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Philosophie
Definition:philosophie
filosofia
philosophy
NT: Philosophy (Philosophie), 6, 13, 27, 38, 45, 50 n. 10, 208, 213, 229, 310, 436, et passim; "the business of philosophers," 4, 23, 220 (Kant); ‘the scandal of philosophy’, 203, 205 (Kant); of culture, 167; of history, 402 (Yorck); of language, 166; of life, 46, 48, 398, 403; of Nature, 432 n. 30 (Hegel); and the occurrence of being, 268fn; essence of philosophizing, 268fn. See also Hermeneutics; Ontology; Phenomenology [BTJS]
Before we conclude this general survey, it is worth-while calling attention to the fact that an authentic response to the appeal of Being [Sein] is precisely what Heidegger understands by “philosophy.” He develops the point in an address to the philosophers of France in 1955. [GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?]
The word appeared for the first time, the author claims, in Heraclitus, and there as an adjective rather than as a noun, describing the man who φιλεῖ τὸ σοφόν. φιλεῖ [philia] is interpreted to mean “respond,” and σοφόν [sophon] to mean ἔν-πάντα [hen-panta], sc. Being-as-λόγος [logos] (ἔν [hen]), insofar as it gathers together beings [Seienden] (πάντα [panta]) unto themselves and lets them be. During the era of sophistry, both appeal and response took different forms. Then the mystery of Being [Sein] in beings [Seienden] disclosed itself to the true thinker as threatened by the crass charlatanism of the sophists. In such a situation the authentic response was to try to salvage Being [Sein] from this fallen condition, hence to strive after Being [Sein] in beings [Seienden] beyond the level of every-dayness [Alltäglichkeit]. The fundamental drive was an ἔρως [eros]. To Aristotle, the Being-to-be-sought disclosed itself as the being-ness [Seiendheit] (ουσία) of beings [Seienden], and responding to it he posed the question: τί τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν? [ti to on he on; GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?, pp. 21-22 (Heraclitus), 23-24 (Sophists), 24-25 (Aristotle).]
Now Heidegger’s thesis is that what the occidental man traditionally has called “philosophy” is precisely that striving after the Being of beings [Sein des Seienden] that implies a passage beyond the sensible (physical) to the supra-sensible and begins with Plato. We can see, then, that for Western thought [Denken] philosophy, as we know it, is identified with metaphysics [Metaphysik], so that when Aristotle comes to define philosophy, the result is the classic definition of metaphysics [Metaphysik]: ἐπιστήμη τῶν πρώτων ἀρχών καὶ αἰτιών θεωρητική. Paraphrasing in Heidegger’s sense, we take this to mean: philosophy is that endowment in man (ἐπιστήμη [episteme]) by which he can catch and hold in view (θεωρητική [theoretike]) beings [Seienden] in that by which they are as beings [Seienden] (ἀρχών [archon], αἰτιών [aition]). No one will doubt, least of all Heidegger, that this conception of philosophy is a legitimate one. What makes it so, however, is not that it crystallizes once and for all the meaning of metaphysics [Metaphysik], but that it is an authentic response by Aristotle to the address of Being [Sein] to him. The author insists, however, that the historic formula is only one way of conceiving the correlation of address-response between Being [Sein] and man. It is helpless, for example, to express this correlation as it came-to-pass in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Why, then, absolutize it? Being [Sein] remains after Aristotle, as before, eminently “free” to address itself to man in some other type of mittence [Geschick], articulated in some other way. [GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?, pp. 25-27 (ἐπιστήμη. . .), 28-29 (freie Folge). The word “free” here has a polemical connotation, directed against the Hegelian notion according to which the mittences [Geschick] of Being [Sein] would be determined by a dialectical necessity. Cf. p. 31.] If we, for our part, remain docile to Being [Sein], which in the Aristotelian tradition imparted itself as metaphysics [Metaphysik], are we not after all – indeed in a very original way – still “philosophical”?
During the course of Heidegger’s development, he uses the word “philosophy” sometimes in the narrow sense, by which it is identified with metaphysics [Metaphysik], sometimes in the broad sense, as a response to Being [Sein]’s appeal. In the first case, it shares the same destiny as metaphysics [Metaphysik] and must be overcome. In the second, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished. [V.g. GA9, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, p. 48 (narrow sense); GA36-37, p. 24 (broad sense).] We make no attempt to retain the problematic beyond calling attention to it here. Let it suffice to say that in disengaging the sense of foundational thought [wesentliche Denken], we delineate Heidegger’s conception of philosophy as well. For there is only one philosophical question that interests him, the question about Being [Sein] and its truth [Wahrheit]. This is the “one star” – the only – that remains constant along the way. [“Auf einen Stern zugehen, nur dieses....’’; GA13:7, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens] It is, one might think [Denken], the evening star that must have caught his eye when, in the gathering darkness of Reichenau, he watched the light go out of the west. [RHPT:23-24]
filosofia
philosophy
NT: Philosophy (Philosophie), 6, 13, 27, 38, 45, 50 n. 10, 208, 213, 229, 310, 436, et passim; "the business of philosophers," 4, 23, 220 (Kant); ‘the scandal of philosophy’, 203, 205 (Kant); of culture, 167; of history, 402 (Yorck); of language, 166; of life, 46, 48, 398, 403; of Nature, 432 n. 30 (Hegel); and the occurrence of being, 268fn; essence of philosophizing, 268fn. See also Hermeneutics; Ontology; Phenomenology [BTJS]
Before we conclude this general survey, it is worth-while calling attention to the fact that an authentic response to the appeal of Being [Sein] is precisely what Heidegger understands by “philosophy.” He develops the point in an address to the philosophers of France in 1955. [GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?]
The word appeared for the first time, the author claims, in Heraclitus, and there as an adjective rather than as a noun, describing the man who φιλεῖ τὸ σοφόν. φιλεῖ [philia] is interpreted to mean “respond,” and σοφόν [sophon] to mean ἔν-πάντα [hen-panta], sc. Being-as-λόγος [logos] (ἔν [hen]), insofar as it gathers together beings [Seienden] (πάντα [panta]) unto themselves and lets them be. During the era of sophistry, both appeal and response took different forms. Then the mystery of Being [Sein] in beings [Seienden] disclosed itself to the true thinker as threatened by the crass charlatanism of the sophists. In such a situation the authentic response was to try to salvage Being [Sein] from this fallen condition, hence to strive after Being [Sein] in beings [Seienden] beyond the level of every-dayness [Alltäglichkeit]. The fundamental drive was an ἔρως [eros]. To Aristotle, the Being-to-be-sought disclosed itself as the being-ness [Seiendheit] (ουσία) of beings [Seienden], and responding to it he posed the question: τί τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν? [ti to on he on; GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?, pp. 21-22 (Heraclitus), 23-24 (Sophists), 24-25 (Aristotle).]
Now Heidegger’s thesis is that what the occidental man traditionally has called “philosophy” is precisely that striving after the Being of beings [Sein des Seienden] that implies a passage beyond the sensible (physical) to the supra-sensible and begins with Plato. We can see, then, that for Western thought [Denken] philosophy, as we know it, is identified with metaphysics [Metaphysik], so that when Aristotle comes to define philosophy, the result is the classic definition of metaphysics [Metaphysik]: ἐπιστήμη τῶν πρώτων ἀρχών καὶ αἰτιών θεωρητική. Paraphrasing in Heidegger’s sense, we take this to mean: philosophy is that endowment in man (ἐπιστήμη [episteme]) by which he can catch and hold in view (θεωρητική [theoretike]) beings [Seienden] in that by which they are as beings [Seienden] (ἀρχών [archon], αἰτιών [aition]). No one will doubt, least of all Heidegger, that this conception of philosophy is a legitimate one. What makes it so, however, is not that it crystallizes once and for all the meaning of metaphysics [Metaphysik], but that it is an authentic response by Aristotle to the address of Being [Sein] to him. The author insists, however, that the historic formula is only one way of conceiving the correlation of address-response between Being [Sein] and man. It is helpless, for example, to express this correlation as it came-to-pass in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Why, then, absolutize it? Being [Sein] remains after Aristotle, as before, eminently “free” to address itself to man in some other type of mittence [Geschick], articulated in some other way. [GA11, Wes ist das – die Philosophie?, pp. 25-27 (ἐπιστήμη. . .), 28-29 (freie Folge). The word “free” here has a polemical connotation, directed against the Hegelian notion according to which the mittences [Geschick] of Being [Sein] would be determined by a dialectical necessity. Cf. p. 31.] If we, for our part, remain docile to Being [Sein], which in the Aristotelian tradition imparted itself as metaphysics [Metaphysik], are we not after all – indeed in a very original way – still “philosophical”?
During the course of Heidegger’s development, he uses the word “philosophy” sometimes in the narrow sense, by which it is identified with metaphysics [Metaphysik], sometimes in the broad sense, as a response to Being [Sein]’s appeal. In the first case, it shares the same destiny as metaphysics [Metaphysik] and must be overcome. In the second, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished. [V.g. GA9, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, p. 48 (narrow sense); GA36-37, p. 24 (broad sense).] We make no attempt to retain the problematic beyond calling attention to it here. Let it suffice to say that in disengaging the sense of foundational thought [wesentliche Denken], we delineate Heidegger’s conception of philosophy as well. For there is only one philosophical question that interests him, the question about Being [Sein] and its truth [Wahrheit]. This is the “one star” – the only – that remains constant along the way. [“Auf einen Stern zugehen, nur dieses....’’; GA13:7, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens] It is, one might think [Denken], the evening star that must have caught his eye when, in the gathering darkness of Reichenau, he watched the light go out of the west. [RHPT:23-24]
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