BTMR

HEIDEGGER, Martin. Being and Time. Tr. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. TRANSLATORS’ PREFACE AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE SEVENTH GERMAN EDITION INTRODUCTION: EXPOSITION OF THE QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING I: THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING 1. The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being 2. The Formal Structure of the Question of Being 3. The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being 4. The Ontical Priority of the Question of Being 5. The Ontological Analytic of Dasein as Laying Bare the Horizon for an Interpretation of the Meaning of Being in General 6. The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology 7. The Phenomenological Method of Investigation A. The Concept of Phenomenon B. The Concept of the L o g o s C. The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology 8. Design of the Treatise PART ONE: THE INTERPRETATION OF DASEIN IN TERMS OF TEMPORALITY, AND THE EXPLICATION OF TIME AS THE TRANSCENDENTAL HORIZON FOR THE QUESTION OF BEING DIVISION ONE: PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DASEIN I: EXPOSITION OF THE TASK OF A PREPARATORY ANALYSIS OF DASEIN 9. The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein 10. How the Analytic of Dasein is to be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology 11. The Existential Analytic and the Interpretation of Primitive Dasein. The Difficulties of Achieving a ‘Natural Conception of the World’ II: BEING-IN-THE-WORLD IN GENERAL AS THE BASIC STATE OF DASEIN 12. A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World, in terms of an Orientation towards Being-in as such 13. A Founded Mode in which Being-in is Exemplified. Knowing the World. III: THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD 14. The Idea of the Worldhood of the World in General A. Analysis of Environmentality and Worldhood in General 15. The Being of the Entities Encountered in the Environment 16. How the Worldly Character of the Environment Announces itself in Entities Within-the-world 17. Reference and Signs 18. Involvement and Significance; the Worldhood of the World B. A Contrast between our Analysis of Worldhood and Descartes’ Interpretation of the World 19. The Definition of the ‘World’ as r e s e x t e n s a. 20. Foundations of the Ontological Definition of the ‘World’ 21. Hermeneutical Discussion of the Cartesian Ontology of the ‘World’ C. The Aroundness of the Environment and Dasein’s Spatiality 22. The Spatiality of the Ready-to-hand Within-the-world 23. The Spatiality of Being-in-the-world 24. Space and Dasein’s Spatiality IV: BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS BEING-WITH AND BEING-ONE’S-SELF. THE “THEY” 25. An Approach to the Existential Question of the “Who” of Dasein 26. The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with 27. Everyday Being-one’s-Self and the “They” V: BEING-IN AS SUCH 28. The Task of a Thematic Analysis of Being-in A. The Existential Constitution of the “There” 29. Being there as State-of-mind 30. Fear as a Mode of Stale-of-Mind 31. Being-there as Understanding 32. Understanding and Interpretation 33. Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation 34. Being-there and Discourse. Language B. The Everyday Being of the “There”, and the Falling of Dasein 35. Idle Talk 36. Curiosity 37. Ambiguity 38. Falling and Thrownness VI: CARE AS THE BEING OF DASEIN 39. The Question of the Primordial Totality of Dasein’s Structural Whole 40. The Basic State-of-mind of Anxiety as a Distinctive Way in which Dasein is Disclosed 41. Dasein’s Being as Care 42. Confirmation of the Existential Interpretation of Dasein as Care in terms of Dasein’s Pre-ontological Way of Interpreting Itself 43. Dasein, Worldhood, and Reality (a) Reality as a problem of Being, and whether the ‘External World’ can be Proved (b) Reality as an Ontological Problem (c) Reality and Care 44. Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth (a) The Traditional Conception of Truth, and its Ontological Foundations (b) The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the Traditional Conception of Truth (c) The Kind of Being which Truth Possesses, and the Presupposition of Truth DIVISION TWO: DASEIN AND TEMPORALITY I: DASEIN’S POSSIBILITY OF BEING-A-WHOLE, AND BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH 46. The Seeming Impossibility of Getting Dasein’s Being-a-whole into our Grasp Ontologically and Determining its Character 47. The Possibility of Experiencing the Death of Others, and the Possibility of Getting a Whole Dasein into our Grasp 48. That which is Still Outstanding; the End; Totality 49. How the Existential Analysis of Death is Distinguished from Other Possible Interpretations of this Phenomenon 50. Preliminary Sketch of the Existential-ontological Structure of Death 51. Being-towards-death and the Everydayness of Dasein 52. Everyday Being-towards-the-end, and the Full Existential Conception of Death 53. Existential Projection of an Authentic Being-towards-death II: DASEIN’S ATTESTATION OF AN AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING, AND RESOLUTENESS 54. The Problem of How an Authentic Existentiell Possibility is Attested. 55. The Existential-ontological Foundations of Conscience 56. The Character of Conscience as a Call 57. Conscience as the Call of Care 58. Understanding the Appeal, and Guilt 59. The Existential Interpretation of the Conscience, and the Way Conscience is Ordinarily Interpreted 60. The Existential Structure of the Authentic Potentiality-for-Being which is Attested in the Conscience III: DASEIN’S AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY-FOR-BEING-A-WHOLE, AND TEMPORALITY AS THE ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF CARE 61. A Preliminary Sketch of the Methodological Step from the Definition of Dasein’s Authentic Being-a-whole to the Laying-bare of Temporality as a Phenomenon 62. Anticipatory Resoluteness as the Way in which Dasein’s Potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has Existentiell Authenticity 63. The Hermeneutical Situation at which we have Arrived for Interpreting the Meaning of the Being of Care; and the Methodological Character of the Existential Analytic in General 64. Care and Selfhood 65. Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care 66. Dasein’s Temporality and the Tasks Arising Therefrom of Repeating the Existential Analysis in a more Primordial Manner IV: TEMPORALITY AND EVERYDAYNESS 67. The Basic Content of Dasein’s Existential Constitution, and a Preliminary Sketch of the Temporal Interpretation of it 68. The Temporality of Disclosedness in General (a) The Temporality of Understanding (b) The Temporality of State-of-mind (c) The Temporality of Falling (d) The Temporality of Discourse 69. The Temporality of Being-in-the-world and the Problem of the Transcendence of the World (a) The Temporality of Circumspective Concern (b) The Temporal Meaning of the Way in which Circumspective Concern becomes Modified into the Theoretical Discovery of the Present-at-hand Within-the-world (c) The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World 70. The Temporality of the Spatiality that is Characteristic of Dasein 71. The Temporal Meaning of Dasein’s Everydayness V: TEMPORALITY AND HISTORICALITY 72. Existential-ontological Exposition of the Problem of History 73. The Ordinary Understanding of History, and Dasein’s Historizing 74. The Basic Constitution of Historicality 75. Dasein’s Historicality, and World-history 76. The Existential Source of Historiology in Dasein’s Historicality. 77. The Connection of the Foregoing Exposition of the Problem of Historicality with the Researches of Wilhelm Dilthey and the Ideas of Count Yorck VI: TEMPORALITY AND WITHIN-TIME-NESS AS THE SOURCE OF THE ORDINARY CONCEPTION OF TIME 78. The Incompleteness of the Foregoing Temporal Analysis of Dasein 79. Dasein’s Temporality, and our Concern with Time 80. The Time with which we Concern Ourselves, and Within-time-ness 81. Within-time-ness and the Genesis of the Ordinary Conception of Time 82. A Comparison of the Existential-ontological Connection of Temporality, Dasein, and World-time, with Hegel’s Way of Taking the Relation between Time and Spirit (a) Hegel’s Conception of Time (b) Hegel’s Interpretation of the Connection between Time and Spirit 83. The Existential-temporal Analytic of Dasein, and the Question of Fundamental Ontology as to the Meaning of Being in General