Begriff

concept [ETEM] concept [BTJS] NT: Concept (Begriff), 2-6, 4fn, 7fn, 10, 16, 21, 37-39, 47, 51, 63-64, 150-152, 156-157, 201fn, 232, 311-316, 360-364, et passim; fundamental, 3-4, 9-10, 22, 39, 362, 397; formation of, 10, 39, 150-152, 157, 219, 312, 349, 375; of time, 17-18, 26, 235, 304, 326, 333, 338, 349, 404-406, 418, 420, 426-428, 432. See also Being, concept of; Category; Existentials; Foreconception [BTJS]

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1. ‘Der Begriff ist sonach die sich begreifende Begriffenheit des Selbst, als welche das Selbst eigentlich ist, wie es sein kann, das heisst frei.’ The noun ‘Begriffenheit’ is of course derived from ‘begriffen’, the past participle of ‘begreifen’ (‘to conceive’ or ‘to grasp’). ‘Begriffen’, however, may also be used when we would say that someone is ‘in the process of’ doing something. This would suggest the alternative translation: ‘The concept is accordingly a self-conceiving activity of the Self – an activity of such a nature that when the Self performs it, it is authentically as it can be – namely, free.’ [BTMR:484]

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Traduzimos agora por “reduzir a conceitos” a expressão unter Begriffe bringen, que há pouco traduzimos mais literalmente por “colocar sob [unter] conceitos”. No entanto, é necessário assinalar que, na tradução portuguesa da Critica da Razão Pura, a diferença sublinhada por Kant – e assinalada por Heidegger – entre “reduzir a conceitos” (unter Begriffe bringen) e “reportar a conceitos” (auf Begriffe bringen) não é respeitada e é tomada como sinônima. Daí que, nesta tradução, se possa ler o seguinte: «Diversas representações são reduzidas, analiticamente, a um conceito [werden... unter einen Begriff gebracht] (questão de que trata a lógica geral). Mas a lógica transcendental ensina-nos a reduzir a conceitos [auf Begriffe zu bringen], não as representações, mas a síntese pura das representações». Nesta última frase, o respeito pela diferença estabelecida implicaria traduzir a última frase por «ensina-nos a reportar a conceitos». [Casanova; GA3MAC:121]

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Every intuition [Anschauung], he [Kant] says, is a representatio singularis. The concept, however, is also a representatio, a “self-presenting,” [Sichvergegenwärtigen] but, in this case, a representatio per notas communes. The concept is distinguished from intuition by the fact that, as a presenting [Vergegenwärtigung], it presents something that has the character of generality [Charakter des Allgemeinen]. It is a “general representation.” [allgemeine Vorstellung] To better understand this, Kant quite clearly says, in the introduction to the Logic that in every cognition [Erkenntnis], matter [Materie] is to be distinguished from form, “the manner in which we cognize the object.” [die Art, wie wir den Gegenstand erkennen] A savage sees a house and, unlike us, does not know its for-what; he has a different “concept” of the house than we who know our way around in it. Indeed, he sees the same being, but the knowledge of the use escapes him; he does not understand what he should do with it. He forms no concept of house. We know what it is for, and thus we represent something general to ourselves. We who know the use that one could make of it have the concept of house. The concept goes beyond answering the question of what the object is. [GA18:10-11]