Welt weltet

mundo munda Let me illustrate this with regard to how Heidegger’s use of tautological writing repeatedly performs the displacement of propositional statement from the primary locus of truth. Through a series of “tautological” phrases—the world worlds, time times, space spaces, the event eventuates, “language languages” (the untranslatable Die Sprache spricht), and so on—Heidegger critically undermines the boundary between the grammatical categories of nouns and verbs. The fraying of this limen becomes pivotal to Heidegger’s idiom, precisely because it exposes and counters the hypostatizing of being into beings. Phrases like “the world worlds” and “time times” indicate that temporalization is never properly thinkable as “time,” because it does not come to stand as an entity whose existence is ostensibly signified by the sign “time.” Similarly, there is only “worlding,” or better put, “it worlds”—es weltet—which comes to be hypostatized into a construct “world,” which becomes graspable as an “it,” as something about which we can predicate, say, that the world is beautiful, or ugly, or cruel. Seen from the perspective of statements (Aussage), what sentences like “the world worlds” say is indeed tautological, merely stating and restating the world through worlding, time through timing, space through spacing, and so forth. Yet this is precisely the point, as in this manner Heidegger draws attention to the underside of statements and assertions. For what he wants to induce through this fashion of writing is for thought to no longer comprehend these phrases from metaphysical and thus logical standpoints but instead to expand the poietic resonance of the phrase, to heed what the phrase bespeaks but what cannot become accessible in a statement. More precisely, he wants to attend to what is sayable without being statable (sagen without the possibility of aussagen). Thus, phrases like “the world worlds” or “the event eventuates” mark this critical fold between saying and stating. This fold cannot be “stated,” that is, defined or expressed in a proposition, which inescapably erases it, but must instead be thought by experiencing the resonance of such phrases. Thinking happens in this resonance, above and beyond propositional language. [ZiarekLH]

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Dans la version de Fribourg (OOA1935), on trouve »Welt waltet« (le monde règne) alors que dans la conférence de 1936 (« L’origine de l’œuvre d’art» [conférences de 1936 à Francfort sur le Main, GA5]) il y a »Welt weltet« (le monde monde). Dans le cours du semestre d’hiver 1929-1930, les Concepts fondamentaux de la métaphysique, Monde-finitude-solitude [GA29-30], Paris, Gallimard, 1992, on trouve à plusieurs reprises l’expression Walten der Welt (§ 74, p. 502 sq.). Mais dans De l’essence du fondement (1929) Heidegger réunissait déjà les deux expressions et écrivait explicitement : »Welt ist nie, sondern weltet« (Le monde n’est jamais, mais monde) (Questions I, op. cit., p. 142 [GA9]). Et depuis la parution en 1987 du cours du semestre d’hiver 1919 (Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56-57, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1987) nous savons que l’expression »es weltet« était déjà employé par Heidegger à cette époque (op. cit., p. 73). [Dastur, Le concept de monde chez Heidegger après Être et temps, ALTER n. 6, 1998]

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