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indicating

Definition:
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By INDICATING Dasein’s ontico-ontological priority in this provisional manner, we have grounded our demonstration that the question of Being is ontico-ontologically distinctive. But when we analysed the structure of this question as such (Section 2), we came up against a distinctive way in which this entity functions in the very formulation of that question. Dasein then revealed itself as that entity which must first be worked out in an ontologically adequate manner, if the inquiry is to become a transparent one. But now it has been shown that the ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what makes up fundamental ontology, so that Dasein functions as that entity which in principle is to be interrogated beforehand as to its Being. BTMR §4

But signs, in the first instance, are themselves items of equipment whose specific character as equipment consists in showing or INDICATING. We find such signs in signposts, boundary-stones, the ball for the mariner’s stormwarning, signals, banners, signs of mourning, and the like. INDICATING can be defined ‘as a ‘kind’ of referring. Referring is, if we take it as formally as possible, a relating. But relation does not function as a genus for ‘kinds’ or ‘species’, of references which may somehow become differentiated as sign, symbol, expression, or signification. A relation is something quite formal which may be read off directly by way of ‘formalization’ from any kind of context, whatever its subject-matter or its way of Being. BTMR §17

Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every ‘indication’ is a reference, but not every referring is an INDICATING. This implies at the same time that every ‘indication’ is a relation, but not every relation is an INDICATING. The formally general character of relation is thus brought to light. If we are to investigate such phenomena as references, signs, or even significations, nothing is to be gained by characterizing them as relations. Indeed we shall eventually have to show that ‘relations’ themselves, because of their formally general character, have their ontological source in a reference. BTMR §17

If the present analysis is to be confined to the interpretation of the sign as distinct from the phenomenon of reference, then even within this limitation we cannot properly investigate the full multiplicity of possible signs. Among signs there are symptoms [Anzeichen], warning signals, signs of things that have happened already [Rückzeichen], signs to mark something, signs by which things are recognized; these have different ways of INDICATING, regardless of what may be serving as such a sign. From such ‘signs’ we must distinguish traces, residues, commemorative monuments, documents, testimony, symbols, expressions, appearances, significations. These phenomena can easily be formalized because of their formal relational character; we find it especially tempting nowadays to take such a ‘relation’ as a clue for subjecting every entity to a kind of ‘Interpretation’ which always ‘fits’ because at bottom it says nothing, no more than the facile schema of content and form. [SZ:78] BTMR §17

As an example of a sign we have chosen one which we shall use again in a later analysis, though in another regard. Motor cars are sometimes fitted up with an adjustable red arrow, whose position indicates the direction the vehicle will take – at an intersection, for instance. The position of the arrow is controlled by the driver. This sign is an item of ‘equipment which is ready-to-hand for the driver in his concern with driving, and not for him alone: those who are not travelling with him – and they in particular – also make use of it, either by giving way on the proper side or by stopping. This sign is ready-to-hand within-the-world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for INDICATING, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment. It has the character of the “in-order-to”, its own definite serviceability; it is for INDICATING. This INDICATING which the sign performs can be taken as a kind of ‘referring’. But here we must notice that this ‘referring’ as INDICATING is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment. BTMR §17

Instead, ‘referring’ as INDICATING is grounded in the Being-structure of equipment, in serviceability for... . But an entity may have serviceability without thereby becoming a sign. As equipment, a ‘hammer’ too is constituted by a serviceability, but this does not make it a sign. INDICATING, as a ‘reference’, is a way in which the “towards-which” of a serviceability becomes ontically concrete; it determines an item of equipment as for this “towards-which” [und bestimmt ein Zeug zu diesem]. On the other hand, the kind of reference we get in ‘serviceability-for’, is an ontologico-categorial attribute of equipment as equipment. That the “towards-which” of serviceability should acquire its concreteness in INDICATING, is an accident of its equipment-constitution as such. In this example of a sign, the difference between the reference of serviceability and the reference of INDICATING becomes visible in a rough and ready fashion. These are so far from coinciding that only when they are united does the concreteness of a definite kind of equipment become possible. Now it is certain that INDICATING differs in principle from reference as a constitutive state of equipment; it is just as incontestable that the sign in its turn is related in a peculiar and even distinctive way to the kind of Being which belongs to whatever equipmental totality may be ready-to-hand in the environment, and to its worldly character. In our concernful [SZ:79] dealings, equipment for INDICATING [Zeig-zeug] gets used in a very special way. But simply to establish this Fact is ontologically insufficient. The basis and the meaning of this special status must be clarified. BTMR §17

What do we mean when we say that a sign “indicates”? We can answer this only by determining what kind of dealing is appropriate with equipment for INDICATING. And we must do this in such a way that the readiness-to-hand of that equipment can be genuinely grasped. What is the appropriate way of having-to-do with signs? Going back to our example of the arrow, we must say that the kind of behaving (Being) which corresponds to the sign we encounter, is either to ‘give way’ or to ‘stand still’ vis-à-vis the car with the arrow. Giving way, as taking a direction, belongs essentially to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Dasein is always somehow directed [ausgerichtet] and on its way; standing and waiting are only limiting cases of this directional ‘on-its-way’. The sign addresses itself to a Being-in-the-world which is specifically ‘spatial’. The sign is not authentically ‘grasped’ [“erfasst”] if we just stare at it and identify it as an indicator-Thing which occurs. Even if we turn our glance in the direction which the arrow indicates, and look at something present-at-hand in the region indicated, even then the sign is not authentically encountered. Such a sign addresses itself to the circumspection of our concernful dealings, and it does so in such a way that the circumspection which goes along with it, following where it points, brings into an explicit ‘survey’ whatever aroundness the environment may have at the time. This circumspective survey does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our environment. There is also another way in which we can experience equipment: we may encounter the arrow simply as equipment which belongs to the car. We can do this without discovering what character it specifically has as equipment: what the arrow is to indicate and how it is to do so, may remain completely undetermined; yet what we are encountering is not a mere Thing. The experiencing of a Thing requires a definiteness of its own [ihre eigene Bestimmtheit], and must be contrasted with coming across a manifold of equipment, which may often be quite indefinite, even when one comes across it as especially close. BTMR §17

Signs of the kind we have described let what is ready-to-hand be encountered; more precisely, they let some context of it become accessible in such a way that our concernful dealings take on an orientation and hold it secure. A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of INDICATING; it is rather an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself. In a symptom or a warningsignal, ‘what is coming’ ‘indicates itself’, but not in the sense of something [SZ:80] merely occurring, which comes as an addition to what is already presentat-hand; ‘what is coming’ is the sort of thing which we are ready for, or which we ‘weren’t ready for’ if we have been attending to something else. In signs of something that has happened already, what has come to pass and run its course becomes circumspectively accessible. A sign to mark something indicates what one is ‘at’ at any time. Signs always indicate primarily ‘wherein’ one lives, where one’s concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something. BTMR §17

In establishing a sign, however, one does not necessarily have to produce equipment which is not yet ready-to-hand at all. Signs also arise when one takes as a sign [Zum-Zeichen-nehmen] something that is ready-to-hand already. In this mode, signs “get established” in a sense which is even more primordial. In INDICATING, a ready-to-hand equipment totality, and even the environment in general, can be provided with an availability which is circumspectively oriented; and not only this: establishing a sign can, above all, reveal. What gets taken as a sign becomes accessible only through its readiness-to-hand. If, for instance, the south wind ‘is accepted’ [“gilt”] by the farmer as a sign of rain, then this ‘acceptance’ [“Geltung”] – or the ‘value’ with which the entity is ‘invested’ – is not a sort of bonus over and above what is already present-at-hand in itself – viz, the flow of air in a definite geographical direction. The south wind may be meteorologically accessible as something which just occurs; but it is never present-at-hand proximally in such a way as this, only occasionally taking over the function of a warning signal. On the contrary, only by the circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming, is the south wind discovered in its Being. [SZ:81] BTMR §17

[SZ:82] The foregoing Interpretation of the sign should merely provide phenomenal support for our characterization of references or assignments. The relation between sign and reference is threefold. 1. INDICATING, as a way whereby the “towards-which” of a serviceability can become concrete, is founded upon the equipment-structure as such, upon the “in-order-to” (assignment). 2. The INDICATING which the sign does is an equipmental character of something ready-to-hand, and as such it belongs to a totality of equipment, to a context of assignments or references. 3. The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment, but in its readiness-to-hand the environment becomes in each case explicitly accessible for circumspection. A sign is something onticalty ready-to-hand, which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of [was ... anzeigt] the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of worldhood. Here is rooted the special status of the sign as something ready-to-hand in that environment with which we’ concern ourselves circumspectively. Thus the reference or the assignment itself cannot be conceived as a sign if it is to serve ontologically as the foundation upon which signs are based. Reference is not an ontical characteristic of something ready-to-hand, when it is rather that by which readiness-to-hand itself is constituted. [SZ:83] BTMR §17

We have indicated that the state which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand as equipment is one of reference or assignment. How can entities with this kind of Being be freed by the world with regard to their Being? Why are these the first entities to be encountered? As definite, kinds of references we have mentioned serviceability-for-, detrimentality [Abträglichkeit], usability, and the like. The “towards-which” [das Wozu] of a serviceability and the “for-which” [das Wofür] of a usability prescribed the ways in which such a reference or assignment can become concrete. But the ‘INDICATING’ of the sign and the ‘hammering’ of the hammer are not properties of entities. Indeed, they are not properties at all, if the ontological structure designated by the term ‘property’ is that of some definite character which it is possible for Things to possess [einer möglichen Bestimmtheit von Dingen]. Anything ready-to-hand is, at the worst, appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others; and its ‘properties’ are, as it were, still bound up in these ways in which it is appropriate or inappropriate, just as presence-at-hand, as a possible kind of Being for something ready-to-hand, is bound up in readiness-to-hand. Serviceability too, however, as a constitutive state of equipment (and serviceability is a reference), is not an appropriateness of some entity; it is rather the condition (so far as Being is in question) which makes it possible for the character of such an entity to be defined by its appropriatenesses. But what, then, is “reference” or “assignment” to mean? To say that the Being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assignment or reference means that it has in itself the character of having been assigned or referred [Verwiesenheit]. An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and referred as that entity which it is. With any such entity there is an involvement which it has in something. The character of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an involvement. If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. The relationship of the “with ... in ...” shall be indicated by the term “assignment” or “reference” . BTMR §18

In this context of an existential analytic of factical Dasein, the question arises whether giving the “I” in the way we have mentioned discloses Dasein in its everydayness, if it discloses Dasein at all. Is it then obvious a priori that access to Dasein must be gained only by mere reflective awareness of the “I” of actions? What if this kind of ‘giving-itself’ on the part of Dasein should lead our existential analytic astray and do so, indeed, in a manner grounded in the Being of Dasein itself? Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says “I am this entity”, and in the long run says this loudest when it is ‘not’ this entity. Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein is not itself? What if the aforementioned approach, starting with the givenness of the “I” to Dasein itself, and with a rather patent selfinterpretation of Dasein, should lead the existential analytic, as it were, into a pitfall? If that which is accessible by mere “giving” can be determined, there is presumably an ontological horizon for determining it; but what if this horizon should remain in principle undetermined? It may well be that it is always ontically correct to say of this entity that ‘I’ am it. Yet the ontological analytic which makes use of such assertions must make certain reservations about them in principle. The word ‘I’ is to be [SZ:116] understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator, INDICATING something which may perhaps reveal itself as its ‘opposite’ in some particular phenomenal context of Being. In that case, the ‘not-I’ is by no means tantamount to an entity which essentially lacks ‘I-hood’ [“Ichheit”], but is rather a definite kind of Being which the ‘I’ itself possesses, such as having lost itself [Selbstverlorenheit]. BTMR §25

But now that falling has been exhibited, have we not set forth a phenomenon which speaks directly against the definition we have used in INDICATING the formal idea of existence? Can Dasein be conceived as an entity for which, in its Being, its potentiality-for-Being is an issue, if this entity, in its very everydayness, has lost itself, and, in falling, ‘lives’ away from itself? But falling into the world would be phenomenal ‘evidence’ against the existentiality of Dasein only if Dasein were regarded as an isolated “I” or subject, as a self-point from which it moves away. In that case, the world would be an Object. Falling into the world would then have to be re-Interpreted ontologically as Being-present-at-hand in the manner of an entity within-the-world. If, however, we keep in mind that Dasein’s Being is in the state of Being-in-the-world, as we have already pointed out, then it becomes manifest that falling, as a kind of Being of this Being-in, affords us rather the most elemental evidence for Dasein’s existentiality. In failing, nothing other than our potentiality-for-Being-in world is the issue, even if in the mode of inauthenticity. Dasein can fall only because Being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it. On the other hand, authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon. BTMR §38

What in general does one have in view when one uses the term ‘agreement’? The agreement of something with something has the formal character of a relation of something to something. Every agreement, and therefore ‘truth’ as well, is a relation. But not every relation is an agreement. A sign points at what is indicated. Such INDICATING is a relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what is indicated. Yet manifestly not every agreement is a convenientia of the kind that is fixed upon in the definition of “truth”. The number “6” agrees with “16 minus 10”. These numbers agree; they are equal with regard to the question of “how much?” Equality is one way of agreeing. Its structure is such that something like a ‘with-regard-to’ belongs to it. In the adaequatio something gets related; what is that with regard to which it agrees? In clarifying the ‘truth-relation’ we must notice also what is peculiar to the terms of this relation. With regard to what do intellectus and res agree? In their kind of Being and their essential content do they give us anything at all with [SZ:216] regard to which they can agree? If it is impossible for intellectus and res to be equal because they are not of the same species, are they then perhaps similar? But knowledge is still supposed to ‘give’ the thing just as it is. This ‘agreement’ has the Relational character of the ‘just as’ [“So – Wie”]. In what way is this relation possible ‘as a relation between intellectus and res? From these questions it becomes plain that to clarify the structure of truth it is not enough simply to presuppose this relational totality, but we must go back and inquire into, the context of Being which provides the support for this totality as such. BTMR §44

It cannot be denied that the call is often experienced as having such a tendency. It remains questionable only whether this experience of the call permits it to ‘proclaim’ itself fully. In the common-sense interpretation, one may suppose that one is sticking to the ‘facts’; but in the end, by its very common sense, this interpretation has restricted the call’s disclosive range. As little as the ‘good’ conscience lets itself be put in the service of a ‘Pharisaism’, just as little may the function of the ‘bad’ conscience be reduced to INDICATING indebtednesses which are present-at-hand or thrusting aside those which are possible. This would be as if Dasein were a ‘household’ whose indebtednesses simply need to be balanced off in an orderly manner so that the Self may stand ‘by’ as a disinterested spectator while these Experiences run their course. BTMR §59

In INDICATING the formal aspects of the idea of existence we have been guided by the understanding-of-Being which lies in Dasein itself. Without any ontological transparency, it has nevertheless been revealed that in every case I am myself the entity which we call Dasein, and that I am so as a potentiality-for-Being for which to be this entity is an issue. Dasein understands itself as Being-in-the-world, even if it does so without adequate ontological definiteness. Being thus, it encounters entities which have the kind of Being of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. No matter how far removed from an ontological concept the distinction between existence and Reality may be, no matter even if Dasein proximally understands existence as Reality, Dasein is not just present-at-hand but has already understood itself, however mythical or magical the interpretation which it gives may be. For otherwise, Dasein would never ‘live’ in a myth and would not be concerned with magic in ritual and cult. The idea of existence which we have posited gives us an outline of the formal structure of the understanding of Dasein and does so in a way which is not binding from an existentiell point of view. BTMR §63

After this first characterization of the course of the ontological exposition of bistoricality in terms of temporality, do we still need explicit assurance that the following investigation does not rest upon a belief that the problem of history is to be solved by a coup de main? The poverty of the ‘categorial’ means at our disposal, and the unsureness of the primary ontological horizons, become the more obtrusive, the more the problem of history is traced to its primordial roots. In the following study, we shall content ourselves with INDICATING the ontological locus of the problem of historicality. The researches of Dilthey were, for their part, pioneering work; but today’s generation has not as yet made them its own. In the following analysis the issue is solely one of furthering their adoption. BTMR §72

Submitted on 07.03.2022 14:19
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