-the-world? BTMR §70 Only on the basis of its ecstatico-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space. The world is not present-at-hand in space; yet only within a world does space let itself be discovered. The ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, makes it intelligible that space is independent of time; but on the other hand, this same temporality also makes intelligible Dasein’s ‘dependence’ on space – a ‘dependence’ which manifests itself in the well-known PHENOMENON that both Dasein’s interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and through by ‘spatial representations’. This priority of the spatial in the Articulation of concepts and significations has its basis not in some specific power which space possesses, but in Dasein’s kind of Being. Temporality is essentially falling, and it loses itself in making present; not only does it understand itself circumspectively in terms of objects of concern which are ready-to-hand, but from those spatial relationships which making-present is constantly meeting in the ready-to-hand as having presence, it takes its clues for Articulating that which has been understood and can be interpreted in the understanding in general. BTMR §70 [SZ:370] What this expression signifies at bottom when delimited ontologically, remains obscure. At the beginning of our study, moreover, we could not see any way of even making the existential-ontological meaning of “everydayness” a problem. By now, however, some light has been cast on the meaning of Dasein’s Being as temporality. Can there still be any doubt as to the existential-temporal signification of the term “everydayness”? All the same, we are far removed from an ontological conception of this PHENOMENON. It even remains questionable whether the explication of temporality which we have so far carried through is sufficient to delimit the existential meaning of “everydayness”. BTMR §71 But after the Interpretation of temporality which we have given thus far, do we find ourselves in any more promising a situation with regard to delimiting the structure of everydayness existentially? Or does this bewildering PHENOMENON make the inadequacy of our explication of temporality all too patent? Have we not hitherto been constantly immobilizing Dasein in certain situations, while we have, ‘consistently’ with this, been disregarding the fact that in living unto its days Dasein stretches itself along ‘temporally’ in the sequence of those days? The “it’s all one and the same”, the accustomed, the ‘like yesterday, so today and tomorrow’, and the ‘for the most part’ – these are not to be grasped without recourse to this ‘temporal’ stretching-along of Dasein. BTMR §71 All our efforts in the existential analytic serve the one aim of finding’ a possibility of answering the question of the meaning of Being in general. To work out this question,1 we need to delimit that very PHENOMENON in which something like Being becomes accessible – the PHENOMENON of the understanding of Being. But this PHENOMENON is one that belongs to Dasein’s state of Being. Only after this entity has been Interpreted in a way which is sufficiently primordial, can we have a conception of the understanding of Being, which is included in its very state of Being; only on this basis can we formulate the question of the Being which is understood in this understanding, and the question of what such understanding ‘presupposes’. BTMR §72 If the question of historicality leads us back to these ‘sources’, then the locus of the problem of history has already been decided. This locus is not to be sought in historiology as the science of history. Even if the problem of ‘history’ is treated in accordance with a theory of science, not only aiming at the ‘epistemological’ clarification of the historiological way of grasping things (Simmel) or at the logic with which the concepts of historiological presentation are formed (Rickert), but doing so with an orientation towards ‘the side of the object’, then, as long as the question is formulated this way, history becomes in principle accessible only as the Object of a science. Thus the basic PHENOMENON of history, which is prior to any possible thematizing by historiology and underlies it, has been irretrievably put aside. How history can become a possible object for historiology is something that may be gathered only from the kind of Being which belongs to the historical – from historicality, and from the way it is rooted in temporality. BTMR §72 Factical Dasein takes time into its reckoning, without any existential understanding of temporality. Reckoning with time is an elemental kind of behaviour which must be clarified before we turn to the question of what it means to say that entities are ‘in time’. All Dasein’s behaviour is to be Interpreted in terms of its Being – that is, in terms of temporality. We must show how Dasein as temporality temporalizes a kind of behaviour which relates itself to time by taking it into its reckoning. Thus our previous characterization of temporality is not only quite incomplete in that we have not paid attention to all the dimensions of this PHENOMENON; it also is defective in principle because something like world-time, in the rigorous sense of the existential-temporal conception of the world, belongs to temporality itself. We must come to understand how this is possible and why it is necessary. Thus the ‘time’ which is familiar to us in the ordinary way – the time ‘in which’ entities occur – will be illuminated, and so will the within-time-ness of these entities. [SZ:405] BTMR §78 [SZ:424] The principal thesis of the ordinary way of interpreting time – namely, that time is ‘infinite’ – makes manifest most impressively the way in which world-time and accordingly temporality in general have been levelled off and covered up by such an interpretation. It is held that time presents itself proximally as an uninterrupted sequence of “nows”. Every “now”, moreover, is already either a “just-now” or a “forthwith”. If in characterizing time we stick primarily and exclusively to such a sequence, then in principle neither beginning nor end can be found in it. Every last “now”, as “now”, is always already a “forthwith” that is no longer [ein Sofort-nicht-mehr]; thus it is time in the sense of the “no-longer-now” – in the sense of the past. Every first “now” is a “just-now” that is not yet [ein Soeben-noch-nicht]; thus it is time in the sense of the “not-yetnow” – in the sense of the ‘future’. Hence time is endless ‘on both sides’. This thesis becomes possible only on the basis of an orientation towards a free-floating “in-itself” of a course of “nows” which is present-at-hand – an orientation in which the full PHENOMENON of the “now” has been covered up with regard to its datability, its worldhood, its spannedness, and its character of having a location of the same kind as Dasein’s, so that it has dwindled to an unrecognizable fragment. If one directs one’s glance towards Being-present-at-hand and not-Being-present-at-hand, and thus ‘thinks’ the sequence of “nows” through ‘to the end’, then an end can never be found. In this way of thinking time through to the end, one must always think more time; from this one infers that time is infinite. BTMR §81 Ecstatico-horizonal temporality temporalizes itself primarily in terms of the future. In the way time is ordinarily understood, however, the basic PHENOMENON of time is seen in the “now”, and indeed in that pure “now” which has been shorn in its full structure – that which they call the ‘Present’. One can gather from this that there is in principle no prospect that in terms of this kind of “now” one can clarify the ecstatico-horizonal PHENOMENON of the moment of vision which belongs to temporality, or even that one can derive it thus. Correspondingly, the future as ecstatically understood – the datable and significant ‘then’ – does not coincide with the ordinary conception of the ‘future’ in the sense of a pure “now” which has not yet come along but is only coming along. And the concept of the past in the sense of the pure “now” which has passed away, is just as far from coinciding with the ecstatical “having-been” – the datable and significant ‘on a former occasion’. The “now” is not pregnant with the “not-yet-now”, but the Present arises from the future in the primordial ecstatical unity of the temporalizing of temporality. BTMR §81